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A b str a c t
Taking my cue from Toni Morrison’s Playing in the Dark, I read three contemporary Black
writers in the Americas—George Lamming, Barbados; Michelle Cliff, Jamaica; and Jess Mowry,
United States—for signs o f a response that was ignored when prevailing conceptions of freedom
were formulated in early America. Suggesting that the vision embodied in the name of one
plantation. Sans Souci, characterized attempts to deal with the anxieties of a slaveholding free
republic, I argue that these writers provide an alternative vision by attempting to reconcile the
practices of freedom and care, and I engage their vision in dialogue with several theoretical
discourses that currently inform the practice o f freedom. In In the Castle o f My Skin and Natives o f

My Person, le m m in g moves toward a definition o f freedom that encourages responsiveness and
allows political agency by criticizing classical notions o f independence and promoting notions of
intersubjective and dynamic autonomy. C liffs Abeng and No Telephone to Heaven and Mowry’s

Way Past Cool similarly critique notions of freedom associated with theories o f moral development.
Situating their work on a continuum with slave narratives that negotiated ideologies of domesticity, I
argue that they contest assumptions that an ethic o f care is naturally aligned with confinement and
the private sphere. Care can function like an abeng, a tool that can be used for oppression or
liberation. Cliff and Mowry pursue freedom and justice through a practice that I formulate as
warrior-caregivmg. Cliff retrieves this revolutionary practice for the relatively privileged from the
model of Maroon warriors; Mowry encourages it among the least privileged by combining the
models o f the Little Rascals and the Black Panthers in an adolescent gang I describe,
nonpejoratively, as "Buckwheat Panthers." I conclude that care must complement the practice of
freedom for either homemaking or travelling to move beyond the master-slave dynamic. I combine
Lugones’s concept of "world"-travelling with Lamming’s image of mobile homes to identify an
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alternative mode of habitation and travel and then with the notion o f privilege-cognizant scripts to
describe a practice that could replace the typical tourist’s mode o f carefree travel.
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I n tro d u ctio n
Pr a c t ic in g F reed o m W ith C a r e :
T h e D ev elo pm en t o f W arrior -C a reg iv in g
In the summer of 1996 Escape magazine, Air Jamaica, and SuperCIubs’ Breezes Runaway
Bay sponsored a contest for a free trip to Jamaica. Their promotion promised that the winner and a
companion could ’go to Jamaica for a song,” ’be chillin’ in August on slow-mo Jamaican time,*
and ’realize an immediate reduction in Di-Gel consumption.’ I was tired and easily seduced. I
began to picture myself entering and winning their sweepstakes. But the wording o f one enticement
made me pause: "You’ve been slaving all year, ’ they told me; "You need out, and we’ve got the
escape hatch." Slaving?
The idea that tourists who travel from the United States to Jamaica might imagine
themselves in the discourse o f slavery is unsettling. For, as one character in Michelle C liffs No

Telephone to Heaven observes, the tourist hotels in the novel with names like Paradise Plantation
and Sans Souci, at places with names like Runaway Bay, indicate that ’we have taken the master’s
past as our ow n” (127). The "we" to whom the character refers are the Jamaicans themselves, but
the criticism applies equally well, I think, to those o f us who visit, or dream of escaping to, these
places. If we had a sense of irony or history, that character in C liffs novel suggests, we might call
such hideaways for the rich The Triangle Trade; or, if we were really imaginative, The Middle
Passage (123). I remember that Runaway Bay was the site of a slave plantation owned and lost by
the ancestors o f C liffs protagonist, Clare Savage. As developers prepare to construct tourist homes
in the image o f plantation homes, Clare notices the traces of slave cabins etched in the earth (Abeng
23-27). I wonder now about the origins of that name, Runaway Bay. Whose escape does it
memorialize? The captives who ran from the slave ships when they docked? Or their would-be
masters, the men who dreamed o f escaping a life o f limitation and hard work in Europe for a life o f

1
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opportunity and leisure in the New World? And the discourse of escape and carefree living, with
which travelers might imagine one of the principal means to and appeals of ’living freely," and
which that 1996 promotion tied so casually to the discourse of slavery, begins to seem less innocent
than its casual use would imply.

Sans Souci. Now a tourist resort. Once a slave plantation. Both places promise a Gardenof-Eden-like appeal—for certain inhabitants. Literally, sans souci means free from worry, or
anxiety: carefree. But also, it means free from responsibility, which suggests, implicitly, free from
the ability or need to respond to others. In a basic sense, the carefree life is premised on a freedom
from the need to care for or about others. Those who are carefree are free from caring (about
others) and free o f care (worry) precisely because those others, themselves uncared for, are made
not only to take care o f but also to care about those who wish to be carefree. If the carefree
mentality was reprehensible in the context of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century practice of
freedom and slavery, it may also be suspect in the context of the twentieth-century imagination of
freedom that presumes to exist beyond slavery. For the twentieth-century Eden, in Jamaica for
example, is maintained by the labor of darker-skinned Jamaicans who enter the playgrounds of the
rich, or o f carefree travelers, only to serve. And the care (worry, anxiety) with which these
laborers support the carefree suggests, as Cliff notes in her first novel, that the freedom "which
followed on abolition,* simply turned "slavery-in-fact, which was distasteful* to many, ’into veiled
slavery, the model o f the rest of the western world" (Abeng 28).
The etymology o f the French term, sans souci, suggests that the freedom from anxiety
enjoyed by the carefree may be both illusory and even an attempt to conceal underlying anxiety. To
be carefree, according to the etymologically related synonym, ’insouciant," is to be blithely
unconcerned. To be concerned, according to the etymologically related antonym, "solicitous," is
not simply to pay attention to the needs or wishes o f others, but to pay close attention. Such close
attention is unsound; it implies that the concern for the welfare of others verges on anxiety. Yet the
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desire to be free from anxiety acknowledges, by definition, that reasons for anxiety exist. And the
fact that solicitude, the strongest term for attention to the welfare o f others, is understood not as
altruistic or beneficial concern but as excessive anxiety, suggests that the anxieties being avoided
and rationalized as excessive relate to a reluctance to acknowledge, in any meaningful way,
disparities in the welfare of many. Ethical and political demands for attention to the welfare o f the
many can then be characterized as an unsound response to anxiety rather than a sound concern for
justice.
Thus far, I have been speaking of "freedom" indirectly, and only in terms of a particular
"image” of freedom. But that image of freedom as carefree, and the escape from anxiety and
responsibility that is bound up with that image, have consequences, I believe, for the ways we
constitute and practice freedom politically, socially, economically, and interpersonally. When Toni
Morrison reads the imagery o f early American literature, in Playing in the Dark, she argues that the
imagination of freedom is inscribed with fears and anxieties that the authors attempt to explore and
conquer. While those anxieties relate to such potentially race- sex-, and class-free, and powerneutral issues as the fear of "boundarylessness" or "loneliness, ” they also, she suggests, have much
to do with the fact that the freedom which the early nation sought had to coexist with an "unsettled
and unsettling" Black population (6, 36-37). The idea of the "carefree," I suggest, is both similarly
bound to anxieties associated with "unsettled and unsettling" populations and also hobbled in its
attempt to conquer those anxieties imaginatively. And "freedom" itself, as imagined and socially
constructed in the west, is both unsettled and unsettling.
Unsettled, because the definition of "true” freedom, and the conditions necessary for it,
have been contested from the beginning. Competing political factions, religious factions, economic
factions, and philosophies have all claimed to promote freedom, even as they acted at cross
purposes. The concept of freedom, Eric Foner argues, is unsettled, or "problematic," not simply
because it is ambiguous, but also because it is formed on a "terrain of struggle” ("Meaning o f
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Freedom” 436-437). And these conflicting appeals are each plausible because, as Orlando Patterson
observes in his award-winning analysis o f how and why freedom was constructed as the supreme
value of the Western world (Freedom in the Making o f Western Culture), freedom is and always has
been a tension-filled value.
Unsettling, because, in the democratic political system whose history is so closely aligned
with that of freedom, the ’worst violence is mixed in with the very spirit of [its] promise* (Derrida,

The Other Heading 6). The problem with freedom is not simply that wars, for example, are fought
in the name o f freedom, or that totalitarian regimes are established in the name o f freedom from
other states, or that some people are exploited in the name o f freedom for others. Even more
unsettling is the possibility that such activities are not simply abuses o f freedom, but practices of
freedom as we have come to imagine and construct it socially. For freedom, presumably one of the
west’s most humanitarian values, was paradoxically founded upon and often remains closely tied to
its most inhuman* practices. Like many pairs o f qualities that have been developed as dichotomies
in the intellectual and social history o f the West, the idea o f freedom has long been conceived in
contrast to a polar opposite, the idea o f slavery. As Patterson strikingly observes in an Oxford
Amnesty lecture, Locke’s ’celebrated definition of freedom in the second treatise on government
. . . was written under the chapter entitled not ‘O f Freedom,’ as one might have expected, but, as
this wisest, if most contradictory, o f dead white F-nglish males correctly figured, under the title ‘Of
Slavery” ("Freedom, Slavery, Rights" 178). And, as Patterson more controversially, but
convincingly, argues in his historical sociology, not just the idea but the very practice o f freedom
was generated from the practice o f slavery.
It is possible that both the virtues and the crimes o f freedom have their source in that tragic
etiology of the value. Perhaps freedom is such an unsettled value, in part, because it is unsettling.
Many of the contests over the definition of freedom, Eric Foner and other historians demonstrate,
were shaped conceptually by various attempts to reconcile o r transcend the oppositional, and thus

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

5

interconnected, relationship between freedom and slavery, and practically, by physical struggle
among the various classes o f slave and free peoples. And it is possible that the desire to avoid
anxiety, which informs the notion o f freedom as carefree, may also be related to a desire to avoid
such unsettling contradictions in the history and practice o f freedom even now.
***

Challenging the image o f "freedom without anxiety," or freedom without care, may be vital
for reconceiving the social and political practices o f freedom. The etymology for the concept of
freedom in the English language makes room for an image o f freedom that focuses on an alternate
root which describes free relations as caring relations. In Keywords, Raymond Williams notes that
the English concepts of freedom derive from two roots: one Latin, liber, and one Teutonic, freo.
Because the meaning of both roots depend on an opposing term that refers to slaves or those outside
the household, Williams observes, the "root sense of the free words is dear, as applied within the

free household or family" (182).

This notion of the free household has survived in successive ideas

about the freehold, such as free enterprise. It has survived, that is, and even flourished, in those
ideas which emphasize the sense in which these properties, activities, or relations are free from
outside control. But the complementary notion o f free people as those who are held dear, on the
other hand, seems to have been muted. This notion seems counterintuitive today, even though the
exclusions on which it is based—the denial of "free" status to those who are not held dear-have
undergirded development in and o f the free world.
The apparent incongruity between free people and people who are held dear may rest on
yet another duality, one that assumes and attempts to enforce a split between so-called public and
private spheres. As Nancy Hartsock argues in Money, Sex, and Power, the Greek construction of
freedom relied on a split between freedom and necessity, which were associated, respectively, with
the public and the private spheres. "Freedom" was a political matter that had meaning primarily in
the public sphere of the polis, which was populated by (male) citizens who were equal. In this
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duality, which was connected to the freedom-slavery pair, freedom’s opposite was understood as
"necessity,” for example, as "necessary labor." And this necessary labor belonged to the private
sphere of the household, whose relations, even its loving ones, were decidedly unequal (187). Even
as the practice o f necessary labor was excluded from, and deemed contrary to, the practices of
freedom, that practice o f necessary labor made the practice of freedom possible. For the person
who could practice freedom was carefree because necessary labor was performed by those who,
insofar as they labored necessarily, were not free. Since these practices that were divorced from
freedom were associated with the household, even with those who might be held dear, it is possible
that this conception, and construction, of a public-private split helped to divorce the practices of
freedom from the practices of love, care, or caregiving.
The practice o f many black slaves upon emancipation in the Americas, however, may
recover some of that muted meaning in the understanding of free people. Black conceptions of
freedom were often more expansive than those of white abolitionists. Because slavery was, in part,
a condition of bondage precisely and paradoxically because slaves were denied the extended bonds
o f kinship and love, persons who escaped slavery and those who were emancipated sought to
reconstruct family life and to become involved with a wider network of persons.1 The prevalence
o f Maroon settlements among fugitive slaves and their descendants in the "wilderness” of Jamaica,

1 Foner notes, for example, that the "attempt to reconstruct family life by withdrawing
women and children from plantation field labor” was a nearly universal response of West Indian
blacks to emancipation, and that this response was strongly resisted by planters (Nothing But Freedom
19). Breen and limes provide evidence not only that blacks who became free on Virginia’s eastern
shore during the middle years of the seventeenth century sought to acquire property in order to secure
their freedom, but also that, unlike the white indentured servants who were transformed as small
planters into aggressive, competitive, highly individualistic Virginians, black freemen consciously
reached out to other blacks and formed a small community despite significant geographical
impediments ("Atyne Owne Ground").
Patterson observes that even persons captured in the non-Westem world often desired
"involvement with, and closer bondage to, a wider network of persons"; escaped slaves often sought
the protective bondage o f a kin-based group (Freedom 24, 44).
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the United States, and the Americas generally, supports a vision of freedom made possible by and
in, and even of freedom practiced as the construction of, community.
Patterson suggests that the desire for the bondage o f a kin-based group explains why the
non-Westem world failed to establish "freedom” as a supreme ideal. Arguing that the "removal of
restraint” or the "absence o f impediments” in doing what one desires constitutes the "only

meaningful sense o f the term," Patterson claims that referring to "membership and belonging as a
kind o f freedom" is an "abuse o f language" (Slavery and Social Death 340-342; emphasis added).
Admittedly, the desire for community, and the willingness to surrender some degree o f autonomy
for membership in, and perhaps even some degree of rule by, a group, diverges from the ideal of
full autonomy that currently measures the ideal of freedom in the West; and total submission to
external control, however protective and benevolent, is incompatible with freedom. But to dismiss
the desire for community in an alternative vision of freedom, to deny the name o f freedom to
participation in such community, because this vision limits the primacy assigned to autonomy in
standard conceptions of freedom, is to foreclose prematurely the possibilities for practicing freedom
in varied ways. And it preempts a response to the challenge Patterson himself identifies when he
considers the fact that there would have been no freedmen without slavery: "We arrive then at a
strange and bewildering enigma: are we to esteem slavery for what it has wrought, or must we

challenge our conception o f freedom and the value we place upon it?" (342; emphasis added). It
may be precisely to extricate conceptions of freedom from master-slave dynamics, to imagine a
freedom conceived and practiced without masters and without slaves, that a challenge to prevailing
conceptions of *meaningful" freedom is needed.
If the central feature o f slavery-controi or domination to the point o f ownership by
another—sets up an opposite notion of autonomy as the ideal of freedom, a second feature of
slavery—the denial o f kinship that Patterson characterizes as "social death’—suggests that an opposite
notion o f community and affiliation might also constitute an ideal of freedom. Slavery was a
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'peculiar” domestic institution, in part, because its practices couldn’t, as Hortense Spillers argues,
sustain the 'private realm, even though such practices were central to the ‘home,’ to the very stuff
o f domesticity as planter-aristocrats envisioned it' ('Changing the Letter” 25). I would suggest that
the desire for 'd e a r' relations as a characteristic of and contribution to freedom challenges both the
conception of freedom as escape from community and family and also the conceptions which seek to
keep the features of freedom as a public, impersonal, and 'political* activity distinct from private,
engaged, and "non-political” relations.
Although notions o f family or community and o f love or caring relations are certainly not
without dimensions of constraint and "unfree" practices, the desire of ex-slaves for community
raises the possibility that free and unfree relations and practices are not as divorced as they might
seem in such prevailing mental categories as those based on a public-private split. Attempts to
reclaim and reorient notions of the free might seek, for example, to reorient the concept o f freedom
toward holding others dear without embracing the historically exclusionary basis of such care. I
read in the literature of several contemporary writers from the Caribbean and the United States
evidence o f a struggle to reconcile practices of freedom with practices of care, of a struggle to
articulate the two kinds of practices so that each supports and reinforces, or enables, the other. But
their vision o f a freedom practiced with care, and for care practiced as freedom, is introduced with
another kind of care, a caution or concern that attempts at such reconciliation not be used, for
example, to ignore systemic constraints on practices o f freedom or such other expansions to the
concept of freedom as autonomy and economic power.2 The beneficial aspects o f autonomy may be
addressed by revisions to the concept o f autonomy that do not place it in strict competition with care

2 1 am calling attention to multiple meanings o f "care,” including one in which practices
carried out with care may refer to practices carried out with a degree of caution. The American
Heritage Dictionary, however, advises its readers not to confuse the antonym carefree with careless,
or lack of caution. I would suggest, on the contrary, that the inattention of the carefree to the welfare
of those who too often must care for them is indeed careless, because the sense of freedom enjoyed
by these carefree individuals is based more on an incautious denial o f anxiety, or refusal to admit that
reasons for anxiety exist, than on any reduction of the grounds for anxiety.

R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

9

and connection. The concern for systemic constraints on freedom may be addressed by a vision o f
care that emphasizes, rather than eliminates, the need for radical politics. The move toward the
articulation o f freedom and care is complicated, even inconsistent, and sometimes uneasy; even so,
I would argue, it is strong and compelling.
Central to the vision I see developing in these novels, to the attempt at reconciling practices
o f freedom and care while recognizing the need for radical politics and allowing for other
expansions to the concept of freedom, is a practice that I name warrior-caregiving. As I will
explain in more detail below, a pantheon o f warrior-caregivers in these novels undomesticates the
practice o f care, uncoupling it from practices that are tame, confined to the private sphere, and too
frequently associated with conformity, limitation, and subservience. By the same token, these
warrior-caregivers seek to couple the practice of revolt, even of armed insurrection, with the
practice of care, and modify the extent to which such revolt is connected with excessive self-interest
and independence and with a practice that too frequently reinstalls the freedom of the few without
concern for the justice of the many. In these novels, warriors may be caregivers, and caregivers
may themselves be warriors, but the hyphen that connects and separates the two is important. The
hyphen is vital to their revolutionary attempt to practice freedom with care. It insists that we
practice each in mind of the other without collapsing either into the other. But just as "hybridity,"
as Homi Bhabha discusses it, "is never simply a question of the admixture of pre-given identities or
essences,” a hybridized ’practice” of warrior-caregiving suggests that neither activity retains any
pre-given meaning in the fullness of their articulation (*DissemiNation” 314).
***

In part, I view my work as both extending and modifying the project undertaken by Toni
Morrison in Playing in the Dark, in which she argues that the formulations of freedom in the social
imagination of the New World were connected to and even based on unacknowledged contradictions
in the social practice of freedom—contradictions whose formative power have been eloquently
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demonstrated by such historians of "American” freedom and slavery as Edmund Morgan and David
Brion Davis.3 During the formative years o f "America’s" literature, Morrison argues, the young
nation "distinguished itself by, and understood itself to be, pressing toward a future of freedom” and
"a kind of human dignity" that it believed was unprecedented (33). But, Morrison continues, "[fjor
a people who made much of their ’newness’—their potential, freedom, and innocence—it is striking
how dour, how troubled, how frightened and haunted our early and founding literature truly is”
(35). She suggests that early immigrants who, fleeing oppression and limitation, coveted freedom
and possibility, also understandably feared the practice of freedom. The genre of romance, with its
gothic understanding, allowed their writers to explore the "terror o f human freedom" and to
"conquer fear imaginatively" (36-37).
Race, Morrison insists, mattered much in constructing this freedom and in allaying its
anxieties. Citing the work of Patterson, she notes that slavery, in the new world enterprise,
highlighted, and may even have created, the concept of freedom (38). In a "nation of people who

decided that their world view would combine agendas for individual freedom and mechanisms for
devastating racial oppression,” no romance that explored their anxieties could be free of "the power
of blackness" (xiii, 37).4 The American imagination played upon the slave population, who were
assumed to offer themselves up as "surrogate selves for meditation on problems of human freedom,
its lure and its elusiveness" (37). And writers who took the "architecture o f a new white man" as

3 See, for example, Edmund M organ’s American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal o f
Colonial Virginia (1975), and David Brion Davis’s explorations o f the "problem" of slavery, The
Problem o f Slavery in Western Culture (1966) and The Problem o f Slavery in the Age o f Revolution,
1770-1823 (1975), as well as his reflections on Slavery and Human Progress (1984) and his more
recent volume, From Homicide to Slavery: Studies in American Culture (1986). Eric Foner’s Nothing
But Freedom: Emancipation and Its Legacy (1983) focuses, in part, on the influence of Caribbean
slavery and emancipation on American perceptions of slavery, abolition, and freedom.
4 M orrison’s analysis here complements my earlier suggestion that the anxiety being avoided
in the desire for a carefree existence may be related to an unwillingness to acknowledge and address
inequities in welfare.
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the concern o f United States literature used the denotative and connotative power o f blackness as a
’mechanism for testing the problems and blessings of freedom” (7, 15).
What is distinctive in this white imagination is a vocabulary that disguises the
contradictions o f a free republic deeply committed to slavery and the parasitical nature of a
whiteness that depends on blackness as its companion. That disguise of the racial subject, or the
slave, was so fundamental to the construction of white freedom, that even the work o f writers who
attempted to ’unhobble” their imaginations from the demands o f racially inflected language "could

not coexist with a response from the Africanist persona’ (50; emphasis added).
My project reads contemporary Black literature from the Americas-the literature of those
whose ancestors served as a vehicle for, and often suffered from, without being allowed to
’respond’ to, the understanding and practice of freedom in the colonies of the ’ Free World"; the
literature of those who continue to dwell in tension, or even conflict, with those former colonizers—
precisely for indications of that response which was ignored when prevailing conceptions of freedom
were formulated in the white imagination. I focus on literature written in the twentieth century
because I believe early formulations o f freedom continue to prevail in the contemporary imagination
of freedom in the Americas. And I focus on Black literature o f the Americas rather than AfricanAmerican literature more narrowly defined because I believe that the contradictions and anxieties
that Morrison explores in literature of the United States inflected the imagination and construction of
freedom in the Anglo-Caribbean colonies of the New W orld as well as the United States. As
Patterson argues in his 1994 Oxford Amnesty lecture, "Freedom, Slavery, and the Modem
Construction o f Rights," differing views o f freedom brought over to the New World account for
differences among, for example. New England, Old South, Middle Colony, back country, and black
slave conceptions of freedom. Nevertheless, certain commonalities among British colonial societies,
including ’colonial America and, to a remarkable degree, the horrendous slave societies o f the
British West Indies,” especially Jamaica and Barbados, contributed to the development of
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Anglo-American contractions of freedom that have been pivotal in the development o f modern free
societies (148-156). In the Caribbean, the straggles for freedom on the national level, for selfdetermination or independence from colonial authorities, as well as the experiences of post
independence politics, have created a powerful impetus for attempting to reconstruct the language,
the imagination, and the practice of freedom in decolonizing movements.
Both the formative literature o f American freedom and the ’response” I read in
contemporary Black literature from the Americas concern themselves with ’risk,” but in different
ways. For this Black writing, to translate Cornel West’s words from another context, ’puts black
doings and sufferings, not white anxieties and fears, at the center o f discussion” ( Race Matters 7).
The early literature, as Morrison observes, explored and tried to conquer the ’risks” of freedom.
While that founding imagination superficially, or indirectly, entered the imagination of the slave to
define freedom as slavery’s polar opposite, it accepted uneasily the existence of master-slave
relations in the domain of freedom. But the slaves, whose situation informed the white imagination
o f freedom, had a different ’access” to the imagination of freedom developed by white immigrants
and a different position from which to evaluate its ’risks.” When their descendents attempt to
unhobble their imagination from the master-slave construct that governs ideas about freedom, they
enter a different danger zone, one that puts freedom itself, or freedom as it has come to be
conceived, ’at risk” by introducing elements of care into the conception of freedom.
The authors I read include George Lamming from Barbados, Michelle Cliff from Jamaica,
and Jess Mowry from the United States. I begin with George Lamming and concentrate on two of
his novels: In the Castle o f My Skin (1953), which describes the constraints on and desire for
freedom in the still-colonial Barbados, in the decades just before 1950; and Natives o f My Person
(1972), which allegorically explores the imagination of freedom among the Europeans who invaded
the Caribbean in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. My discussion of Michelle Cliff
focuses on two novels: Abeng (1984) and No Telephone to Heaven (1987), which trace the
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development o f a revolutionary consciousness of freedom in their common protagonist, from her
adolescence in the soon-to-be-independent Jamaica of the 1950’s through her young adulthood in the
post-independence struggles o f the early I980’s. I also refer to C liffs Free Enterprise (1993),
which explores some o f the competing perspectives on freedom that came together during and after
the nineteenth-century African-American War for Independence, particularly among the forgotten
black revolutionaries who participated in the 1859 rebellion that has come to be known as John
Brown’s Raid on Harper’s Ferry. I conclude with the work o f Jess Mowry and focus on the novel

Way Past Cool (1992), which he addresses to young African-American males in US ghettoes and
which explores the constraints on, desire for, and attempts to obtain a degree of freedom among
pre-adolescent gang members who are confined to an urban ghetto in late twentieth-century
California. By choosing to work with Mowry’s fiction, I am deliberately including a novel written
as popular fiction rather than high literature and for a nonliterary audience, specifically young black
males, not simply because I believe that the vision I identify in such writing from the contemporary
Americas crosses such lines of genre and audience in significant ways. I also choose to work with

Way Past Cool because the location of this vision in a novel like Mowry’s is important for
contesting the denigration of youth that marks much contemporary political discourse, for expanding
the realm o f cultural democracy, and for expanding the notion of where alternative visions may be
found. The location o f this vision in a novel addressed to urban youth is also significant because it
represents one important place where, in the words of Henry Giroux, "‘knowledge needs to surface
and emerge in order to be consequential’ with respect to expanding the possibilities for radical
democracy" (17). By reading Lamming, Cliff, and Mowry together, I do not mean to subsume the
discussion of "internal colonies" within the United States under the rubric of postcolonial studies,
but to reveal certain alignments in the vision of these writers who are all part of the African
diaspora in the Americas.
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I read these novels in concert with theoretical essays written by the novelists themselves
and also engage them in dialogue with certain theoretical discourses that influence the imagination
and practice of freedom in the twentieth-century Americas: psychoanalytic theory, ethic o f care
debates, and theories of home, travel, and mobility. In some instances, I use my reading o f these
theories to aid in my reading o f the novels; in others, I use my reading o f the novels to enter my
voice, and the vision o f these authors, into the theoretical debates.
Before I detail the highlights of my analysis, I should probably say a few words about my
use o f the term ’practice'' for talking about the imagination o f freedom. I use the term practice to
contrast with the notion o f freedom as a legal status o r a state o f being, as something to be
achieved, and to emphasize instead a notion of freedom as an activity. I use the term to highlight
three interrelated dimensions in my approach to understanding and evaluating the kind o f freedom
imagined in these works: the performative, the practical, and the experimental. My emphasis on
performative aspects of freedom is based on the premise that the nature or state of freedom depends
closely on the activity o f freedom. Accepting the Marxian notion of praxis—that reality is shaped by
human activity, that humans change, and are changed by, the world through their own activity—I
mean to emphasize my belief that the state of "freedom” is produced by human work, by the
practices of freedom and by the images of freedom which guide those practices. For the practices
of freedom are both shaped by and themselves shape the worldview of those who wish to live
"freely.” I wish to emphasize not only that freedom is constituted by a series o f individual, social,
and cultural practices and meanings, but also that human activity constructs freedom as historical
and changing.
In addition, I use the term to highlight my concern with the practical aspects o f freedom,
with human activity that produces a practical, as opposed to a nominal, kind of freedom. With this
emphasis I am responding, for example, to C liffs concern that such common markers o f political
freedom as emancipation o r independence might be "independence-in-practically-name-only" (Abeng
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5). "Practical* activity in this context has at least two meanings: activity that acts upon and changes
the world, and activity guided by notions o f what can be practiced or done, in the attempt to live
what might appear to be a utopian or impossible freedom.
Finally, I wish to emphasize that the activity o f freedom is something we can practice,
activity at which we can develop skill. But I simultaneously hope to redirect this concept of
practice away from its common association with apprenticeship and towards an association with
experiment. The notion of an apprenticeship to freedom is problematic for conceptual and historical
reasons. Historically, the idea o f an apprenticeship to freedom is contaminated by the ways in
which the concept was enacted, for example, when the "emancipation” o f slaves in the British
colonies o f the Caribbean in the 1830’s was instituted as a gradual process so that "former" or
"sometime-to-be-ex" slaves could serve an apprenticeship to freedom, under the presumed "masters”
of freedom, their ex-in-practically-name-only slave-masters. I hope to redirect the term practice,
therefore, away from its historical imbrication in relations between masters and slaves or masters
and apprentices and also away from the notion of repeated practice, of repetition o f the same
activity that leads to mastery o r perfection. The idea that we might "master” freedom in this way is
unacceptable both because it assumes that we already know what perfect freedom is and also
because learning to practice freedom by repeating what has already been done more than likely
leads to a freedom characterized by relations between masters and slaves rather than between human
beings as human beings. So I use the term practice to suggest experimentation, activity that is
ongoing and changing.
This dimension o f experiment may be necessary since, as Patterson’s history of freedom
notes, the "factors that bring a process into being" are often distinct from those "that account for its
perpetuation" (Making o f Freedom 97). Further, as Edward Said argues, we cannot act "as if
freedom happens, and having once happened goes on happening undeterred and unconcerned"
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("Identity, Authority, and Freedom" 78). Rather, freedom must be continually renewed by
practice.
***

If the literature of the early United States took as its concern "the architecture of the new
white man," the architecture o f the man who both desired and feared freedom, as Morrison argues,
the protagonist, "G," o f Lamming’s first novel, In the Castle o f My Skin, appropriates that concern
in an attempt to construct an architecture for the black man who wishes to escape the force of
colonization. In Part One, I argue that G ’s desire for freedom focuses on the image of escape from
the cage in which he is controlled by authority, or captured by the eyes of others. G adapts the
architecture of the colonial master to imagine the "architecture" that might afford such escape.
Symbolically translating the bricks and mortar of the Great House into the castle of his skin, G
imagines that he is protected from invasion; within his epidermal castle, he imagines he is
independent, in control of his own being. If Lamming’s novel illustrates the force of this image of
freedom from control, it also suggests its inadequacy. Ironically, G has escaped his cage by
choosing to hide in another enclosure, a symbolic fortress. Because he imagines other people as
potentially controlling or invasive, he can only conceptualize freedom in terms of an independence
that requires escape from almost all relations with others. His image of a freedom that protects
himself from external control transmutes into an image that protects him from the risks of freedom,
from the anxieties of "world" traveling, understood literally, interpersonally, and metaphorically.
I argue that G’s imagination o f freedom is inherited from the kind of men Lamming depicts
in Natives o f My Person, European men who wish to escape what they consider to be the oppressive
and whorish institutions of their native land and who dream of establishing a new kind of society
with a new kind of man in the islands o f the Caribbean. Two fundamental ideas are linked in the
men’s imagination o f freedom: escape from their old world, and starting over in a new world, that
is, on uninhabited, unpossessed, virgin territory. Both conceptions mar their enterprise from the
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very start, limit their possibilities for practicing freedom, and eventually contribute to the failure of
their enterprise. These would-be new, free men lack a sense o f responsibility in two meanings of
the term: they are unable to care about, and unable to respond to, others. They have not only
exterminated the populations of the lands they hope to settle, but are also driven to abandon their
relationship with women, whose demands for intimacy and partnership the men interpret as control.
They are "care-ful" mainly in the sense o f being anxious, and so practice "care" by being cautious
about establishing relations with others. That caution, however, often leads them to incautious acts
that may destroy their own welfare as well as that of others.
But T-amming also begins to sketch an alternative, if idealized and imperfectly realized,
vision in Natives. In the context of the failed colonial enterprise, I -amming attributes that vision to
the women, principally "ladies,” who are abandoned by the men and who prophecy that they "are a
future* the men "must learn" (345). That future, which Lamming only hints at, has something to
do with the women’s ability to regard others as "natives of [their] person" (328). Although this title
phrase is enigmatic, its use in the novel suggests that, because the women do not separate others,
even the natives of the islands, from themselves, they can focus on an ability to welcome,
empathize with, and respond to others, rather than on a desire for freedom that compels them to
escape from one group, and to invade, control, or exterminate others. The vision of the women
challenges the traditional notions of autonomy, sovereignty, independence, ownership, and control
that comprise the discourse of freedom, as well as the ideas o f "development," whether personal,
socio-economic, or political, that are so closely aligned with notions of freedom. I argue,
therefore, that contemporary revisions to psychoanalytic theory, like those advocated by Jessica
Benjamin, John Brenkman, and Evelyn Fox Keller, which redefine "autonomy" in terms of
dynamic, intersubjective relations and mutual recognition, become important resources for
conceptualizing how the future that Lamming introduces at the end of Natives might be lived, not in
utopia, but on land and among the living.
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In Part Two, I read the work of Michelle C liff and Jess Mowry in the context of
nineteenth-century slave narratives which also attempted to 'respond' to the vision o f freedom that
guided development o f the Americas. In particular, I link the literature of the two centuries by
suggesting that they share a concord of sensibilities about the possibility for practicing freedom with
care. While nineteenth-century writers negotiated the sentimental ideology o f domesticity in their
narratives o f freedom, these twentieth-century writers can be read in terms of the way they
negotiate contemporary concerns about freedom, sympathy, and moral development, especially as
those concerns are manifested in ethic of care debates. I argue that the ethics which both authors
associate with struggles for survival and freedom demonstrate that a revolutionary sense o f 'c a re ” is
necessary for, rather than opposed to, a revolutionary practice of freedom that strives for justice and
embraces radical politics.
Like f .amming did in Natives, Michelle Cliff reimagines freedom through the struggles of
women. Although she writes about characters who, like her, are relatively privileged in Jamaican
society, because they are light-skinned, educated, or at least middle class-about characters who, as
descendents of colonizers, are meant to be ladies—she wishes to reject the legacy of empire’s ladies.
For that legacy is one in which freedom, or independence, means that the colonized have changed
places with the colonizers. They have become ’insensitive,” able 'to walk through a shantytown in
Kingston and not bat an eye" (Land o f Look Behind 71). So when Clare Savage, the protagonist o f
Cliff’s first two novels, Abeng and No Telephone to Heaven, wishes to rebel, she turns instead to
other ancestors, literal and figurative, to the warrior women who fought against slavery and empire.
Her position of privilege, however, unsettles her location in contemporary resistance movements.
For the privileged character who would be a freedom fighter, "care," the ability to care about and
to take care o f others who are less privileged, emerges as one of the most compelling features of
resistance. For those who haved lived sans souci, true freedom, or meaningful decolonization, does
not mean escape from the corruption of an inequitable society in which care is provided by some
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and received by others, but a willingness to fight for change, to reciprocate that care by confronting
corruption, to combat injustice by caring for and about others.
I use Cliff’s fiction, therefore, to introduce a postcolonial and class perspective to feminist
debate on an ethic o f care. For the care her characters practice is neither maternal, nor domestic,
nor apolitical, but militant, revolutionary, and insistently political. Its practitioners are not women
who serve masters, but a pantheon of warrior-caregivers who refuse to separate revolution and care,
who take care out o f the cradle and onto the battlefield. And it is only their willingness and ability
to care for and about those who are excluded from wealth and power that compels the more
privileged to engage in freedom struggles that challenge political and economic inequality. The
imagination o f freedom in the settling and the development o f the Americas was simultaneously
coupled with and separated from the imagination of love, by assigning the practice of freedom to
the white man o r woman and the practice of love to the slave or the servant who cared for the free
man or woman. While early American literature, as M orrison argues, addressed its anxieties about
freedom in part by imagining a limitless love o f the black man for the white man (S6), someone
whom the slave or servant not only takes care o f but also cares about. Cliff’s fiction responds to
that legacy by insisting that white and nearly white men and women must be willing to confront
their own anxiety and to care for those who are yet ex-slaves and ex-servants in-almost-name-only.
If C liffs imagination of greater freedom, of a freedom that demands greater socio
economic equality, depends on the practice of care by the privileged, she also insists, in the title and
first line of one o f her poems, that "Love in the Third W orld/ exists*; the love among Black women
living in packing crates is "just as powerful," as "complicated" and "long-standing" as love "in the
First or Second Worlds—maybe more so" {Land o f Look Behind 102). Jess Mowry’s Way Past Cool
similarly addresses the potential o f and need for the underprivileged to care for and about each
other.
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Mowiy’s characters, the black members o f a primarily pre-adolescent gang, live in one of
the most confined and least free spaces in the self-proclaimed freest society in the contemporary
Americas, an African-American urban ghetto. Their freedom o f movement, physical and social,
literal and metaphorical, is limited not only by inequitable and oppressive socio-economic and
governmental structures, but also by the ways that the members of their community cope with,
collude with, or combat those structures. The members o f this gang, like many of the characters in
G if f s and lem m ing’s novels, sometimes dream of escape. In imagining Jamaica as an island
paradise, however, they ironically adapt the fantasy o f an escape to freedom that guided the wouldbe colonizers whom Lamming describes and also substitute a fantasy image for the historical reality
of contemporary Jamaican society that Cliff describes. Whether Mowry’s novel does or does not
recognize that particular dream o f escape as ironic, it does recognize that the dream is largely
fantasy; that particular escape is unattainable for most of its characters. Perhaps because the young
members of the gang, who call themselves The Friends, cannot escape to freedom, they are
compelled to imagine and institute other practices of freedom where they live.
What does increase their freedom, however slightly, is an ability to increase the level of
trust between and care about the members of rival gangs. While the practice of trust and care
among themselves does little to effect change, or increase their power, in the political and economic
system that confines them, it does allow them a degree o f freedom, of movement and of personal
security, that they did not have before. What Mowry is careful to show, in addition, is that these
adolescents have the ability to transform their relations with each other by reflecting on and
appropriating the practices of the world around them, especially as they come to know that world
through encounters with authority and by watching television. The boys recognize parallels between
their efforts and such international struggles for freedom, territory, and a "Balance of Power” as
those in the Middle East. To counter the "showtimey" quality o f televised images o f gangs at war
with cops and themselves, they turn to images of the homeboy brotherhood and togetherness o f The
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Little Rascals on reruns of the 'O ur Gang” series. But they combine this model with one from the
black power movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s, that o f the Black Panthers. Based on the
blend o f warrior-caregiving that they develop from this combination, I call them, nonpejoratively,
'Buckwheat Panthers.’
The adolescents also appropriate the model o f The Law which oppresses them, by
governing themselves according to rules and reponsibilities which are, however, open to
negotiation. And they experiment not only by changing rules and responsibilities through 'civic"
debate, but also by abandoning the security o f rules and risking the uncertainty o f trust based on
sympathy o r "heart." Like the members o f the kind of counter-cultural groups that Henry Giroux
labels Fugitive Cultures, they develop a pedagogy that attempts to subordinate questions of
management and culture to questions of politics and ethics (14). As they learn to risk exchanges,
based not on barter, but on trust, they leam to offer that trust 'fo r free. ’ The Friends do not
abandon their notion of territory or the need to protect themselves and that territory they call their
own. But they discover that they only increase the scope and range o f their own freedom when
they take the risk of relaxing their control over the boundaries of that territory. As they risk
allowing members of rival groups to cross into their territory, their ability to cooperate, however
slightly and briefly, allows them, at least partly, to resist complete control by the more dominant
force, and even the alliance, of the cops and established drug dealers.
The power of imagination and the vision that Mowry attributes to these gang members
complements the call for a culture or politics of conversion in the work of two other contemporary
African-American thinkers, bell hooks and Cornell West. In many ways, Mowry’s vision responds
to hooks’ complaint that cultural productions that deal with young black people are anti-utopian and
anti-revolutionary because they "shut down the imagination”; these productions, which Mowry’s
work serves to counter, suggest either that such youth 'have difficulty imagining any way out of
their lives' or that those who manage to dream o f a way out do not survive the genocide (Outlaw
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Culture 46). His work takes to heart hooks’ claim that "as long as w e refuse to address fully the
place of love in struggles for liberation, we will not be able to create a culture of conversion where
there is a mass turning away from an ethic o f domination’ (243). It similarly responds to West’s
concern that a gangsterization marked by high levels of despair and distrust undermines the effort to
forge a more democratic project and to his contention that meaninglessness, hopelessness, and
lovelessness are the major enemy of black survival and that only a politics o f conversion centered
on a love ethic will establish black freedom stuggle as a matter of ethical principles and wise
politics (23, 29, 38, 49, 155). West contends that continuing division, or a focus on escape from
interdependence rather than on connection, is precisely what binds us tightly to the common destiny
of domination, opposition, and anxiety that the practice of escape seeks to avoid (7-8). Mowry’s
novel suggests that the desire to escape from control and anxiety to freedom may similarly bind us
tightly and inevitably to a continuing destiny o f control, anxiety, and escape.
The Friends in Way Past Cool focus on territory and understand freedom as a balance
between control over or autonomy within that territory and the possibility o f increased mobility,
either through escape or through the ability to cross boundaries with a degree of personal safety.
Mowry's novel could be used to support increasingly fashionable propositions that celebrate
deterritorializationin its multiple forms, like exile, migration, nomadism, homelessness, diaspora,
and all sorts o f traveling and border crossing, as the condition of freedom. But Mowry’s novel
challenges uncomplicated alignments o f mobility and freedom by suggesting that mobility
contributes to greater freedom only when mobility is practiced with and/or because of an ethic of
love.
The practice o f care, as I noted earlier, has historically been associated more with
necessity, submission, and subservience than with freedom, partly through its association with the
private, confined territory of the home. Coupling the figure of the caregiver with the figure of the
warrior partly addresses this dilemma. But because the notion o f home is still fraught with tension
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as a location o f freedom, while the notion o f travel and mobility is sometimes uncritically associated
with freedom, the way these novels address the issues of home and travel also becomes crucial to
their vision o f practicing freedom with care. These novels remind readers that travelers who seek
their own freedom are often traveling potentates, and, contrary to conventional expectations, they
suggest that home may sometimes provide the ground of freedom. If either traveling or homemaking is to be compatible with a practice o f freedom that moves beyond the master-slave dynamic,
each must concern itself with the complementary practices of freedom and care.
In Part Three, I introduce the concept o f "‘World’-Travelling" that the feminist philosopher
Marfa Lugones proposes, as a way to conceptualize notions of home and travel that are compatible
with a practice o f freedom with care. In the penultimate chapter, I refocus on Lamming’s Castle
and pay close attention to the features o f the village and natural landscapes—like fences that
collapse, a cherry tree that simultaneously separates and joins yards, walls that serve more as
platforms than barriers, sand castles, beaches whose contours shift, and the crabs who inhabit those
beaches and whose bodies are like houses on stilts—that challenge both the effectiveness and the
desirability of rigid architectural boundaries, ownership of private property, and the rigid separation
of mine and yours. If castle architecture is designed to protect its inhabitants from being seen and
invaded, these alternative structures attempt to balance protection and the risk of welcome by
encouraging a mutual practice of seeing and being seen.
To conclude, I return to the realm o f the tourist and use the work o f Jamaica Kincaid and
writers o f travel guides to reassert that the typical Caribbean tourist is more than happy to revive
the model o f the plantation in his or her desire to vacation sans souci. June Jordan’s discussion of
her travels, by contrast, provides evidence o f an attempt to practice the kind o f "world’-travelling
that Lugones advocates and offers an alternative model for tourists. Finally, I adapt Alison Bailey’s
formulations in "Locating Traitorous Identities’ to conceptualize the notion o f a traveller who
attempts to practice freedom with care by travelling to the "worlds” o f those who serve tourists in
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the Caribbean in order to animate ’privilege-cognizant scripts* that contest the practice o f freedom

sans souci.
The theme o f tourism also has more personal relevance for my project. In working with
these authors, I hope to avoid the kind o f "theoretical tourism* to which the first-world critic can be
susceptible when dealing with literatures from the so-called "margins.* As Caren Kaplan cautions,
if critics are not careful travellers, the margin can become ’a linguistic or critical vacation," the site
of "a new poetics o f the exotic” ("Deterritorializations” 191). I attempt to read these writers, then,
as the kind of ”w orld”-traveUer that Lugones advocates—to listen to the voices o f these insideroutsiders in the domain o f American freedom in order to recognize ’privilege-evasive” scripts and
to develop a potentially "traitorous” account of freedom with care. At the same time, I wish to
recognize, as Bailey observes, that developing a traitorous character requires my own work and
vision. Although I attempt to "see through the lens of their insights," I do not read them like a
"robot" but take responsibility for my analysis o f the "world" I see in their writing.
***

The "social death" that characterizes slavery, in Patterson’s analysis, is closely related to a
lack o f "trust" and "love” in the master-slave relationship (Slavery and Social Death 12). A
practice of freedom that moves beyond the master-slave dynamic must address the practice of care.
My focus on practicing freedom with care is not intended to depoliticize the practice o f freedom-to
suggest that either I o r these novelists and theorists wish to deflect attention away from other
political, social, and economic practices that are necessary to reconfigure the practice o f freedom.
It is not intended, as Comel West argues conservative discussions of ethics do, to "wrench" talk
about values and responsibility "out of historical context and personal responsibility" (22). Rather,
it is meant to suggest that potentially satisfactory political and economic practices depend on
attention to practices o f care, that political and ethical dimensions of freedom are intertwined. And
it is meant to counteract a hesitation to talk about the realm o f meanings and values, which West
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identifies with 'sheer failure o f nerve' on the part o f liberal structuralists, who hesitate because this
talk 'seems to lend itself too readily to conservative conclusions” and who 'resist talking too much
about values because such discussions remove the focus from structures and especially because they
obscure the positive role o f government* (20). It is often a lack of care rather than a call for a
practice o f care that allows us to ignore the political and economic consequences, the inequalities, of
how we practice freedom. And a belief that freedom is so precious that we can’t challenge its
formulations keeps us from recognizing that there might be other ways to practice freedom and
from trying to imagine those alternatives.
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I n t r o d u c in g F r e e d o m as a W a y o f B ein g T o g et h er

For Caliban has learnt that democracy is a way of being together,
most desirable as an arrangement for peaceful living—but he
knows that the Form will be betrayed if he ignores the specific
human elements which are the substance o f that Form. . . .
Freedom is an evil experiment if it means, among other things,
the freedom to betray freedom by a gratuitous exploitation of
freedom.
. . . Democracy should not be conceived by the graduates from
colonialism as a background to which they are condemned to
refer. That is a cricket match with a fixed history of rules.
Democracy is an atmosphere and a future towards which you
work.

{Pleasures o f Exile)1

Contrasting African independence struggles with the complacency o f his native West Indies
in 1960, George I .amming was troubled that the West Indies was, 'perhaps, the only modem
community in the world where the desire to be free, the ambition to make their own laws and
regulate life according to their own impulses, is dormant” {Pleasures 34-35). Arguing that these
British colonies had met the criteria for independence at least a decade earlier, he attributed their
reluctance to claim sovereignty to a deep-seated dependence on the political, economic, and cultural
structures of colonialism. The work o f freedom, he wrote, would have to begin by changing the
basis of their values; the novelist could contribute to that work by attempting to "grapple with that
colonial structure of awareness" {Pleasures 36).

1 When I cite I-amming *s work in the rest o f Part One, I will use the following
abbreviations: "Coming Home” for "Coming, Coming, Coming Home," Castle for In the Castle o f
My Skin, Natives for Natives o f My Person, Pleasures for The Pleasures o f Exile, and Season for

Season o f Adventure.
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Two o f lem m ing’s novels. In the Castle o f My Skin (1953) and Natives o f My Person
(1972), attempt to grapple with such structures. They present characters who have a strong desire
for individual freedom, understood as personal sovereignty or independence, and who expect that
such freedom will afford them greater social and economic opportunity as well as freedom from the
dangers of betrayal and tyranny. While the novels explore the values that guide this pursuit of
freedom, they grapple with the kind o f awareness supported by one particular colonial structure,
that o f the Great House, a West Indian translation o f the European castle. The significance of this
architectural symbol is most explicit in the first novel. Near the end of the story, the protagonist, a
young man who has come o f age in the pre-independence Barbados of the 1930s and 1940s,
prepares to leave the island. On the eve o f departure, he attempts to claim his freedom, and
simultaneously to protect it, by symbolically appropriating the architecture that he associates with
the sovereignty o f the king and the landlord—he attempts to secure himself, as the title suggests,
within the "castle o f [his] skin." In the latter novel, a group o f late sixteenth- or early seventeenthcentury men migrate from the Old World to an island in the New World, where their Commandant
plans to establish a new kind of society with a new kind of man, in the company o f women. It
could be said that these allegorical precursors to the colonial planters and landlords hope to form a
free community in which they "make their own laws and regulate life according to their own
impulses.” The vehicle to this sovereign community is a stolen ship which the Commandant
imagines as a "great castle on the water. ” A number o f narrative complications cause their
enterprise to fail. These complications highlight the importance o f certain ethical considerations in
the pursuit of freedom. The men fail, in part, because o f anxieties, or a desire to avoid anxieties,
that stem from their relationships, or lack of relationship, with others, especially women and natives
o f the islands. Taken together, Lamming’s two novels also suggest that the men fail because their

ambition to claim sovereignty is influenced, like the West Indies’ reluctance to claim sovereignty,
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by a dependence on colonial structures-a dependence which cannot sufficiently change the basis of
their values.
Lamming’s attention to architecture recognizes that the structures o f colonialism are
simultaneously material and metaphorical. Physically, the architecture of the Great House in the
West Indies separates the free and landowning masters from the dependent and subservient masses.
Metaphorically, the architecture o f the castle correlates with the ideas about individual development
and interpersonal relationships that are most commonly associated with classical theories of
psychoanalysis and masculinized concepts of autonomy that depend on rigid separation from others.
Taken together, Lamming’s novels explore the attractions and limitations of the kind o f freedom
supported by such models. The questions they raise about autonomy and independence struggles are
commensurate with the kind o f issues that Jessica Benjamin {The Bonds o f Love) and John
Brenkman {Straight, Male, M odem) address in their cultural critiques of traditional psychoanalytic
models. Like these critiques, Lamming’s novels suggest that a model which emphasizes the
development of interdependence and mutual recognition, or reciprocity over simple autonomy, may
be important to a more desirable practice of freedom.
Several critics have observed that Lamming’s work anempts to shape a vision of freedom
appropriate to the West Indies and that psychological transformations are crucial to that vision.

In

a review which argues that the novels written before Natives o f My Person constitute a "search for
freedom," Wilfred Cartey observes that freedom, for Lamming, is "natural" to people, an
"attribute” waiting to be recognized and claimed through political action. But recognition of this
fundamentally existential freedom has a profound "psychological" effect and "independence" is
marked by a new "way of seeing” and "being seen” (127). While Ian Munro does not elaborate on
the nature o f freedom when he concludes that lem m ing’s fiction seeks to shape "a new vision of
human freedom," he also observes that such change, for Lamming, "must be accompanied by a
profound psychic transformation which it is the artist’s responsibility to articulate" (143).
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Taylor cites I .amming as one o f two Caribbean authors (the other being Derek Walcott) who have
been able to write liberating narratives. In such narratives, freedom is opposed to destiny; and
opening the world to possibility requires activity. Free people choose to make, rather than suffer,
history. Taylor reflects on Frantz Fanon’s attempts to theorize beyond the master-slave dynamics in
Hegel’s philosophical understanding o f freedom struggles, explains that he shares Fanon’s
dissatisfaction with the dualism that Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory sets up between individual liberty
and social existence, and concludes that truly liberating narratives must conceive a relation between
liberating psychiatry and liberating politics. Key aspects o f such "true'' liberation include: a notion
of the group as a liberating entity; a movement toward mutual recognition; and the activity of
individuals who, in Sartre’s terms, are mutually responsible "quasi-sovereigns." Taylor concludes
that Lamming’s Castle is a liberating narrative that "leaves future possibilities implicit and unstated"
(222). He believes that the novel provides a basis for a revolutionized understanding o f the social
world because Lam m ing uses the imagery of the castle to shift focus from outer to inner experience;
Lamming’s appropriation symbolizes a move from domination to historical struggle and recognition
of inherent dignity (194).
I agree that the possibilities for freedom in Castle, and also in Natives, are implicit and
directed towards the future and that a principle of mutual recognition may be central to lem m ing’s
vision o f the future. As the headnote suggests, the freedom Lamming works toward must be based
on a new "way of being together." But both novels also contain a certain ambivalence about the
pursuit o f freedom. That ambivalence suggests that the structures, mental and physical, with which
these characters seek to establish and practice freedom are inadequate to the implicit vision.
Transformations of the castle, whether internal or external, are not sufficiently revolutionary to
change colonial values and promote freedom as a new way o f being together.
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Throughout In the Castle o f My Skin, G and other village boys share a sense that they live
in a "cage. * They are often anxious because they can be seen, and thus captured, by the eyes of
others. Because they think that they are "part o f the other’s world, and therefore no longer in
complete control o f [their] own* when others can see them, they feel most free, most able to control
what they do and say, when they are alone and hidden from view. They speculate that a king, the
ultim a^ sovereign, is most free, or autonomous, because he is alone and unseen. Ironically, the
boys feel more free in such confined spaces as a darkened cinema or even a lavatory with the door
closed than they do in the open air (54-57, 72-74).
When the boys try to make their own rules, adults ask if they think they are kings and
reproach them for wanting to live above their station. But the reproach reinforces their desire,
because "It was a big thing to be a king. It meant that you were getting the feeling that you lived in
a big room all by yourself where no one could see you and you were your own man. Free and
alone" (54). And I -amming seems to approve the boys’ ambition when he observes that he wrote
the novel to "restore the castle where it belonged."
In a critical essay, he writes that he appropriated the title image from a phrase with which
a Derek Walcott poem assaults "some white presence": "‘You in the castle o f your skin, I among
the swineherd.’" I -amming appropriates the image to reject the idea that either his godfather, Papa
Grandison, or other villagers should see themselves "among the swineherd" rather than in their own
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castles (Pleasures 227-228).' Within the novel, G appropriates the image as he prepares to move
from boyhood to manhood.
On the eve o f his departure from Barbados, G reads the latest entry in his journal, written
the day before. He looks forward to living in Trinidad because no one knows him there and he can
"start with a clean record and try to make an impression. If you aren’t native to a place," he reads,
"you have an excellent chance of becoming a gentleman in it." But the entry betrays an
ambivalence in his attitude toward this imagined future and the quality of the relationships he may
or may not enjoy. In Trinidad as well as Barbados, he imagines, the "likenesses will meet and
make merry, but they won’t know you. They won’t know the you that’s hidden somewhere in the
castle o f your sk in ." He is disappointed because he believes that he will not be "able to strike an
identity with the o ther." But he is also grateful because he is "terrified of being known." He
believes that anyone who knows him will use this knowledge to destroy him (260-261). His
response to that fear is to prevent both the threatening knowledge and the comforting identity by
hiding in the castle o f his skin. From G’s perspective, the forward movement of the novel works to
convert naked skin from an image of vulnerability to one of protection.
Taylor approves of G for restoring the castle to its "rightful place," for borrowing the
image to recognize his own dignity rather than moving into a physical castle as the bourgeoisie who
succeed the colonial landlords have done (194). Lamming’s fiction does condemn the bourgeoisie
for moving into more literal castles, but I believe it suggests that a symbolic appropriation, which
understands "dignity” in terms of such imperial structures of awareness, is also problematic.

1 The "assault," in the third canto of Walcott’s Epitaph fo r the Young: XII Cantos, is actually
stated: "You in the castle of your skin, I the swineherd." The line epitomizes the position of a black
boy who has an impossible passion for a white girl; his unrequited love yields a light that is
"deceptive, equivocal," and full of "bewildering clarity." Ironically, Lamming’s inverted
appropriation of the image mimics the result which Canto IV attributes to the experience: "denied
satisfaction/ O f union, . . . we think of turreted castles," and "practice the pieties of [our]
conquerors."
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Joyce Jonas insightfully argues that colonial structures in the Caribbean have been imposed
on both the topographic and the psychic landscape (SO). Claiming that the plantation landscape,
with the landlord in a Great House on the hill and the folk in a surrounding village, ritually
expresses the master-servant structure of relationships that develops within a polarized worldview,
she argues that such polarities must meet in a liminal zone, in a space between the worlds o f the
master and the servant, if new structures and new ways of relating are to be created (8, 45).1
Reading Castle as a Bildungsroman, Jonas concludes that G ’searches for a means to exchange
imprisonment within the perceiving eye of another person for a ‘castle’ of the self that defies
invasion.” In terms of the plantation landscape, G moves from the outside to the inside of the
"landlord’s ‘castle,’" or from the "cage" to "freedom" (62).
If translating the castle from bricks and mortar to skin affords G some sense of protection
as he escapes the eyes of Barbados and braves travel to other worlds, however, his use of the image
to structure and maintain his sense of freedom is at least ambivalent. Jonas’s own analysis
undermines the character o f the freedom she says he gains. Even as she argues that G takes
"possession of the boundaries of the self," her metaphor, which claims that he 'converts the cage of
the already defined into the fortress o f the ever signifying," suggests that he is as likely to be
exchanging one imprisonment for another as to be moving from imprisonment to freedom (emphasis
added). And if she notes, at one point, that this castle is "impregnable," she concedes at another
that its protection is a "frail counterpart" of the landlord’s (60-62). Jonas concludes that, overall.
Lamming merely inverts rather than changes the colonial structures (134).
For Jonas, the faulty vision belongs not only to G, but to Lamming and the novel as a
whole. But the fault may just as readily lie in the expectations with which critics read a novel they

2 In a similar vein, Paquet argues that I .amming is most concerned with the way that
structures of society shape individuals and that he embodies what is most significant in these
structures in his characters and the confrontations between them (1-5).

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

33

identify as a Bildungsroman. In an early analysis of the "typical Bildungsroman," W. H. Bruford
observes that 'T he novel usually ends when [the hero] has attained to some degree o f maturity"
(30). This expectation suggests that the final position of the protagonist reflects the novel’s mature
vision; the novel is as wise o r limited as the final vision of the hero. But in an alternative reading,
the history o f the village and the perspective o f other characters are as crucial as the story of G’s
development to evaluating the vision o f the novel. As I will argue later, other images in the novel,
including a cherry tree and a crab, whose body is like a house on stilts, contribute to possible
alternative visions.3 In this reading, the limitation associated with the image of the castle belongs
less to the vision of the novel, which may contest that image, than to G and the limits of the
colonizing education he has received, as well as the limits of his prospects for success in the
colonial context.4
As I noted earlier, G himself recognizes certain limitations in his image of the castle. But
he does not reject it because he sees no preferable alternative. At least one important reader,
however, refrained from embracing the image and its meaning. Lamming records that his Papa
Grandison, in whose honor Lamming chose the image, complained that "the Castle and the Skin
made no sense at all” when Lamming’s mother shared the book with him (Pleasures 229).
r -amming seems to account for Papa’s lack o f identification with G and with the image by

3 See Part Three for a discussion of other architectural and quasi-architectural images in
Castle and o f the extent to which they allow or encourage relationships based on mutual recognition.
4 The story o f G’s development may fit more closely with the contestatory tradition identified
by Patricia Alden in her analysis of Social Mobility in the English Bildungsroman. The early
examples of this genre espouse a faith in progress and in the value of the individual characterized by
a bourgeois h u m a n i s m The individual who experiences upward social and economic mobility also
matures morally, spiritually, and psychologically and concludes his development with some kind of
adjustment to society. But, Alden argues, "in the course of the nineteenth century this sanguine view
o f social mobility is not sustained by most major writers." Instead, the genre increasingly exposes
contradictions in the ideology; *[u]pward mobility which formerly led to freedom and self
development now leads only to alienation and moral compromise." The final position of the
protagonist who is able to advance socially and economically may thus reflect the powerlessness of
the individual to mature morally, spiritually, and psychologically in a society that values bourgeois
individualism (1-4).
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explaining that Papa was both dying and a colonial. But an incident that is significant to Pa, the
character who represents Papa Grandison and other old villagers in a biographical reading of the
novel, may point to an alternate basis for rejection. An unidentified voice in a dream first takes Pa
back to the "land of the tribes" and the passage of Africa’s best "produce" to the Caribbean islands
and then speaks to those who will come after Pa. Alerting them to "the limits of the freedom they
talk," the voice reminds: "The beginning had the best intentions. A sailor called Christopher
followed his mistake and those who came later have added theirs. . . - The only certainty these
islands inherit was that sailor’s mistake, and it’s gone on from father to son ’mongst the rich and
the poor” (211). The character o f that mistake can be examined in one o f Lamming ’s last novels.

Natives o f My Person. The legacy o f that mistake, as the voice in Pa’s dream laments, continues in
the story that Castle describes. While the dream occurs before G prepares to leave the island, the
voice is prophetic, and a comparative reading of the two novels shows that the legacy of that
mistake continues in G’s embrace of castle architecture.
M a l e - F e m a l e R e l a t io n s a n d t h e F o u n d in g M i s t a k e :
W h o r e d o m , V ir g in it y , a n d t h e P u r s u it o f a F r e s h S t a r t
With Natives o f My Person Lamming tells, in an allegorical mode, a story of Europeans
who sail to the Caribbean in the late sixteenth or early seventeenth century with, in the language of
Pa’s dream, "good intentions. "5 They are lead by the Commandant, who, on five previous

5 A broad use of the Prospero-Caliban analogy, in which the figure o f Prospero from
Shakespeare’s The Tempest represents European colonizers and the figure of Caliban represents
colonized natives, draws together several enterprises with "good intentions." The voyage of
Columbus, as noted in Pa’s dream, provides the original example. But the more immediate example
for the enterprise in Natives is, as Lamming claims, the late sixteenth-century voyages reported by
Hakluyt, which also influenced Shakespeare (Pleasures 12-13, Kent 13-14). This enterprise offers an
alternate but unrealized version of San Cristobal’s past. While Lamming focuses on the colonization
o f the Caribbean, his use o f the 1589 Hakluyt Voyages broadens the potential application of his
allegory to all the Americas. Edmund Morgan, for example, in his history of American Slavery,
American Freedom, extensively describes Hakluyt’s role in the failed dream o f Roanoke, which
thought of English freedom in global terms and hoped to liberate the oppressed people of the New
World. M organ’s work is particularly apt for my project since the failure of this dream, in his
analysis, constituted the pretext to "the American paradox, the marriage o f slavery and freedom”
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expeditions, had slaughtered the Tribes of the Indies and trafficked in cargoes of black flesh. The
scene o f his earlier expeditions was named, idyllically, as "Sans Souci,” but also described,
pejoratively, as the ’Demon Coast.* On this particular return journey, however, he intends to
reverse his ambition. Rather than extract a fortune from the isles, he intends to bring a fortune-the
men and the women who will form a new and enlightened society—to San Cristobal (10-11, 25,
228).
The primary purpose of the Commandant, his officers, and his crew is to assure their own
freedom outside an oppressive, corrupt, and divided kingdom. The nature of the most powerful and
tyrannical institution in that kingdom, the House o f Trade and Justice, indicates a primary source of
its corruption—the House links and even subordinates the system o f Justice, meaning Law, to the
interests o f Trade. The "House* is not only the "vital center o f all commercial affairs," but also the
’heart and flesh and conscience of the Kingdom." It commands "ultimate obedience" and very few
manage to live outside its attention and the restrictions it places on individual liberty and economic
opportunity (7). But the men on board the Reconnaissance are going to try. In the words of their
Steward, they seek "some escape to freedom" (292). The Commandant, who once worked for and
with the House, now has another vision o f Justice; although he has not informed most of the men of
his plans, he hopes to establish a fleer kingdom, a kingdom without slavery, slaughter, or other
terror. The enterprise is risky, not least because the Commandant has stolen the ship and
undertaken the voyage without the authority o f the House, which makes their effort "a crime on the
scale of treason" (7).
G can be linked to two key figures in this enterprise, the Commandant and the pilot,
through descriptions that echo the "castle o f skin” imagery that G uses to describe his situation at
the end of Castle. The Commandant, who has "inherited a name [unspecified] which . . . his

(5-42). I argue that the notion of freedom embraced in and inherited from the Commandant’s failed
effort to establish a utopian kingdom in San Cristobal is similarly compromised.
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ancestors had conferred on a castle and a battle,* now considers his ship, the vessel with which he
will break loose, ”a great castle on the water’ (8, 11). Like G’s, his castle is mobile; unlike G’s, it
is more a mode o f travel than a mode of habitation, although the Commandant spends so much time
travelling that his ship also becomes his main dwelling. Both G and the Commandant focus on this
castlelike architecture in journal entries that record their desire to become or create new men,
specifically ’gentlemen,” in a new place (Castle 260-261; Natives 10-11).
The pilot is both foreigner and stranger, as G expects he will be when he leaves Barbados.
His behavior among the rest of the crew reflects G ’s desire for privacy and mimics the seclusion G
intends to practice. One crew member complains that the pilot ’doesn’t spare a word that would
help you see inside him. Keeps everything shut tight’ (13). And the narrator describes him as
"friendless," inhabiting "his solitude like skin, incapable of any other possession but his own’ (13,
283). As Jonas remarks, the pilot’s ’strategy for survival in a world that seeks to penetrate the
self" is, like G’s, to "retreat into the masking ‘castle’ o f one’s skin from which one can observe,
reflectively, while remaining unseen” (112). According to Jonas, this strategy allows the pilot an
integrity and freedom unknown to the others; her reading thus excuses him from the errors of the
enterprise. This freedom, however, is less that o f the artist, as Jonas suggests, than that of the king
or the Great, whose power the boys in Castle and the philosopher Derrida describe in similar terms.
Derrida associates the figure of "The King" with the "incomparable power" o f the mask, which
shares what may be the "supreme insignia of power” with the visor on a suit of armor: "the power
to see without being seen" (Specters o f Marx 8-9).6 The language of lem m ing’s text suggests a

6 Although Foucault does not use similar images to describe such supreme power, this
definition is consistent with Foucault’s master concept in Discipline and Punish. As later discussion
will indicate, D errida's description is especially appropriate for evaluating lam m ing’s use of such
images. Just as Derrida seeks to speak to and with ghosts, namely the specters of Marx, so Lamming
seeks to speak with the ghosts of G’s ancestors in a kind o f Ceremony of Souls. And just as
I -amming attempts to deal with the legacy (or the ghosts) o f Shakespeare’s Prospero (The Tempest) in
his work, Derrida frames his analysis by reflecting on the legacy of another Shakespearean character,
the ghost of Hamlet’s father.
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sinister quality in the pilot’s "power. ” The pilot is "a vast agency of secrets, a central intelligence”
whose "power was wordless, invisible” (283).
The attitude o f the pilot is not excused from, but coinplicit with, the errors o f the
enterprise—one o f those errors being a suspiciousness that only allows the men to imagine
autonomy, or freedom from invasion and control by others, in terms that require isolation. That
suspiciousness is not only inherited from their experience with the House of Trade and Justice but
also reinforced by their anxieties about women and the power they believe women try to exert over
men. One of the chief reasons for their failure to establish the kind of progressive society the
Commandant imagines is because they can’t create a new way o f being together that includes
women as equal partners. Despite the Commandant’s plan, the men are ultimately unwilling to
include women who are not sufficiently submissive. The enterprise is aborted when the men abort
their relationships to women who are already waiting on the island.
In a conversation with George Kent, Lamming explains that the major obstacle to the
enterprise is the difficulty the men experience in relating to women: The relations between men and
women are "far more complex and far more challenging than the question of managing men or
establishing a new colony” (6). Chafing under the tyranny of the House of Trade and Justice, the
men on the Reconnaissance are concerned with 'restoring their manhood” (16). The men do not
question the structure o f authority per se, but rather their own place in the structure. The way the
men see it, restoring their manhood requires them to "m utiny," in a manner of speaking, against the
authority o f the House and also against the power they impute to women. According to the view of
the men, the "power" o f each is corrupt and abusive. While most of the crew do not oppose the
power o f the House to enslave or exterminate those outside the Kingdom, they oppose abuses which
can be inflicted on them—the power, for example, to brand, hunt, and imprison poor or rebellious
vagabonds inside the Kingdom, to hang all "suspects" in a murder, and to appropriate the wealth of
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the Kingdom for itself. But the men consider any power exercised by women, indeed any effort to
extract commitment, relationship, or fidelity, as an abuse o f power.
The Steward illustrates the way the men obfuscate the dynamics of power to justify both
their refusal to depend on women and their inability to respond to the affections and desires of
women. Although his wife believes she has given up all "claims to privilege” and all ’family
connections* so that the Steward might ’feel complete master in [their] life ,' he complains that she
has the ’evil ambition’ o f getting "power over" him (178, 202).

As Lamming notes in his

interview with Kent, the Steward unfairly interprets ’her affection and gestures not as positive help,
but as her strategy o f colonizing him, for keeping him in a particular relation to her” (8). The
tension between them develops because she is cousin to Tate de Lysle, the Lord Treasurer o f the
House of Trade and Justice; in the Steward’s mind, the power of the House and the power o f his
wife are aligned. The Steward has been cheated out o f some rare maps by the Lord Treasurer,
whom he is unwilling to confront, and he is unable to succeed in any of his other endeavors. But
he interprets his wife’s desire to intercede on his behalf as evidence of envy, ambition, and a desire
to restore her connections to the House. He is unwilling to be in her debt, which he equates with
being under her power, and displaces his grievances toward the House onto her.
The way he responds to the case o f an orphan girl who arrives at their door illustrates the
way he perverts notions o f his wife’s ambition and excuses his own faults by blaming women. The
girl insinuates that the Lord Treasurer seduces the girls at the orphanage he patronizes. Rather than
let his wife make use o f her connections to confront the Treasurer, the Steward makes his own deal
and arranges to keep the girl as his maid. He seduces, and perhaps rapes, the girl, believing he has
simultaneously triumphed over the Treasurer and reduced his wife in her own eyes. When he later
discovers that the girl was his own daughter from a youthful "escapade," and that the Treasurer had
been aware o f the relationship, the Steward absolves himself from responsibility for the "weight of
incest" by blaming his wife. He charges that she arranged for his destruction by taking the orphan
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in. Complaining "‘that such a thing should be done to man like me,” he reclaims his innocence
and justifies himself as her victim (190-200).
Reflecting on the major "challenge" the men face on this enterprise, I -amming suggests that
true "innovation," and the possibility of a "new liberation,” would require men to "reorganize their
emotions regarding women" (Kent 6-7; emphasis added).7 The way the men organize their
emotions regarding women, and also regarding freedom from tyranny, is with the polarized
concepts o f whoredom and virginity.
When the Steward’s wife rages against his habitual neglect, cowardice, and other failures,
for example, he dismisses the basis of her complaints by focusing on a lack o f respectability in her
behavior. He judges that "‘The common whores were dumb virgins by comparison” (179). One
voice of the common men illustrates the utter conventionality and indiscriminate application of this
habit of thought. He complains that all women who have moved from the Northern to the Southern
pan of the Kingdom are whores, that all women in the South are harlots before they are wives, and
that all women, in fact, a rt whores: "‘I say you were born to a whore if your mother was a
woman” (17-19). He concedes that men would then be "whoresons," but he directs his diatribe
against women. Even when he challenges other men, he does so by faulting their women.
And it is the charge o f a woman’s whoring that brings the enterprise to a halt. The charge
is directed against the current Lady of the House, who was once, and expects to be the future,
mistress o f the Commandant. The charge is made by the Boatswain, an officer whose ambition is
to "seek a chance," to be "a man on the inside" of power (256-257). In pursuit of that ambition, he
had "assisted in the plundering adventures that had brought glory to Lime Stone" and had saved the
Commandant’?; life on previous expeditions (246, 256). When this service was not sufficiently

7 Lamming’s observation matches Orlando Patterson’s analysis in Freedom in the Making o f
Western Culture. Patterson observes that "no sociological trend more decisively correlates with the
growth o f commitment to the value of freedom than men’s willingness to accept the equality of
women" (395).
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rewarded, he sought a chance to make contact with the Lord Treasurer through the "special
privilege” o f the Lord’s wife, the Lady o f the House. The Lady refused to make that contact.
After a period o f 'intim ate’ relations, she brings his service to an end by offering him a place on
this new enterprise with the Commandant. Because he wished to be loyal to the House, he
complained that her "whoring" was innocence compared to the treason o f the enterprise (338-340).
In anger, he attempted to, and believes he did, kill her. He escapes retribution by taking the place
she had prepared for him. In a "confession" that "requires no promises on his part, ’ he justifies his
action by claiming that the Lady was corrupt, treated him like "a stud," and subjected him to the
indignity of her licentiousness, requiring him to choose between her "cunt" and his "grave" (249254). But he is now troubled because one of the crew, a painter, has a vision that the Lady of the
House is waiting for them at the island of San Cristobal (236-237, 249). A revealing anxiety
punningly connects his desire for power with masculine impotence. He fears that the Lady will
subject him to disgrace by giving "evidence o f his failure to be a man on the inside" and he suffers
a nervous breakdown, swearing in front of the crew that "‘The Lady of the House was nothing but
a whore’" (261-263). The enterprise comes to a halt when the Commandant learns about the
charge.
The Commandant designed this enterprise as a response to the Lady’s charge that his
former "work” for the House, which included the slaughter of natives, was no more than
"butchery" (72). The Lady’s words also characterize the "work" of the House in terms the men use
to denigrate the behavior of women as "whoring," but she extends the terms to condemn the
behavior o f men as well. She describes situations in which wives and husbands unite out of selfinterest, for monetary or political advantage, for example, rather than out of care for their spouse.
The Lady includes her own marriage to the Lord Treasurer in the indictment. She explains that the
Commandant, whom she loved, had become like a ghost to her. Each time he returned from one
expedition, he would stay briefly and then set out on another; although he promised to return
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shortly, his absences were long. Concluding that the Commandant "‘had lost all sense o f the
difference between the coming and the going,’” she offered herself for "rescue* to the Lord
Treasurer. He offers her possessions and comfort; she provides him a "‘Lady for his parlor’" and
allows him to "‘rummage like a common dog for his sex outside.’” The Lady then concludes that
husbands and wives in the Kingdom act the roles o f whores and keepers of whores because "‘their
whoredom is also the whoredom of the House o f Trade and Justice.’” Whoredom is "‘the national
principle’" o f Lime Stone, both the citizen’s "‘private vice’" and the "‘nation’s religion’" (344). It
is such whoredom, such abuses in marital relations and in the nation’s commercial and juridical
institutions, that the men and women of the enterprise seek to escape.
When the Lady, now married, offered the Commandant this ship and refused to return to
the comings and goings which had become "‘names for the same activity’" in their previous
relationship, the Commandant devised this plan to colonize the island of San Cristobal as an attempt
to reclaim her as his mistress in a new kind o f relationship in a new society (72, 268-277, 342).
But he believes himself humiliated when the Boatswain accuses her of whoring, and the
Commandant orders that they "will proceed no further." On account of the Lady’s alleged
"treachery," he aborts an enterprise which, according to the pilot, had begun as "the fruit o f love."
Although the pilot urges him to consider the Lady’s behavior in another light, the Commandant is
unable or unwilling to focus on the gift she made him of this ship, on her waiting for his arrival, or
on the chance o f renewed life on the island (263-267).
Part of his difficulty arises from the way he, as well as several of the other men,
characterize their enterprise. Believing that they have been subject to oppression in a whoredom,
the men seek to restore their manhood and attain their freedom in virgin territory. The Surgeon
expands on their line o f thinking when he associates the blessings of such a place with "the
privilege" of starting life "afresh," "from scratch." He envisions an experiment in which he
becomes famous, a pioneer in the arts of healing, and explains: "‘You can only manage it in virgin
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lands where you have the chance to start from scratch’” (112-113). For the Surgeon, the promise
o f virginity requires new women as well as new land. In order to exercise the 'privilege of starting
from scratch* in the "blessed territory” of "virgin lands," he must first get his wife ”out of the
w ay.” Because she has been faithful rather than a whore, however, she gives him no "honorable
reason for abandoning her,” and he gets her out o f the way by imprisoning her in an asylum (165169). While the Commandant is hoping to rejoin rather than abandon his mistress, and the Steward
denies that he is united with the Surgeon "by the experience of private tyrannies," these men are
susceptible to the Surgeon’s error because they share his error of thinking.
The novel begins to indict this line o f thought when the Commandant reads his journal
shortly before he hears the news o f the Boatswain and the Lady. He comes across an entry that
describes the genesis o f this enterprise in terms that match the Surgeon’s. When he comes to his
intention, "’Now my ambition is in reverse; and I reckon it is a more noble preference to plant
some portion of Lime Stone in the virgin territories o f San Cristobal,” the Commandant stops to
repeat the phrase, "‘virgin territories.” The narrative voice comments that he talks "to himself as
though he had suddenly discovered some error in his meaning” (245). He does not pursue that
discovery, however, because he is interrupted by the arrival o f the Boatswain.
Critics rightly note that the "error” refers to his previous extermination of the natives; the
territory becomes virgin only through their death.® But the "error" of trying to build a utopia on
"virginity” also indicts the men’s attitudes toward women. As Jonas argues, linking the land with
"a promise o f virgin delights" associates the colonized with a feminine image that the masculine
colonizer attempts to dominate and control (89-93). She further notes that the Surgeon’s repetitive

®Avis McDonald, for example, argues that the island becomes "virgin territory" and
"suitable . . . for the founding o f a new, free state, only as a result o f the extermination of the
indigenous inhabitants" (81). Helen Tiffin also argues that the "crucial flaw in . . . the enterprise is
exposed” by recognizing that the "virgin territory" is "the site of a succession o f punitive expeditions
. . . that have annihilated the original inhabitants" (36).
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’talk of starting ‘from scratch . . . in virgin lands” identifies his ambition with conquest,
domination, and a ’suggestion of rape” (101). I would argue that the error is even more
fundamental and applies more broadly. If the ideal of virginity is flawed, then so is the mindset
that condemns whoredom as the opposite o f virginity. And if starting from scratch means starting
in virgin territory, then the practice o f freedom as escape from existing connections, as starting
fresh or new (even, or especially, when that fresh start is imagined as an escape from corruption,
from whores and whoring), is tainted by the same flaw. The flaw is also one that hints at endless
repetition; because women and lands cannot remain virgin once they are possessed, the pursuit of
freedom as a fresh start requires a continuous ’breaking loose,* as the title of Part I names their
activity, from existing connections. Since the promise of virginity underlies, in one way or another,
many of the men’s utopian expectations, the error of virginity indicts not only their desired
relationship to women as well as to natives and foreign lands, but also the ideal of freedom as they
imagine it.
The error belongs not just to the Commandant, but to the men in general. If there were
any possibility o f continuing the enterprise once the Commandant gave his order to halt, that
possibility was killed by the other officers. Even though their connections with women differ from
the Commandant’s, these officers also want a "fresh start," which they associate with virginity. If
the Commandant began this enterprise in order to reunite with his mistress, the officers joined him
in order to escape from their wives. If the Commandant wishes to halt the enterprise when he hears
that the Lady is a whore, the officers wish to abandon it when they hear that their wives are waiting
for them at San Cristobal. Yet, in the words of the pilot, the Commandant and the officers share an
"absolute deficiency," a "common failure to accept reunion with their women" (314).
According to the pilot, that deficiency stems from a "lack of courage"; the officers are
frightened by "real power." They want "‘to feel authority over the women,” but not "‘to commit
themselves fully to what they felt authority over” (319). There is much merit to the pilot’s
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analysis, and several critics essentially repeat his words in accounting for the failure o f the
enterprise.9 Success, according to these critics, would depend on a change in power relationships.
The case of the Steward, however, illustrates both the strength and the limits o f this diagnosis.
The Steward’s concern over his relationships to women is marked by symptoms o f anxiety.
He feels as if the skin on his chest is rippling and fluttering, as if water were 'spinning under his
skin’ (178). He wears his wedding ring on a chain around his neck because it feels like ”a prison
around his flesh* when he puts it on his finger; but then he plays with the ring compulsively and
repeatedly slips it on and off his fingers. He looks to the Surgeon as if he is working through "an
early hysteria’ (100, 180-183). The Steward admits to one ’anxiety," that the orphan girl who left
his house after he seduced her might soil his name or blackmail him; he suspects that the girl and
his wife, over whom, in the pilot’s words, he has tried to feel authority without committing himself
fully, have devised a plot to exercise power over him. But he only feels a brief "liberation from all
his fear” when he hears that the girl has died (195-196). What this case helps to illustrate,
however, is not simply a faulty exercise o f power, but also a failure of care.
Critics who read the pilot’s statement to mean that the men need to rehabilitate their
exercise of power by balancing it with responsibility emphasize the sense in which responsibility
refers to a duty or obligation the men must be willing to assume. And one of the Steward’s faults
is his desire to be free from obligation. But he is as averse to being obliged to others as he is
averse to being obliged fo r others and his case shows that the two forms of obligation are
connected. He refuses his wife’s connections and her help because he has an "aggressive selfregard"; he wants to do things for himself (179-181). When he arranges to take in the orphan girl

9 Paquet, for example, argues that the enterprise fails as a result of "a debilitating power
struggle between the sexes," characterized by a "conflict of power and responsibility," and must be
redressed by "restructuring . . . the balance o f power’ (101). McDonald argues that the men wish to
escape the "burden and responsibilities” o f their past and refuse to accept reunion because they refuse
"to accept a future in which the old power relationship is abandoned" (82).
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as his maid, he is able to settle things with the Lord Treasurer only because he ’had taken nothing”
from the Treasurer. He is ’free,” able to act as he chooses, only because he owes no one a debt
(191).

He doesn’t want to be obliged to others because he doesn’t want to be obliged for others;

he doesn’t want his sense o f freedom, which he understands as complete autonomy and open
possibility, to be compromised by a need to respond to the needs and desires of others.
What the critics, as well as the pilot, do not articulate clearly is the sense in which the
men’s lack o f responsibility is a failure of responsiveness, o f the ability to respond to and receive a
response from others. The distinction between the two is crucial to the exercise o f freedom with
care because, as Uma Narayan argues, colonizers used the rhetoric of responsibility, meaning
obligation, to justify paternalistic guidance and rule as "care” for their inferiors (134-135). When
the pilot suggests that the men must be able ”‘to commit themselves fully to what they felt authority
over,’” his language echoes the rhetoric of paternalistic power. Narayan charges that such
'responsible* colonizers fail *to be genuinely attentive and responsive to the needs, interests, and
welfare of others” (138, emphasis added). The Steward, a hopeful colonizer, is a case in point. He
is unwilling to respond, for example, to his wife’s charge o f neglect, to the orphan girl’s request for
asylum (instead, he substitutes his seductions for those o f the Treasurer), or to the recognition that
his behavior might destroy the comfort and intimacy that was developing between his wife and the
girl. Instead, he sees his wife’s requests for intimacy, as well as the intimacy she shares with the
girl, as threats. He wishes to be free bom any obligation to or for them and also bee from the
anxiety that accompanies his lack o f trust in them. The symptoms that continue are evidence that
his strategies for freeing himself are unsuccessful. He experiences a contradiction at the heart of
the way he attempts to secure his freedom from tyranny, imagined or real: he cannot be free of
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care, meaning anxiety, because he refuses to exercise care, meaning active concern for the welfare
of others and a willingness to listen to their needs, particularly in his relationships with women.10
W hen the men on the Reconnaissance are unable to respond to women, and to allow
women to respond to them, they are also unable to respond to the possibility in new situations. As
Derrida reflects in The Other Heading, those who deny others the "right o f response" in any but the
most restricted sense deprive themselves of the ability to respond, to invent "another gesture" or to
open the future to chance (30, 35, 105). Ironically, what the men lose in the search for a new start
on virgin territory when they undermine their relations with women they consider whores is,
according to Lamming, a liberated future, a future that "would be an innovation rather than a
continuation o f the past" (Kent 7). By focusing only on escape from the past, the men deny
themselves the opportunity to respond either to that past or to the present and future. Paradoxically,
freedom as escape inhibits the possibility of freedom as experiment; the escape from old restrictions
and anxieties, on which the Commandant builds his enterprise, does not promote thinking
differently. The charge that the officers exercise authority without commitment shows itself to be
closely related to an implicit charge that they practice freedom without response-ability, without
care for others and without possibility of a different future.
This deficiency, which is only indirectly acknowledged by the pilot, indicts the pilot along
with the other officers. The pilot admits that he joined this enterprise because he wanted "'power; I
have never had power over anyone’" (152). His lack of commitment and responsibility in
exercising that power, however, is highlighted by a narrative comment that is juxtaposed to his
criticism o f the officers. Here the narrative voice comments that the interests of the pilot, who is
"resolute about his multiple choice of direction," come "to an end with the certainty of his survival"

10 Munro comes closest to my analysis when he argues that the "ultimate cause of the
expedition’s failure” is the failure of the officers "to show humanity and compassion towards their
women” and suggests that the pilot’s remark gives their failure broad significance (139).
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(319-321). Not only does he reject any national attachment, but also any commitment to a woman.
He tells the officers, "‘I have no woman. I shall have no woman’" (152). Having enjoyed one
moment of prior intimacy with the Surgeon’s wife in the asylum, he claims that the only thing he
missed without women was *’degradation” (153).11
Once the officers learn that their wives are waiting their arrival at San Cristobal, their
"escape to freedom" requires that they "escape from the future o f the enterprise, from a reunion
with” their wives (293-296). Unaware o f the Commandant’s orders to halt their progress, the
Steward and the Surgeon murder him and are themselves killed by his cabin boy (306-311). The
crew, who object to a rumor that the enterprise will be abandoned, mutiny, take to the boats, and
"continue the enterprise as [they] see fit" (307-308).
After condemning the officers as representatives of middle class men who fail "to show
humanity and compassion toward women’ and who thus continue "the colonial legacy of conquest,
command and exploitation," Munro suggestively comments that "the determination of the men . . .
to continue the expedition without the officers may be seen as a statement of the role of the
common man in shaping a future West Indian society" (139). On a theoretical level, this shift to
the common men might hold promise for renewing the enterprise in a way that is less subject to the
corruption and failure of the officers. Baptiste, who leads the mutiny, characterizes their action as

“ My analysis departs significantly from that of Jonas, the only other critic who draws a
connection between the pilot and G. Jonas views the absolute condition o f exile embraced by the
pilot in an unequivocal and positive light. For her, the pilot "opts for the freedom of the crossroads"
he is a liminal figure who is able to practice "a freedom not experienced by men within the
boundaries and under the dictatorship of ideologies’ (112-113). While I share a skepticism toward
national loyalties that inhibit cross-cultural affiliations, I am arguing that if the novel endorses the
pilot’s lack o f commitment at all, it does so much less strongly and much more equivocally than
Jonas seems to imply. The pilot is less a liminal figure capable of various and multiple affiliations
than an outsider who refuses all affiliation.
In this particular, my reading is closer to that o f Paquet, who considers the pilot as an
example o f "amoral power.’ If he is "untouched by the crippling psychological and spiritual
torments” o f perverted male/female relationships, he is "motivated purely by profit and the desire for
power” and is "ready to strike any bargain that will be to his advantage” (113).
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"‘an act o f justice’” which compensates the common men for their labor. Noting that "‘it is a
fearful thing for common folk to act on their own orders,’” he presents their ’independence” as an
act o f courage against corrupt authority (300-308). And the crew’s insistence on reaching the island
without the officers might afford the potential to practice freedom in a way the Commandant
advocated in an early speech: "‘We have broken loose and will continue free from the ancient
restrictions of the Kingdom. This is the essence o f the matter. Whatever you were before, the
question now is what you must become. Such freedom is a vocation you have to learn and plant,
now and long after the enterprise is complete’” (52). The men have broken loose from old
restrictions and have redefined "justice." On a practical level, however, the possibility that the men
will be able to establish a liberated future in which individuals can practice freedom as a new way
of being together is restricted by the character of the crew who take over the enterprise and the
principles that guide them.
For Baptiste, the powder maker who leads the mutiny, and finally considers himself ”alone
and free,” is a crew member who heard the Commandant’s orders against taking slaves as a "breach
of contract* (131-132, 300). "Justice,” for Baptiste, would allow him to realize the promise o f his
labor through the fortune o f black flesh. He decides to continue without concern for the officers’
interests because he believes the "common hands were too far gone in the just expectations o f the
future to be distracted” (308). Pierre, another crew member prominent in the redirected enterprise,
considered the mass suicide o f the slaves they captured before the Middle Passage a "great
inconvenience” and a ’grievous loss of fortune. ” He considers the Blacks of the Guinea Coast a
’people who will prostitute themselves, granting free access to their continent” and cannot
understand this 'unreasonable” death; he finally attributes it to their ignorance and absence o f soul
(105, 121). As T.amming observes, the journey had turned Pierre into an "imperialist" (Kent 11).
If Paquet is correct in identifying the exceptional aspect of the Commandant’s utopian enterprise as
its noncommercial purpose, then its appropriation by the crew, for whom the promise o f freedom is
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associated with the promise o f gold, holds little promise for a future that is not based on economic
exploitation (102-105). The crew wildly 'dream of gold and glory’ and consider the Lord
Treasurer the 'summit o f achievement” (21). Since the common men’s attitudes towards women is
no better than that of the officers and no better than their own attitudes toward black slaves, there is
little reason to expect that their behavior toward the women who are waiting on the island will
produce an innovative, free society.12 Early in the journey, an anonymous voice of the common
men dreams about lying in the ’kind o f bed” the Lord Treasurer has made—one in which he sleeps
with 'virgins’ while he keeps his wife like a 'domestic beast,” a 'cow or a dog or some such
animal of convenience” (17). As Jonas argues, we can expect that the 'sam e flaws that doomed the
‘breaking loose” will be "evident in the new generation of reformers" (97).
T h e L egacy

of that

M i s t a k e : L o n e l in e s s

and

D is t r u s t

I .amming has observed that you could read his work, from In the Castle o f My Skin to

Natives o f My Person, as one work. If Castle begins the cycle of works that moves from the
colonial period through independence. Natives is both the work that rounds out the cycle and the
work that "might have opened that cycle"; "the end is the beginning' ("Africa and the Caribbean"
18-19). Unlike the men of the Reconnaissance who focus on the future as a completely fresh start
divorced from the past. Lamming can only imagine the future, what may happen beyond the
present, by returning to the past.
Lamming concedes that engaging in a dialogue with ancestral figures, even if those figures
are imagined, can function something like the Haitian ceremony of the Souls (Kent 9S). During this
ceremony, as lemming explains it, the dead return to speak to the living. This confrontation
between present and past is necessary for the dead as well as the living. In order to be redeemed.

12 Paquet also associates the crew’s desire to ’restore their manhood" with their potential for
tyranny, economic exploitation, and a general tendency to perpetuate the injustices they expect to
leave behind (105-107).
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the dead must "go into matters which they did not, for one reason or another, when alive” (Kent
94). They must "offer a full and honest report on their past relations with the living, * so that each
may be forgiven (Pleasures 9). The dialogue is also intended to guide the living who need to
reform their present condition (Pleasures 10). Since the world of the living is "also the creation of
the dead,” this dialogue is needed to change the 'architecture of the future” (Kent 94). By choosing
to go 'forw ard by making a complete return to the beginnings,” Lamming allows the dead to speak
to the living through Natives o f My Person (Kent 96).
Because the dialogue in the Ceremony o f Souls focuses on past mistakes, participating in
this ceremony is particularly important for the present practice of freedom. As Sandra Pouchet
Paquet suggests in her reading of lem m ing’s Season o f Adventure, the dialogue is ’mutually
liberating,” freeing both dead and living 'from the errors of the past” (69). Several parallels
indicate that dialogue with these particular ancestors, the characters in Natives, might be especially
appropriate for G when he prepares to leave Barbados at the end of Castle.13 G’s potential
'ancestors” in this novel include not only the Commandant and the pilot, but also the other officers
of the Reconnaissance, its crew, the women on the sister ship Penalty, and the Tribes who have
been dispossessed or exterminated.
When Lamming tells George Kent that Natives comments simultaneously on ’two sets of
historical circumstances, ” the period o f colonization and the contemporary world o f post-colonial

13 Several critics have noted the significance o f this ceremony or, more loosely, o f a dialogue
between past and present, in Lamming’s work. Paquet, for example, focuses on its overall
significance and its explicit representation in Season o f Adventure. A few have read Natives o f My
Person, as I .amming and Kent suggest, as an example of this ceremony. Leonie Harris explains its
significance much as Lamming himself does in his conversation with Kent; the spirit of the original
enterprise continues to live in such features o f the present as the international corporation, the corrupt
government, o r the bourgeois middle-class. M unro, in a brief overview, notes that Natives "is a
journey into the souls of both colonizer and colonized,” and that it suggests the 'underlying, recurrent
patterns o f Caribbean history,” but he does not analyze the correspondence between the past o f
Natives and the present of lemming’s other novels (126, 143). To my knowledge, only Jonas makes
a direct link between G and one of the characters in Natives. As I noted earlier, she links G with the
pilot, Pinteados (112).
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territories, be focuses on the "parallel relationships” between the leaders and the masses in the two
circumstances. N either he nor Kent attempt to evaluate the ’parallel relationships” between men
and women even though, as I noted earlier,

I-a m m in g

argues that the major obstacle to creating "a

new order of relations between men” in the period o f colonization is the inability o f the men to
"reorganize their emotions regarding women” (Kent 5-6). I would argue that similar difficulties
with male/female relationships inhibit the development o f a truly innovative order o f freedom in the
contemporary world o f San Cristobal, the world portrayed in Castle.
If we consider G’s attitude at the end o f Cattle with the benefit of the backward glance that
the Ceremony of Souls provides through Natives, we can see that his "mistake” is close to that o f
the C om m andant, the pilot, and the other officers. His image of freedom as escape from tyranny
and protection from invasion corresponds closely with that o f the men because the society in which
he is raised is similarly corrupt and characterized by difficult relations between men and women;
and G’s mistake similarly involves anxieties about relationships with others and an inability to
practice the kind o f responsibility that emphasizes responsiveness. If the castle image in Walcott’s
poem denies union to the black boy, G’s inverted use o f the image rejects union.
It is noteworthy that G comes upon the title image as he rereads a diary entry. Like the
Com m andant reading his own journal, G encounters a disturbing image, an image which could alert

him to possible error. As I noted earlier, G’s attitude toward the protection afforded by the title
image is ambivalent at best. Like the Commandant who repeated the phrase *virgin territories” in
his journal entries, G repeats the ”castle of skin" image twice in the one entry and makes it the last
thing he intends to record in his journal, because he finds himself saying "the same things over and
over." Between the tw o repetitions of the image, however, he records the "last engagement* he has
on the island, a meeting with a prostitute (261). It is after this engagement that he writes about
wanting to hide in the castle o f his skin.
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His meeting with the prostitute is a curious one. He responds to her touch and the sight of
her shiny, dark skin by belching. When she takes offense, he tells her a story about a boy who
tricks others by getting them to grab a stick covered with bird shit. W hen the prostitute doesn’t
understand why he tells her this "funny” story, he records ambiguously that he ’couldn’t wait to
explain" (261). Whether he nw»ans that he doesn’t take the time to explain, or that he loses no time
in explaining the unflattering connection, is unclear. The incident, in either case, is degrading and
ultimately hostile.
Jonas suggests that "the boy in the story epitomizes the impulse to . . . use another’s
humiliation and shame to prove one’s own manhood." A rguing that the prostitute unwittingly
acquiesces in this process when her customers prove their manhood on her body, Jonas suggests that
G "refuses to win ‘manhood’ so cheaply." Instead, he turns "shit" into "medicine" by confronting
his own darkness (70). My reading, by contrast, suggests that G responds precisely and
problematically out of concern for his manhood. If Walcott’s poem describes a self-denigrating
admirer of a white mistress, as Jonas claims, G’s appropriation of the poem ’s castle imagery tends
to denigrate others as it protects himself.
Not only do images of beset manhood recur throughout the novel, but stories of beset
manhood introduce significant changes in the life and thinking of the com m unity.14 It is after the
head teacher learns about his wife’s adultery with the schoolmaster Slime, for example, that Slime
resigns from teaching and opens the Friendly Society and Penny Bank that eventually dispossesses
the villagers who join it (76-77, 233-257). When G and the boys spend a day at the beach
reflecting on the state of their world, they focus on two stories of men, Jon and Bambi, who are
forced to choose between two women. Interpreting the tragedy that results, the boys conclude that

14 I am borrowing the phrase, "beset manhood," from Nina Baym’s analysis of masculine
theories o f American literature as "Melodramas of Beset Manhood.” H er phrase is especially
felicitous for my study since she argues that the idea of America, as a land o f promise, was
developed by male authors as a myth o f the male who must escape social, or female, constraint in
order to realize his individuality, or freedom, in an unsettled, or virgin, wilderness (71-73).
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the "trouble" comes from marriage, which, according to an old saying, "‘ain’t make for
everybody.’" Trumper announces that he will never marry because there are so many bad things
about it, "‘you don’t sort of get ’bout as you like, an’ the woman always seem to think she’s got
some special kind of claim on you, as if you’re a kind of pigeon o r fowl’" (141-142). Their
adolescent discussion echoes the thinking of the men on the Reconnaissance. ls
Paquet is one critic who interprets the novel from a masculine perspective that identifies
with the boys’ anxieties. Focusing on the colonial society’s attack on manhood, she interprets these
stories as a loss of village harmony and integrity and free spirit and ascribes their tragedy to the
"impositionof an alien social contract that has no relevance." Claiming that the church and the
school in this setting are "emasculating,' she finds that the novel endorses Trumper’s politics of
black identity, criticizes the villagers’ inability to organize in their own interests, and suggests that
their inability to recognize the "function o f power" reflects a "loss o f manhood." She concludes
that the novel argues for a complete break with such "crippling traditional restraints," in particular,
by showing that G must separate from the authority of his mother (20-27). While Paquet’s analysis
is perceptive as an explanation o f G ’s choices, it is less convincing as a description of a positive
message that the novel endorses.
Paquet perceptively highlights the significance of G ’s struggle with his mother for his
developing ideas of freedom and manhood. For example, the day on the beach, when the boys
rehearse the village stories of beset manhood and elaborate their philosophy o f life, takes place after
his mother tells him that he must choose between her and the men on the comer, between her
knowledge and their knowledge, since he "‘can’t serve two masters’" (113). As he returns from the

15 I -amming observes that the groupings of the men in Natives are similar to the groupings of
the boys in Castle and that those "long speculations and so on between the men on the deck in Natives
o f My Person are really an extension of the long speculations of the boys on the beach in In the
Castle o f My Skin.' But he only notes a similarity in their "talking about a world which exists only
as an idea in your head" rather than a similarity in their discussion o f men and women ("Africa and
the Caribbean” 18).
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beach he prepares a lie to keep his disobedience from her; the quality o f that lie, according to the
boys, places him in the ranks o f lawyers and politicians (157-158). He also chooses to spend his
last morning reading those significant passages from his own diary instead o f responding to his
mother’s calls for attention and respect. She has been packing his things for nearly a week and is
preparing one last celebratory meal, but he ignores her, treating her, as she says, as if she were his
"maid.” When she insists that he treat her with the dignity she deserves, he tries to "appease" her,
but fails because he cannot recognize that her complaints against him have any merit (260-267).
His behavior replicates that of the Commandant when the Lady demeans his work as butchery and
angrily complains about his decision to leave her in order to continue that work. As the
Commandant and G listen to the women berate them, they each reflect that such bursts of anger are
becoming familiar and respond, almost peevishly, with the same question. Aggrieved at what they
consider unfair assaults, the Commandant asks his mistress, "‘What have I done now?’" and G
asked his mother "outright what [he] had done this time" (Natives 69-70; Castle 263-264). While
G’s mother tries to make him understand that he will be able to respect others only if he remembers
to respect her, he refuses to listen and thinks only about "escape" (260-267). The "need" for a
complete break thus corresponds well with G’s perspective. But his perspective does not go
unchallenged and does not represent the novel’s argument.
What Paquet’s analysis misses is the way a perspective that focuses on manhood can
translate social constraint into female constraint or social struggle into a struggle between men and
women, or mothers and sons. While Paquet recognizes that the emphasis on manhood is a source
of error for the colonizing enterprise in Natives, she suggests that restoring manhood offers a
solution to the colonized in Castle. But the parallel contexts in which G and the Commandant read
their diaries and discover a hint o f error or ambivalence suggest that the situations of the male
colonials, both the colonizers and the colonized, may be more similar than she acknowledges. If
the Commandant turns to his journal as he prepares to meet his mistress on the island, G turns to
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bis diary as he prepares to leave his mother on the island. The fact that one is coining and the
other is going seems to set up a certain distinction, but that distinction is blurred if we recall the
Lady’s caution that the two movements were collapsed in the Commandant’s travels. G’s difficulty
with responding sympathetically to his mother echoes both the Commandant’s inability to respond to
the Lady’s needs each time he leaves and also his inability to reorganize his emotional response to
her as he approaches the island.
In one intriguing comment on Castle, Ngugi implies that the boys substitute a contest with
mothers for economic, political, or social struggle. "[T]he boys think it is the stupidity of their
mothers which drives them from home, ” because they do not understand that the root of their
situation lies in slavery and economic necessity. Ngugi suggests that this misunderstanding arises
from their ignorance o f the relationship between slavery and freedom; this ignorance results in an
effort to "find their roots in a general human predicament of sin, death, resurrection and salvation
by grace" (113-117). If we accept that the general idea and practice o f freedom is historically
linked to the specific practice of slavery, as Orlando Patterson and Edmund Morgan, among others,
argue, then the boys have inherited an attitude toward freedom that is connected to the history of
slavery whether or not the boys understand that connection.16 They may continue the practice of
freedom developed in master/slave relationships in other forms o f relationship, particularly those
which involve authority and potential domination. When the boys displace the authority o f the
master onto mothers, as the men in Natives displace the authority o f the House onto women, they
may localize that authority in a way they can resist, without fundamentally challenging the dynamics
o f master-slave interactions.

16 See Patterson’s Freedom in the Making o f Western Culture for an argument that the
connection between slavery and freedom began with the development o f Athenian democracy. See
Morgan’s American Slavery, American Freedom for his impressive analysis o f this connection in the
development o f American democracy.
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One generalization that emerges when we consider the image o f freedom that underlies the
boys’ understanding, or misunderstanding, of slavery and their own relationships with women,
family, and others, is that the freedom developed within this understanding is marked by a sense of
loneliness. Freedom, as the 9-year-old G intuits when he reflects on his lack of family relations, is
a blessing that takes the form o f a consolation for loneliness: "[LJoneliness from which had
subsequently grown the consolation o f freedom,'’ he notes, "was the legacy with which my first
year opened." Like the less than certain "consolation* o f the showers which "bless" his ninth
birthday, it is, at best, a mixed blessing (9-15).
This concern with the connection between freedom and loneliness underlies the boys’
discussions o f beset manhood and different worlds on the beach, Trumper’s embrace of race
politics, and G ’s retreat into the castle of his skin. Trumper, for example, embraces the politics of
race as one way to avoid being "alone in a world all by yourself" (295-301). In a significant sense,
G’s choice is in direct contrast to Trumper’s. Where Trumper believes he can be known as and can
act as a citizen of a larger world, the world of race, G prefers not to be known and, risking
loneliness, chooses to be alone in his world, in the castle of his skin.17 What G avoids with his
choice is "responsibility." He tells Trumper that he avoids politics, and thus race, because "’I don’t
like the idea o f being responsible to hundreds of people’" (292). What both choices have in
common, however, other than being determined by skin, is that both seek protection from the ’pop,
pop,* the "something goin’ off in yuh head," that they expect when worlds collide or change and
people feel they don’t belong (142-145). Both seek protection from conflicting worlds by inhabiting
a single world—the world of race or the world o f the individual. In order to protect, both must
exclude others as not native to their world. What both choices restrict is a broad sense of
responsibility, the ability to respond to and change others unlike them and to let those others

17 See Cooke, "The Strains of Apocalypse," for another reading o f G, with his need for
independence, as a "lonely T " (28, 39).
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respond to and change them. G looks forward to travelling in another world precisely because he is
*not native” to that world; for he expects that he will enjoy greater freedom and mobility as an
outsider and a non-native (260). His choices match those of the pilot, the only non-native of Lime
Stone on the Reconnaissance, who feels momentarily that he would like to ”be part o f another’s
understanding,” but ultimately chooses to 'create himself as an absolute foreigner* (316,319). G’s
prospect o f unsettling himself from his native sphere is also unsettling in another sense; his source
of hope is also a source of anxiety. Paradoxically, G prepares to unsettle himself and travel in
other worlds by attempting to protect himself from becoming unsettled by those w orlds.18
What underlies this fear of other worlds is a lack of trust. The boys fear betrayal because
they fear that others hide a secret self inside them. Boys who move from the village school to the
High School, for example, feel excluded from both worlds and can neither trust nor be trusted
because they believe that "hidden somewhere in each was the other person which wondered how far
the physical surface could be trusted” (220-221). For this reason, G would have difficulty trusting
in the solidarity of race politics that Trumper embraces. G’s choice echoes that of the Steward.
Because he had been betrayed by the Lord Treasurer who had stolen his maps, he was "afraid that
any confidence might be used against him" and any ’gesture of collaboration” was only a 'pretext
for some future theft”; consequently, the Steward 'closed his doors against all offers of
comradeship” (Natives 329). But G’s choice, hiding within the castle of his skin, reinforces rather
than resolves this fear. The 'h id in g ” that he sees as necessary for freedom is both his protection
and the source of his greatest fear. Practicing a freedom that excludes others creates a seemingly
insoluble dilemma: this kind o f freedom promotes the very loneliness for which it provides the only
consolation.

18 See Part 3 for further discussion of connections between modes of habitation, travel, and
the practice o f freedom with care in Lamming and the other authors in this study.
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The experience o f the village, like the competition and discord in Lime Stone, provides
ample reason for distrust. Both Slime and the head teacher, who believe they share two worlds, the
world o f the village and the world of the school or authority, betray the villagers. The head teacher
suffers his own betrayal, his wife’s infidelity with Slime. The "explosion’ that occurs in his head
echoes the "pop, pop" that the boys fear, and it forces him to contemplate a "novel response,"
something to replace the ready responses which had all become inoperative, if he is to overcome the
impotence o f inaction. As he reflects on questions of trust, on concern for his own power and
authority, and on concern for Slime’s wife and children, he feels his mind becoming "undisciplined"
and ends up "farther away from a decision than he was when he had started to think of one" (6468). His general inability "to get a ready response, a new tactic for a problem which had never
appeared before," prefigures the difficulty the villagers face when they try to decide on an
appropriate response to having their land purchased away from them. But his specific inability to
develop a just solution that combines concern for the effects of his choices on himself and on others
highlights the paucity of the heritage within which he is working.
And the way G hopes to resolve the challenge of betrayal when worlds collide is simply
based on a fantasy. That fantasy is exposed when the boys invade the landlord’s home, which is as
large as a castle and as different from their world as the place they call "the other world," heaven.
Even as they demonstrate that this fortress is subject to intrusion and a kind o f "house-breaking,"
they imagine that their presence creates no disturbance, that they can keep each of their worlds
separate, intact, and fundamentally impregnable. When Trumper suggests that everything’s in
order, "‘[b]ig life one side an’ small life a next side,’" the phrase he uses to describe their feeling
of harmony, "‘you get a kin’ o ’ feelin’ of you in your small comer an’ I in mine,” uncannily
echoes the structure of the poetic lines from which the title image is drawn: "You in the castle of
your skin, I among the swineherd" (171-175).

This house-breaking episode suggests that G’s skin,

which he inhabits as a castle even as the landlord becomes "a relic o f another tim e," will be far
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from impregnable and that his attempt to keep himself to himself is based on a similar fantasy of
sovereign autonomy (230).
The image G adopts is a fantasy not least because, as the voice in Pa’s dream cautions,
"there’s always two worlds to one man" (211-212). It is precisely this worry, that moving in
another world might bring out another person in themselves, someone different from who they think
they are, that creates the greatest anxiety among the boys, that makes them worry that something in
their heads will go "pop, pop," and that encourages them to avoid feeling (142, 153). The integrity
of their worlds, and their belief that they can be free in those worlds, are threatened not simply by
their inability to know the person hidden inside the other, but also by their inability to trust the
other inside the self.
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One o f the ’others" G must be open to is "Caliban” and the legacy of the native that
Caliban represents. As a contemporary West Indian, G has dual ancestors in the European and the
native (Pleasures IS). In his critical essays, I -amming explores not only the freedom inherited from
Prospero but also the freedom native to Caliban. He concludes that each legacy involves a different
"mistake” in the way people relate to each other, and he proposes that the Prospero and the Caliban
within the divided West Indian subject must work together if the West Indies are to practice a
freedom that is masterless and slaveless (Pleasures 8S, 159).1
The Commandant in Natives is, like Prospero, "a new man intent on being a new master";
like Ahab, he is a master-builder obsessed with a master plan (Pleasures 151). His own freedom in
his new enterprise requires that his power and independence be recognized and protected. The
loneliness and distrust that precedes and continues with G ’s appropriation of the master’s symbol of
freedom with or through protection illustrates one of the limitations o f his legacy.2

1 Although the figures o f Prospero and Caliban are taken, as I already noted, from
Shakespeare’s 1611 play, The Tempest, the characters and plot o f The Tempest do not provide the
exclusive referent for Lamming’s analysis of a Prospero-Caliban relationship. In a more general
scheme, he figures colonizers as Prosperos and the colonized as Calibans. Accordingly, my
"summary” o f the Prospero-Caliban relationship in his work is not restricted to his direct analysis of
Shakespeare’s play, but includes several pertinent features of his broader analysis.
2 This reading o f the Commandant challenges the one presented by the Boatswain within the
novel. The Boatswain says that his own rule of conduct is to distrust, to consider another a crook,
until his conduct proves he can be trusted and claims that the Commandant follows an opposite code,
trusting others until they prove unworthy of such honor. He concludes that either way can be
"grievous error” (213). The Boatswain may be perceptive in describing two approaches to
interactions with others and in suggesting that each may involve error, but he is inaccurate in
describing the Commandant’s tendency. The Commandant certainly never trusted the natives of the
60
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While Prospero’s mistake corresponds broadly with that o f the man who becomes the
master in Hegel’s description o f the master-slave dialectic, Caliban’s mistake is not originally that
of the man who becomes the slave in the same dialectic. Lamming focuses instead on Caliban’s
original situation, which illustrates the legacy of the native before master-slave relations. Although
Caliban becomes Prospero’s slave, his original mistake is one o f spontaneous generosity, rather than
concession in a struggle for recognition. As Lamming describes it, Caliban’s mistake is a
"tendency to welcome." The danger o f this mistake is the betrayal that G fears. When Caliban’s
offer o f affection is betrayed, he is both dispossessed and enslaved. The solution, however, is not
simply to adopt Prospero’s strategy. To the extent that an enslaved Caliban identifies with
Prospero’s notion and with his limited offers of freedom and equality, Caliban is actually colonized
by affection (Pleasures 76, 101, 114).
Even though Caliban’s generous welcome carries great risk in encounters structured by
Prospero’s intentions and fears, his mistake is yet a "source of some vision." For Caliban’s mistake
affords "a kind o f creative blindness" (Pleasures 115). Prospero’s mistake, by contrast, presumably
involves a destructive blindness.
As I noted in the previous chapter. Lamming enters into a Ceremony-of-Souls-like dialogue
with one o f these West Indian ancestors, Prospero, through his portrait o f the Commandant and the
officers o f the Reconnaissance. That same novel also explores the legacy of Caliban, but does so
chiefly by entering into dialogue with the women who, travelling on the sister ship Penalty, have
arrived at the island ahead of the men. Natives o f My Person explores the legacy of the ProsperoCaliban pair, in pan, by figuring it in terms of allegorical male-female pairs.
Lamming’s critical analysis o f The Tempest connects the two pairs. Prospero condemns
Caliban’s mother, Sycorax, as a "so-and-so" and takes "refuge in the lesson of chastity in order to

islands and keeps much of his plan for this enterprise secret from the officers and the men; and
during the voyage from Lime Stone to the islands, he has very little interaction with anyone.
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evade o r obscure talk about* Miranda’s mother, "the woman who is supposed to be his wife.”
Since these women are dead in The Tempest, they are silent, unable to respond. I amming suggests
that it will take 'som e arrangement similar to the Haitian Ceremony o f Souls” for them to return
and "tell u s what we should and ought to know.” He concludes that hope for the future lies in the
children o f these two mothers; for Caliban and Miranda now "share an ignorance that is also the
source o f som e vision” (Pleasures 115-116). In the final section of Natives, Lamming arranges a
kind o f Ceremony o f Souls that allows some o f these ’mothers” to speak, if only briefly.
T.amming presents most of Natives in a way that mimics the histories of the European
colonizers—in a way that depends on the invisible presence o f blackness and also on the invisible
presence o f women. In Playing in the Dark, Toni Morrison eloquently argues that the invisible
presence o f blackness conditions the literary imagination of whiteness and freedom.3 lemming
similarly argues that our social institutions treat ’the female as an invisible presence, . . . made
absent w hen she is most present" ("Coming Home" 50). In Natives o f My Person he makes it clear
that the invisible presence of natives and women conditions the imagination o f manhood and
freedom. W hile the natives of the islands never speak, the women waiting on the island do.
Unaware that the Commandant, Surgeon, and Steward have been killed, the Lady, the wives of the
two officers, and perhaps the other anonymous women, provide a "creative legacy" that shifts the
focus o f the novel from the failure o f the aborted enterprise to an end o f open possibility (Kent 88).
As the Lady o f the House prophetically and enigmatically concludes, these women "are a future’
the men "must learn" (345).
H er comment adds several ironic twists to the ambitions of the men. In his reading of
Prospero and Caliban,

f - a m m in g

suggests that "future is the very name for possibilities” (Pleasures

109). Throughout the journey in Natives, the men have focused their hopes on the "future." The

3 See my introduction for a fuller discussion of Morrison’s text and the extent to which it
influences the shape of this project.
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habit o f mind was so endemic that long before the Steward had trained his wife "‘to feel and think
of the future as the only important aspect o f time” (202). And the "future" throughout the men’s
journey has been somehow bound up with the promise o f the islands ahead. The Lady’s phrase
picks up the language of the men and reorients it. The "future" does wait for the men on that
island. But it is not so much the gold and the glory the men had been imagining; rather, the future
is the women from the kingdom the men had left behind. If these women are the men’s "future,"
they are also connected to the men’s "past." Their dual status reflects two key ideas: there is no
completely "fresh start’ as the Surgeon and others had hoped, but neither is there any possibility of
simply returning to the old kingdom and its ways.
What it means for the "women" to be the future, however, is highly ambiguous. The
words might simply mean that the future must be lived with these particular women. O r that it
must be lived as these particular women have lived. Or that it will be lived by these women,
perhaps in some new way that even they are only beginning to glimpse. Or, further, that it will be
lived between these women and must be lived as they manage to live with each other. The meaning
of the future is also ambivalent. If the notion of the "future" presented in the novel has involved a
sense o f promise and of potential fortune, it has also involved a sense o f anxiety, of something
unknown, mysterious, hidden from present knowledge. The men have tried, on the one hand, to fix
that future by planning it and taking charge over it, or they have tried, on the other hand, to get a
glimpse of some unknown, unplanned future through prophetic visions. Neither practice has yet
been particularly rewarding.
Lamming, as a novelist, tries a different method when, in culminating his series of novels
about his contemporary world, he hopes to glimpse the possible future of the Caribbean islands after
independence by exploring the past, by imagining a dialogue with the characters in Natives.
Applying that method internally, by looking into the women’s past within the world of the novel,
may be the most fruitful for glimpsing what kind of future they might portend.
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Although [.amming criticizes the men’s inability to carry out a creative future with the
women and sets up a gendered structure that opposes the women’s practice to the men’s, and seems
to endorse their practice over the men's, the women are not simply victims to the men and their
portrait is not simply positive. The Steward’s wife, for example, did try to use the orphan girl who
showed up at their door as a ’’pawn,* in her attempt to influence her husband, as well as in their
attempt to best the Lord Treasurer (203, 335). The Lady, when she was simply the Commandant’s
mistress, wanted to feel a "pride of conquest" over him, to divorce him from the sea; she forbade
him, unsuccessfully, to leave her again (56-60). The Lady did commit adultery with the Boatswain,
although she claims she reached out first in sympathy rather than in domination and then continued
in submissive indifference and self-debasement; and the Surgeon’s virtuous wife did have
intercourse with the pilot, although it was only once and only when she had been abandoned by the
Surgeon and unjustly confined in an asylum (170, 337-340).
But there is perhaps something more promising in their past, something which indicates at
least a potential for a more creative responsiveness to others—one that allows sympathy with another
to influence their own feelings and behavior even as they hope to influence the feelings and
behavior of others. The Steward’s wife, for example, learns to appreciate the orphan girl as a
companion. The way she thinks about the "gift" o f this companionship provides a striking contrast
with the way G thinks about relationships with others and reflects a legacy that he may need to
consider in his desire for independence. For the Steward’s wife had experienced the "solitude" she
knew in her marriage as a "prison"; her home had been an unwelcome "fortress." So she
experiences the companionship with the girl as release rather than confinement—even though the
mutual affection releases painful feelings. When she learns about the sexual relations between the
girl and her husband, the experience is horrifying and enlightening. She is finally able to see the
girl not simply as a gift to her, but as a "person” with separate feelings. She recognizes both that
the girl is afraid o f her husband’s attentions and that the girl feels powerless to complain partly
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because the girl is responding to the wife’s need for companionship (335-336). In part, what she is
able to see when she recognizes the suffering o f another is the role she plays in the suffering.
It is the related 'virtue* o f 'se lf inquiry” in the Commandant’s mistress (before she marries
the Lord Treasurer) that the Commandant fears and seeks to avoid so assiduously. He, like the
Steward, likes to think o f him self as innocent; when accused, like G, he is aggrieved. The
difference in the gendered approaches to self inquiry when such inquiry relates to the suffering of
others is highlighted in how the Commandant and his mistress react to the slaughter and the
subsequent response o f the Tribes on Sans Souci during earlier expeditions. For him, the slaughter,
as well as the torture he inflicted to make the Tribes work in the mines, had been part o f his
”duty,” or responsibility, a way o f securing command. The resistance he encounters from the
Tribes on a subsequent expedition is an unallowable 'liberty.* Because they have defeated, and
almost killed, him by digging and concealing 'graves* on the beach and then retreating
underground, be vows that he will never leave them alone. If he is to practice his independence

sans souci, without care for their needs and without concern for his life, they must consent to
subjugation. He is most offended when his mistress makes a 'trial of their [his and the kingdom’s]
triumphs.” He reminds her that her own father led the expedition during which the Tribes were
first slaughtered and suggests that he has acted in her name. He offers her the jewels he took after
the Tribes went underground at Sans Souci and insists that they are not souvenirs o f conquest, but
souvenirs of her (56-65, 70-82, 219).
His mistress is briefly seduced by the jewels and his acts of affection, but she cannot long
enjoy the jewels from Sans Souci without care. She knows their price too well—for herself and for
the Tribes. She considers her experience and that of the Tribes in parallel and develops her
sympathetic response partly by recognizing something similar in their situations and partly by
imagining how she and the kingdom would suffer if their experiences were even more closely
aligned. She had been on the Demon Coast o f Sans Souci when her father, who was assisted by the
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Commandant, sent the men o f the Tribes to the mines and she had seen the suffering o f the women
who remained to farm like cattle and to ’wait” for the return o f their men. Since she now knows
the pain of being separated horn the Commandant, she begins to condemn the kingdom’s "work"
even more forcefully than she had in the past. She suffers when she remembers that 10,000 women
and uncounted children had died in one month, that the women, in madness or resistance, had
drowned their own children before the kingdom’s bullets cut them down, and that the kingdom
considers her father, who is responsible for the slaughter, a "decent” man because he is loyal and
affectionate to his own family. She concludes her reflections by trying to calculate how quickly the
people o f the kingdom would become extinct if they were killed at a similar rate. The Commandant
is indignant at her accusations and appalled by her attempt to imagine the people o f the kingdom in
the position of the people o f the Tribes (76-82). It is possible to read the Lady’s final statement,
that she and the other women 'a re a future” the men "must leam," as the novel’s response to the
words with which the Commandant refuses to accept her "demonic" way of understanding the
kingdom’s relations with the Tribes: "She is a virtue I cannot satisfy" (76).
He prefers a woman o f fantasy, as the moment he is most happy with her behavior
indicates. On the day that, unknown to him, she marries the Lord Treasurer, he sees "her the way
he wanted her to be": smiling softly and reflectively, "yet warm with attention" and no hint of
"recrimination" (270). The real woman, however, is someone who has both married the Lord
Treasurer and is beginning to plan the Commandant’s rescue from prosecution for finally opposing
the interests of the House; she is capable of self-inquiry and of judgment.
Unwilling to judge himself according to her "virtue,” the Commandant searches for some
failing in her. When he later hears the Boatswain’s charge that she is a 'whore,* he latches onto
her 'betrayal” as an excuse to end their connection. As the pilot phrases it, the Commandant, like
the Surgeon, uses a woman’s infidelity to "m ake peace with himself* (317). Each has been
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defensive about his own failings and finds a certain relief in discovering an "honorable" reason for
ending their relationships.
The women, by contrast, choose to help their men and to rejoin them even though the
women are aware o f the men’s failings and even though the men have betrayed them. The women
explain their own behavior as a practice o f 'love,* which to them means that they choose to act, at
least sometimes, in the men’s behalf even if that choice means acting against their own 'interest"
(202, 328).
Another way to account for the women’s attitudes, however, is to see them attempting to
reconcile Prospero and Caliban in ways that Lamming says the contemporary West Indian must
leam to do. Intrapsychically, they must recognize both Prospero, or the element of power, and also
Caliban, or the element o f generosity or the tendency to welcome, as part of themselves, and must
reconcile the two aspects within themselves. Interpersonally, when they identify themselves in the
position o f Caliban, they must 'w ork together' with and reconcile themselves to Prospero in the
figures of such men as the Commandant, the Surgeon, and the Steward. For if, as Lamming
suggests, the future must derive from the past, which includes Prospero as well as Caliban, and the
"women” are the 'future," then any possibility the women embody must also incorporate the
legacies o f Prospero as well as Caliban. When one of the wives defines the "interests" involved in
her choice in terms that hint at this possibility, because those terms suggest that the men’s and
women’s interests are not completely separate and that the interest of another is not necessarily
foreign to her, she says that her husband has become "’a native of my person’" (328).
R e a l iz in g

t h e f u t u r e in

"N a t iv e S o i l "

Like the notion of a "future," the notion o f a "native” has been both prevalent throughout
the novel and used in a number o f ways. Those who are indigenous to Lime Stone use the term to
define themselves. They commonly use the designation, 'native o f Lime Stone," to identify those
who come from the same place as potential comrades and as knowable. Those who are "not

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

68
native,* like the pilot, do not share their habits and are excluded from their company and treated
with suspicion. One o f the crew insists that the pilot is not a ’safe’ companion, because he is ' ‘not
native to Lime Stone, where the word is necessary as blood. We call on it in and out of season, for
good reason and bad, or no reason at all” (13). When the pilot then chooses to identify himself as
the polar opposite o f native, and to disassociate himself from them, and eventually all others, by
becoming the absolute ’ foreigner,’ he thinks of this position as being ’impervious, remote, and
devoid o f all interest in [others’] personal destiny* (294).
The pilot, who was bom and raised on Antarctica, and is thus ’native" to it, has refused
that identification and deserted because he was branded as a traitor for objecting, like the
Commandant, to the peace treaty being negotiated between their nations. The pilot expresses his
freedom through his insistence on foreignness, by which he radically separates his interests from
those o f all other people. The freedom of the ’foreigner," moreover, is one which allows him to be
'resolute about his multiple choice of direction,* to live without any allegiance or commitment to
others (321). Such lack o f involvement with others may be Prospero’s most damning quality; for
l-amming calls ’total indifference . . . a perfect example of human degradation" (Pleasures 116).
By considering others as natives of rather than foreign to themselves, the women designate another
way o f being together as their path to the future and its freedom.
The people o f Lime Stone do not use this opposing term, 'foreigner, * to describe those
who are indigenous to the islands rather than to Lime Stone. Instead, they use the same term they
use to name themselves, "native," but often in a different sense. Those who come from the islands
are seldom described as "natives of" or ’native to” Sans Souci or San Cristobal, for example, but
simply as "natives” (or ’tribes”). The word takes on ontological connotations when it is used to
characterize those inhabitants as savage or beastly and different from the inhabitants of Lime Stone.
If the women also embody this sense of the term when they consider others as natives of
themselves, then they are refusing such strict ontological distinctions between themselves and
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others, and, figuratively, between Prospero and Caliban. And their use of the phrase would reclaim
the word 'native,” as another T-amming novel puts it, from that list o f names 'that start with ‘n’”
and that twentieth-century intellectuals, like their seventeenth-century predecessors, use to deride the
islands’ indigenous and dark inhabitants {Season 71).
The image the women use institutes a new mode of connectedness with others and relocates
the place of identification from a nation or land to the self, to the body and the psyche. The image
adds another irony to the ambition of the Surgeon, who had joined this enterprise because he
believed that 'fate had deprived [him] of a chance to realize [his] visions in the native soil o f Lime
Stone" (51). As I noted earlier, he can only envision success on "virgin" territory. The position of
the women at the end of the novel suggests that one thing the Surgeon and the other men must leam
to do is reorganize their understanding of 'native soil” as well as 'virgin territory* and their
relationships to both. The future will be lived on "native soil."

That "soil," however, must now

be understood in its multiple and shifting meanings, which include the character o f the land they left
behind and o f the islands toward which they are heading, the past and the future and the connections
between the two, as well as the women who are connected to the soil and even identified with it.
The novel makes at least one explicit connection between women and soil when the Commandant
has intercourse with his mistress following his fourth voyage, the one during which he was defeated
by the Tribes through their "strategy of the graves." Even as he enjoys her body, his mind turns to
the assault he will mount against the natives on another voyage. The narrative describes his
preoccupation by observing that "his . . . sperm was nurturing a different soil" (65). The use of
the word "different" draws the land, the woman’s body, and perhaps his thoughts about the future,
together in the idea of "soil." By the end of the novel, the women have come to stand, figuratively
and in all its meanings, for the 'native soil’ on which the future must be lived.
The bodily image with which the women begin their journey to the future also provides a
useful contrast with the attitude that G embodies when he sets out on his journey. G’s 'castle of
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skin* imagery embodies the promise and the risk that Lamming associated with Prospero; since it
promises independence by emphasising separation from others and self-protection, it risks isolation
and loneliness. In the language I have been using to describe the characters in Natives, G assumes
that others are foreign beings, with interests hostile to his own, who will try to invade and destroy
him. The other is like an antigen, a toxic substance that the body must attack if the antigen is not
to weaken and possibly destroy the body. G ’s metaphor, moreover, assumes that his body may not
be able to produce the antibodies necessary to eliminate the antigen and seeks to establish the skin
as a barrier to invasion.4
The women’s image, by contrast, assumes that the other is native and they are willing to
incorporate the other. It is possible to read such incorporation as a dominating gesture, as Paquet
does, when she claims that the women view the men as ’extensions of themselves” and attempt to
possess and control the men and their exploits. Arguing that the women’s desire for mutual
fulfillm ent means the death o f the men, she concludes that this dangerous result is the penalty the

women extract for being excluded from mutual power (108-111). The interests of the two are still
hostile, but the women are not, as they assert, acting against their own interests, but against the
men’s interests. The body in Paquet’s argument treats the other as food; the women have simply
mimirlrpii the colonizing man who consumes the body of the native, but they treat the colonizing

man as the native.
This reading would mean that the women have more or less taken over the men’s
ambitions. But the difference in their attitudes toward the native Tribes of the islands suggests that
the women’s practice will be different from the men’s. In their real relations with the Tribes, the
men have invaded, responded to welcome with betrayal, and dominated the natives. Even on this

4 Tiffin draws on a similar biological analogy. But she uses it as a metaphor for ’writing
back’ to evaluate the novel. Natives. She argues that Lamming’s text treats the imperialist as an
invader and produces antibodies [she mistakenly identifies these as antigens] that replicate the antigen
with a view only to expelling it (31).
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final enterprise in which the C ommandant intends to reverse his former ambition, he thinks that
even 'th e basest men” under his command will be able to 'erect themselves into gentlem en'
because 'orders to seize command over the savage tribes’ provide a 'perfect school o f conquest and
command* (11). The Lady, by contrast, has developed a sympathy for the Tribes by identifying
with their suffering. For the women to treat the men as natives indicates that the women somehow
identify with the men; such identification also suggests that their interests may be connected rather
than simply opposing.
The women’s gesture is closer to that associated with Caliban in Lamming’s analysis—it
suggests generosity and welcome more than possession and control. The moment o f welcome
anticipates that their interests will be mutual. The female body may treat the other as it does
sperm, a foreign substance that may be incorporated by and may fertilize the egg. Their interests
may be cooperating rather than antagonistic, and the sperm may 'become" native in a limited sense,
because it unites with the egg to produce the entity which will become the fetus. The fetus, which
embodies both, is only partly native to the mother, but their interests are mutual, though different;
and they are protected from mutual destruction by each other through the specialized, intrauterine
environment which the mother’s body provides.
This last reading o f the bodily metaphor is consistent with the argument offered by Jonas.
She claims that the phrase, 'natives of my person,” embodies a goal—specifically, that the self must
recognize the Other as native to its own psyche and must draw polarized opposites together within
itself (91-95). The reading is also supported by the reason Lamming offers for choosing the phrase
as his title—that he was impressed by a man from Ghana who called his children "natives of my
person.* He observes that everything in the book, and everything created from its experience, is a
native o f his person (Kent 4).
Jonas suggests that the risk associated with such a gesture is m inim al. Recognition of the
other within the self may overthrow the ego, but the kind of dominating ego which would reject the
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other should be overthrown (91-95).

But the risk o f welcome, as Lamming describes it in his

analysis of Caliban, is not small, particularly when the other is dominating. When this welcome is
betrayed rather than reciprocated, Caliban may be sacrificed and enslaved. The dangers o f betrayal
and destruction represent the kind of threat that G seeks to protect himself against through the
contrasting mechanism of withdrawing within the castle of his skin.
As I noted earlier, I .amming indicates that the welcome which Caliban practices is the
source of a vision that needs to be developed even though the practice opens him to the risk of
betrayal. I-am m ing’s novels, however, are highly allusive about what kinds of attitudes and
behaviors, especially regarding the self and its relationships with others, might embody that vision.
One argument that Eve O’Callaghan makes when reviewing the work of Jamaican novelist and
sociologist Ema Brodber suggests that the concepts involved in psychoanalytic theory might offer a
way of understanding the ’future” that is promised at the end of Natives.
When Brodber discusses Jane and Louisa Will Soon Come Home with O ’Callaghan, she
explains how and why her novel works as a ’case study” for her social work students. The novel
describes the kind o f ’therapeutic tool” that is needed to heal the ’dissociative personality” that the
students will encounter in the contemporary Caribbean. The therapy, as Brodber explains it,
requires a certain kind of ’ ‘going back’ to the past”: ’you have to know them (the ancestors) and
you have to know that these were the problems and this was how they dealt with them; . . . you
have to look and you have to shake their hands still and know that this was their way o f coping.
But it does not necessarily mean that you have to do it this way” (O’Callaghan 64). O ’Callaghan
connects this process with Lamming’s work by suggesting that the process Brodber describes works
mainly by allowing "you" to know and assess the ’natives o f your person" (64). The therapywhich also describes the central activity of the Ceremony of Souls—consists in reclaiming,
reassessing, and perhaps even transcending, the past, which is ’native’ to you.
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When the women describe their connections to ’natives of [their] person” at the close of
Lamming’s novel, they may be struggling to articulate the kind o f new meanings, values, practices,
and kinds of relationship that comprise what Raymond Williams calls an emergent or even preemergent ’structure o f feeling’- ’affective elements o f consciousness and relationships" that are
’active and pressing but not yet fully articulated’ within a dominant social order and which depend
’crucially on finding new forms or adaptations o f form ’ (Marxism and Literature 123-134). Some
contemporary critiques o f psychoanalysis present the attitudes about autonomy and interpersonal
relationships that are described and endorsed by traditional psychoanalytic theory in terms that
connect those attitudes with the ideology embraced by G and the men on the Reconnaissance; that
ideology serves to describe and endorse the dom inant social order. The revised understandings of
autonomy and interpersonal relationships that cultural and feminist critiques o f psychoanalysis offer,
by contrast, may articulate that active and pressing structure of feeling that begins to emerge at the
end of Natives.5
C o n c e p t u a l iz in g

the

"F u tu r e"

in

C r it iq u e s

of

P s y c h o a n a l y t ic T h e o r y

Classical psychoanalysis, according to these critics, focuses on development as
individuation and independence. Its developmental norms promote a kind of autonomy that requires
radical separation from others. Ideally self-regulating, self-determining, self-possessive, and selfsufficient, this mode of autonomy conflicts with intimate, caring, reciprocal interpersonal
relationships.

5 It is important to keep in mind that a ’critique," as I will be using the term, proceeds from
within and is not simply negative. When Terry Eagleton represents his work as a "critique" of
ideology rather than a "criticism," for example, he explains that a ’critique," like the techniques of
psychoanalysis, ’seeks to inhabit the experience o f the subject from the inside.” It does so not simply
to recount what is awry in the situation, but to ’elicit those ‘valid’ features o f that experience which
point beyond the subject’s present condition’ (Introduction xiv). Brenkman, in his cultural critique of
psychoanalysis, also uses this sense of the term. These critiques of psychoanalysis seek to redefine
rather than simply overthrow such concepts as autonomy.
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In Straight Male M odem: A Cultural Critique o f Psychoanalysis, for example, Brenkman
observes that the norm of autonomy in psychoanalytic theory has traditionally been expressed as
individual self-sufficiency and assumes rivalry between persons. Even when Paul Ricouer
challenged Freudian theory by showing that the ’form o f personhood implied in the Freudian
account" derives from capitalist forms of property and contract, his revisions ended up defending
"possessive individualism' (30-31). "The autonomy o f one’s person" that Ricouer envisioned
beyond the master-slave relation is a "mode of possessiveness." Like G within the castle o f his
skin, this autonomy "is protected against the intrusions o f others just like one’s property" (35).
Feminist critics identify this form of autonomy, one that must be protected against
intrusion, as defensive and isolating. Psychological autonomy is a key concept in Evelyn Fox
Keller’s Reflections on Gender and Science. Arguing that scientific objectivity is the "cognitive
counterpart o f psychological autonomy," she identifies traditional attitudes about psychological
autonomy as the emotional substructure that joins science with masculinity (71). She contends that
the form of autonomy which is presented as a developmental goal in traditional psychoanalysis
assumes that "autonomy can only be bought at the price o f unrelatedness’ (72). Because this form
o f autonomy is threatened by connections with others, it can never be relaxed. It requires a rigid,
vigilant, defensive separation between self and others; if the separation offers comfort when it allays
the anxiety o f intrusion and control by others, it also results in loneliness (82-102). The
defensiveness and ambivalence that Keller describes characterize G ’s behavior and feelings when he
retreats behind the castle o f his skin. The connections Keller establishes between psychoanalytic
and scientific theory and practice helps to explain the basis o f G’s anxiety. Autonomy, according to
Keller, is the psychodynamic root that equates knowledge and power, opposes each to love, and
connects each with domination (71-72, 116). Within this dynamic, the act of knowing is felt not as
communion, but as the conquest that G fears.
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Keller’s contention, that such autonomy is "pseudo-autonomy* and 'signals vulnerability
rather than security” echoes the claims made by Benjam in, a psychoanalyst whose critiques o f
traditional accounts Brenkman and Keller repeat, endorse, and expand upon (102). Noting that the
fem inist critique o f the autonomous individual in psychoanalytic theory parallels the Marxian

critique of the bourgeois individual, Benjamin explains that the ideal of individual "freedom” in
each of the contested concepts denies real dependency and is essentially negative: it "consists o f
protection from the control or intrusion of others." Such "unfettered individuality," freed from
bondage, is "stripped bare o f its relationship with and need for others" (187-188). Benjamin also
argues that this self-protective, inward-turning "free” individual—the kind G hopes to be—may
simply accept "powerlessness in the guise of autonomy' (179).
But the "powerlessness" that takes the form of such pseudo-autonomy, by distancing itself
from others and pretending it can control the self even if it cannot affect the world, avoids other
ethical considerations. For this defensively autonomous self who is powerless may rationalize his
failure to exercise agency, especially with regard to others. In particular, Benjamin suggests, the
powerlessness that takes the form o f pseudo-autonomy may express itself as a denial of
"responsibility to care for others" (179-180). Her analysis fits G ’s situation at the end of Castle.
When G seeks to protect himself from others by withdrawing within the castle of his skin, he
simultaneously accepts "powerlessness in the guise of autonomy” and abdicates the responsibility of
caring for others. When he watches a house collapse as the villagers try to move it, for example, G
notes: "‘I tried not to think about it since there was nothing I could do’” (Castle 301). His lack of
responsibility is also connected to a failure of response-ability. G justifies his form of self
protection by arguing that the people on Barbados, and probably elsewhere, can never really know
each other. He accepts, in Benjamin’s terms, an inability "to get through to the other, or to be
gotten through to," and suffers the "solitary confinement" that is a "modem form of bondage" (84).
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Such response-ability, which the men on the Reconnaissance also lacked, is key to the
revised understandings of autonomy and o f self in connection to others that Brenkman, Keller, and
Benjamin develop. Brenkman, for example, proposes that autonomy can be understood as the
"capacity to participate actively and on a par with others in a widening network o f interactions”
(206). These self-developing interactions with others are facilitated by "dialogic receptivity" (216221). Keller argues that a "dynamic," fluid conception of autonomy is preferable to the static, fixed
conception o f autonomy that denies connections with others and protects itself through defensive
separation. The differentiation that marks personal growth can be understood less as a separation
between self and other and more as a "particular way of being connected” (107). Dynamic
autonomy promotes that particular kind of connection by acknowledging that "ebb and flow’ is
necessary between self and other and by allowing a temporary suspension o f boundaries in the se lf s
interactions with others (100-101). Keller picks up on Benjamin’s argument, which is also
Brenkman’s, that such autonomy is fostered by "responsiveness" between two or more developing
subjects (113).
The possibility that the women at the close of Natives may be trying to develop this kind of
responsiveness when they pay attention to the men’s needs and welcome the men inside themselves
is suggested by one further comment that Keller makes about dynamic autonomy. As the
boundaries between self and other become more "flexible,” Keller argues, "the distinction between
self-interest and altruism begins to lose sharpness" (100). By extension, altruism, or acting in the
interest o f another, as the women say they are acting, is not simply self-sacrifice. Instead, the
women’s capacity for empathic experience may, in Keller’s words, give "rise to a sense of agency
in a world o f interacting, interpersonal agents with whom [they feel] an essential kinship while still
recognizing and accepting their independent integrity’ (101). When the women suspend the
boundaries between themselves and their husbands or lovers, they neither equate the men’s interests
with their own nor fully oppose their own needs to the men’s needs; instead, they use their sense of
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kinship with the men to act in a way that fits their own desires to participate as 'partners* in this
enterprise.
As I noted earlier, the m eaning embodied in designating others as 'natives o f my person*
has been read negatively, as a gesture of the women’s domination over the men, and could also be
read negatively in an opposite way, as an indication of the women’s abandonment o f self to the
men. The notion that the women engulf the men o r lose themselves in the men may reflect the
influence o f another key concept within the reigning ideology of classical psychoanalytic theory—the
concept of symbiosis. Within the classical model, the earliest stage of h um an development is
characterized by a symbiotic attachment between the child and the mother, a relationship in which
the child is wholly dependent on the mother for care—for love as well as physical care. The
connection between the child and the mother is fantasized as one of merging, in which the two exist
as a unity with little or no boundary between them. To mature, the child must become flee o f this
dependency by separating from the mother. In the 'crudest formations' o f this theory, as
Brenkm an puts it, 'th e mother’s emotional power and significance simply compromise* the child’s

growth toward autonomy; their relationship is reduced to a 'mere autonomy-robbing dependency*
(163, 201). The child who remains attached may accept heteronomy, or subjection to another’s
rules, interests, and ideas, in place of autonomy. When freedom is understood as separation,
connection is seen as regression. Connection becomes a "return” to symbiotic attachment, and
qualities that are associated with the supposedly symbiotic bond, like empathy, nurturance, and
care, are also assumed to impede autonomy. In terms of this concept, the women at the end of

Natives would be viewed: either, like the mother in this formation, who impedes the men’s freedom
by overidentifying with them and attempting to "care* for them to such an extent that the men can
no longer act—the men’s sole autonomy, like that o f the child who can do little more than refuse his
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food, would be to refuse to continue the enterprise; or, like the child who does not manage to
separate from others and becomes overattached and subservient to the men.6
The flaw with such thinking, as Brenkman explains it, proceeds from a misunderstanding
of the 'relation o f dependence and autonomy* in real mother-child relations. Even though an infant
is dependent on its mother, such dependence is not simply the opposite of autonomy, but its
'precondition”; and "autonomy is not the opposite* o f connection with others, 'b u t the corollary of
unconstrained, self-developing interactions with" them (216).

While "autonomy-robbing" mother-

child relationships exist, they represent "pathogenic" rather than "normal” relationships. For the
description of more normal mothering, as well as its implications for psychoanalytic theory and
concepts of autonomy, Brenkman, like Keller, refers to Benjamin.
Benjamin develops her descriptive as well as normative revisions to psychoanalytic theory
by paying attention to actual mother-child interactions rather than to retrospective fantasies of that
interaction. The idea o f "primal oneness," she concludes, "is a retroactive fantasy" (173).
Observations of actual interactions indicate that "from the beginning there are always (at least) two
subjects," a mother and a child who are both individuals who have and act on their own needs, at
least to some extent, rather than a symbiotic, undifferentiated unity. One key premise in the study
of intersubjective relationships (of the experiences that occur between as well as within individuals)
is that connection and separation exist sim ultaneo u sly rather than sequentially in developmental
stages which posit them as opposites. Even though a mother (or father) and an infant are unequal,
Benjamin posits, they can and do engage in an active exchange characterized by mutual influence.

6 Mary Donnelly relies on this notion o f symbiosis and on the need for G to separate from
his state of pre-Oedipal unity with his mother in her reading o f Castle. Donnelly cites Benjamin to
describe this state o f unity in the Freudian account as a state o f "oceanic oneness" and to characterize
the mother as "engulfing," but then accepts the classical theory o f development to argue that G must
separate himself from "the unity Benjamin posits," as if Benjamin’s critique follows the traditional
script on this point (8-12). As will become clear, my reading o f Castle and o f the significance of
Benjamin’s critique o f psychoanalytic theory for evaluating the nature of G’s "autonomy" is
diametrically opposed to Donnelly’s reading.
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From this beginning of unequal mutuality, development toward the equality that characterizes
relationships in a free social order does not move toward an individuation that is opposed to
connection, but rather ’toward increasingly mutual and self-conscious recognition’ (emphasis
added). In Benjamin’s account, the desires for independence and intimacy, for self-assertion and
connection, exist in tension, but not as opposites. The pleasure involved in recognizing others is as
important as the pleasure involved in being recognized by others. The reciprocal practice of mutual
recognition can balance these needs. The mother can take pleasure in the child’s growing autonomy
and the child can take pleasure in recognizing the mother as a person. And growth toward
autonomy is promoted as much by connection as by individuation. Even as growing recognition o f
each other’s difference can moderate the fear of merging that sometimes leads to radical separation,
contin u in g connection, informed by recognition of each other’s kinship, can create the opportunity

for autonomy because it moderates the fear of loneliness that can accompany such movement. The
struggle to individuate is not seen as a hostile defense against connection but as a positive effort to
become a ’more active partner" in affectionate interactions with others. Rather than striving to

’grow out of relationships” in order to become free of the other, Benjamin argues, we can learn to
become free persons who are "more active and sovereign within them" (10-45, 96).
The "future" that the women at the close of Natives represent may be one in which the
practices of autonomy and freedom are based on such mutual recognition. When they acknowledge
others as "natives of [their] person," the women may be struggling to articulate emergent feelings of
"recognition" rather than feelings o f a symbiotic oneness. They may be neither tyrannous, nor
heteronomous, but struggling towards the kind of intersubjective, dynamic autonomy described by
these critiques of traditional psychoanalytic theory. Their feelings that the men are "native” to them
may represent the temporary and partial "excursion" into unity that characterizes recognition, rather
than a complete merger. For the intersubjective mode, as Benjamin describes it, is based on the
recognition that "someone who is different and outside shares a similar feeling"; when attunement
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becomes intense, self and other can "feel as if momentarily ‘inside * each other" (126, 174; emphasis
added).
Recognition is not based on identity, or complete identification with another, but on
acknowledging that different selves have something in common. The Commandant’s mistress, for
example, begins to "recognize* the natives o f Sans Souci when she realizes that she and the women
of the tribes share something similar, namely, waiting for their men who are away, and still sees
that the fate o f those women is harsher than hers because they are forced into labor and are being
exterminated. These women are "different" from her, but they are not "foreign" to her.
"Difference," as Benjamin explains, "is only truly established when it exists in tension with
likeness, when we are able to recognize the other in ourselves" (169). In other words, likeness and
difference are mutually constituting in the practice of recognition, and both become possible when
the women begin to view others as "natives" of their person.7
The mutuality that Benjamin, Brenkman, and Keller posit is only an unrealized possibility
in terms o f the women’s connections with the men. In lem m ing ’s terms, the women’s "blindness"
to the men’s inability or unwillingness to reciprocate such recognition may allow them to create a
"vision" o f the future that differs from the present. But the potential for mutuality does emerge in

7 See Taylor, whose work I mentioned in the introduction to Part One, for another
evaluation of Afro-Caribbean literature that redefines freedom as an unrealized possibility of mutual
recognition and argues that liberatory narrative must move toward a society based on mutual
recognition (xii). Developing his argument from the philosophical work o f Hegel, Kant, and Sartre,
and the psychoanalytic, political work o f Franz Fanon, he also emphasizes the importance of
responsibility and of becoming a lover in order to tell a story of lived freedom that perceives the
world and history as possibility. But his focus, taken from Fanon, on the group as a liberatory entity,
leads him to privilege the creation o f national culture more than the mutual recognition between
individuals and across worlds that I emphasize in the work of Benjamin (35, 81). He also follows
Hegel more closely, suggesting that mutual recognition follows from the secondary struggle in the
master-slave dialectic, when the slave compels the master to recognize him (84). The mother, for
Benjamin, is not necessarily in the position o f the master who must be forced into recognizing her
child, but someone who may actively foster and create the conditions for the child’s autonomy. I
resist Taylor’s approach because it tends to justify slavery as inevitable, as Taylor concedes, even
though its point is to emphasize the necessity of realizing freedom. Benjamin’s theory, by contrast,
introduces the possibility that mutual recognition may develop, and grow best, in relationships that do
not break down into the positions of master and slave.
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the novel, most strongly in the interactions among the women themselves. Their exchanges in the
final chapter are marked by the kind of ’ebb and flow’ that characterizes the kind o f ’dynamic
autonomy" that, as Keller describes it, allows for etnpathic experience through a temporary
suspension of boundaries (100). In alternating voices which respond to, blend with, and
differentiate from each other, the women recognize, for example, that they have each been betrayed
by the men they love and experience troubling signs o f that betrayal. The signs are similarly
physical, but different: the Lady’s hair has changed color, the Steward’s wife has begun to ’see’
(for example, the fear that the orphan girl experiences), and the Surgeon’s wife hears her husband’s
voice, and particularly his laugh, in her ear.* The women share their histories and continue to
explore what is similar and different in their relationships with men and in their responses to
different forms of desertion. Despite betrayal, they have each chosen to help the men they love.
As the women empathize with one another’s stories, however, they occasionally shift their concern
from their husbands to the welfare of each other, pausing when they think one o f them is in pain
and making an effort to help one another through the pain by reminding each other that it does pass
(340). The practice of care supports rather than impedes their attempts to develop a more dynamic
autonomy.
These women, as I noted earlier, are, like the men and the tribes, ancestors whose vision
affords G another inheritance. And Lamming’s Castle is a complicated novel which engages the
concepts that are central to classical accounts o f autonomy and freedom in dialogue with the
revisions to those concepts that are central to contemporary critiques o f psychoanalytic theory. The
possibility for mutual recognition may be as limited in the colonial context that G inhabits in Castle
as it was between the women and the men in Natives. But the limitations are nor equally strong in

8 The Surgeon’s wife has responded to her husband’s infidelities w ith steadfast loyalty. In an
effort to compromise her virtue, he had invited men to their home and encouraged them to seduce her
if they could. When she finally ’informs” him o f their attentions, he simply laughs at her naivete; it
is this laugh which haunts the wife and keeps her from seeing ’who was behind that laugh” (327).
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all his relationships, even though the strategy he plans to adopt, that of hiding within the castle of
his skin, assumes that all intimacy is primarily one-sided and destructive. One problem with this
strategy is that it "protects" him from the pleasure involved in relationships based on mutual
recognition as well as from the fear involved in relationships based on hostile interests and
domination.
As I have also noted earlier, two key parallels between the situations in Natives and in

Castle show that the reasons for G’s choice may be partly appropriate and partly inappropriate.
Like the men and women who are subject to the oppressive and corrupt control o f the House in

Natives, G and other villagers in Castle are subject to the oppressive power o f authorities and
traitors. But like the men who can only see women as obstacles to freedom in Natives, G
sometimes treats his mother as if she is nothing more than an "autonomy-robbing” authority. Both
G and the men in Natives share a tendency to fear and denigrate women’s real or fantasized power
and to dismiss women’s requests for recognition.
But G’s relationship with his mother is actually more complicated than he imagines it to be
in moments of defensive separation. Like the actual mother-child interactions on which Benjamin
bases her revised accounts o f psychoanalytic theory, G ’s interactions with his mother are complex
and have the potential to support the kind o f dynamic autonomy that is characterized by connection
and individuation. Significantly, one particular occasion of caregiving on the part o f G ’s mother
reveals the complicated ways in which the practices o f separation and connection shift in a dynamic
balance. Just before his departure from the island, she packs his trunk and fixes them a final meal.
On one level, her acts are meant to assist and celebrate his departure, for she has shared, and may
even have initiated, his ambition to better himself by getting an education and moving beyond the
life o f the village. On another level, she performs these acts of care in a way that she hopes will
continue their connection with one another even when they live apart. When she packs his books in
his trunk, for example, she also gives him a little book containing the gospels to read on the plane
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because she is a practicing Christian and concerned for his salvation. She reminds him that she has
often heard him reading chapter fourteen of St. John’s gospel and the lines she chooses to cite now
suggest an alternative to the vision embodied in his castle of skin image: "‘Let not your heart be
troubled,’” she reads to him; "‘In my Father’s house are many mansions, . . . I go to prepare a
place for you . . . that where I am, there you may be also’” (280). The meal she prepares is a
special occasion which simultaneously marks his departure and reminds him of his connection to her
and the food he has enjoyed on the island.
When his mother first calls him to the meal, G ignores her. Her reaction reveals her
frustrated desire to be recognized by him even as he separates from her: "‘I’m not sayin’ at all that
there ain’t going to come a time when you got to make your own decisions all by yourself, . . . But
even then you got to respect me’* (265). But he has been absorbed in reading his journal and his
idea about hiding in the castle o f his skin and is predisposed to reject her attempts at influencing
him and to think of her requests as simply intrusive and domineering. His vision of autonomy, at
least at the moment, reflects the classical notion o f self-sufficiency in which mature understanding
develops without guidance from another rather than an alternative vision of intersubjective autonomy
in which, as Benjamin argues, ”the other must make a difference* (221). Mature understanding,
according to this ideology, develops by active participation with others in a state of parity.
Although G ’s mother has not always treated him in a way that might promote a mutual
interdependency between them, her flawed efforts on their last day together suggest that she at least
desires a different kind of connection.
If G is prone to keep his mother at a distance, he also takes pleasure in her care and in
their final meal together. His complicated attitudes reveal that desires for individuation and
intimacy, as Benjamin posits, are both strong. The tension between the two is relaxed, as
Benjamin’s account suggests it might be, in a moment that switches their conflict to laughter.
Benjamin observes that "play" between a mother and child affords some of the earliest experiences
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of the reciprocity and mutual influence that can build intersubjectivity (26-27). Her theory suggests
that play can provide an arena for "practicing* freedom within, rather than outside of, a caring
relationship with another.
When G ’s mother tries to hit him with a stick, for the first time in many years, he grabs
the other end and they become involved in a tug o f war. He suddenly bursts into laughter and she
ends up following his lead. The pattern is a familiar one. It confirms that G ’s mother promotes his
autonomy in one way that Benjamin’s account describes a mother’s contribution to a child’s
developing autonomy, by letting him struggle with her and particularly by letting their conflict
evolve into playfulness (121). Their capacity for such interaction has been building at least since G
was nine.
When G, who was still too young for the public bath, gets a "shower” in his back yard, for
example, the mothers are angry at their children who, having crowded the fence to look and laugh,
break the fence and destroy a pumpkin vine. G’s mother also becomes angry as G tries to get away
from her in "a game of cat and m ouse.” But soon the mothers are laughing indulgently when the
boys escape them by "playing bear" (16-24). In this instance, the "hiding" that allows the boys to
escape in the shape o f a bear is effective precisely because it is playful camouflage. The mothers
can "see through” the boys’ stratagem and affectionately accept it. Within an affectionate
relationship, the boys’ "escape" is a temporary game; "return" is voluntary and welcome.
Another moment of play occurs years later when G’s mother punishes him for paying
attention to the gang on the comer rather than to her. He cries as she swings the belt, but
something "switches over” in his head when she says, "‘Hard ears you won’t hear, hard ears you
must feel,’" to indicate that she must make him listen to the belt if be won’t listen to her words.
Because the boys often mock a pot-bellied teacher who uses the same expression, G bursts into
laughter. When G explains, his mother experiences the same switch-over and soon they both "laugh
and cry all together like children at a circus* (113-141). The mutuality may indicate that each has
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become "native” to the other’s person. Once again, when conflict is experienced as a moment in
affectionate relations, it becomes possible to convert that conflict to mutual recognition. It suggests
that vigilance on behalf of the self can be relaxed, that self-respect, and the respect o f others, can
coexist with a sense o f humor about the self and about the self's exchanges with others. The spirit
of playfulness allows relative unequals, like G and his mother, to interact as relative equals.9
The sim ilar moment of conversion during their final meal allows G and his mother a space
in which they can be alone in the presence of the other, laughing quiedy as they eat. The moment
allows G to enjoy the food his mother has prepared and to remember her preparations with
fondness; it also opens the space for them to engage in a dialogue that is marked by greater
recognition and mutual respect even as it acknowledges their differences. The recognition is not
perfect, and their interactions are not on a par, but mother and child are engaged in a process that
may move them toward a more dynamic autonomy, toward a kind of freedom that not only allows
for but depends on the continuation of a caring relationship between them. This kind o f autonomy,
as Brenkman suggests, is never realized once and for all, but exists in the continuing work of
dialogic interaction (217).

Castle, like Natives, hints at a vision of autonomy and freedom outside the master-slave
dynamic, but that vision is not contained exclusively, or even chiefly, in the title image. If there is
a particular place in which this potential is contained, it will not be found within the walls of a
castle, nor within the outhouse in which G and the boys used to hide in order to be alone, but
perhaps within the space o f play where one can be alone in the presence of another.

9 See Jonas for a complementary interpretation of the significance of playfulness in one of
I running’s other novels. Season o f Adventure. Following the argument of the theologian Harvey Cox
in The Feast o f Fools, she locates in play the alternative to the brutal Puritan-capitalist ideology of
San Cristobal. She argues that art itself can be viewed as this kind of play, which *imagine[s] other
situations than those existing in fact." By celebrating "the otherness that lies outside each successive
structure," it deconstructs society’s fictions (54-56).
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***

Revised conceptions of psychological autonomy and the development o f interpersonal
relations that follow the intersubjective model described by Benjamin, Brenkman, and Keller cannot,
in and o f themselves, effect the kind of political freedom that Lam m ing encourages the 'graduates
from colonialism” to work toward in the essays he has collected in Pleasures o f Exile and with
which I began this discussion. Changes in the nature of the intrapsychic self and the nature of
interpersonal relationships cannot take the place o f more direct political action and social
transformation. But the way we envision and practice freedom in the personal and the political
realms are connected; for both have something to do with our understanding o f dependence and
independence and o f their connection with the notion of 'development.”
Benjamin, for example, illustrates how ”Hegel’s notion of the conflict between
independence and dependence,” which informs much political thinking about freedom, 'meshes with
the [traditional] psychoanalytic view” about the development toward autonomy that she critiques
(33). And I jm m ing himself, in one of his later essays, suggests that traditional ideas about
psychological, economic, and political development are connected and similarly ”toxic” for the
practice of a more revolutionary freedom in the contemporary Caribbean. He discusses the
economic heritage o f the West and its impact on the 'fam ily” of nations and submits that
"development. . . is, perhaps, the most dangerously toxic word in our vocabulary." Since
evaluating a society in terms of material development ignores the human content of societies and the
dynamics of social relations within them, focusing on economic development 'encourages a wide
range of distortions about the meaning of human personality, and the material base that would allow
for the cultivation o f a critical and reflective self-consciousness which is, ultimately the raison

d ’etre o f a human existence" ("Coming Home" 44). Such "critical and reflective selfconsciousness" must inform ideas about development of the "material” base. Significantly, it is in
the context of this discussion that I amming criticizes contemporary thinking about economic and
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political institutions for ignoring the practices o f women. This thinking, like the thinking that
informs classical psychoanalysis and the practices o f the men in Natives, is flawed because it is
masculinized. Making the presence o f women visible is part of the necessary correction in all these
realms.
The vision o f Lamming’s backward glance in Natives, in which he tries to make the
presence of women more visible, suggests that encouraging a development toward classical notions
of autonomy in interpersonal, social, economic, and political existence, may be similarly "toxic." If
the psychic and political realms are intertwined, as Lamming suggests, then the "independence" that
separates colonial from post-colonial history and that measures political development toward
freedom and democracy may also need to be reassessed in terms o f a more dynamic conception of
autonomy. Within that conception, the practices o f care may be not only compatible with but even
necessary to revolutionary practices of freedom.
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P art T w o
F r ee d o m Struggles in M ich elle C u f f a n d J ess M o w r y :
W arrior -C a r eg iv in g and E th ic o f C a r e D ebates

When did we (the light-skinned middle-class Jamaicans) take over
from them as oppressors? I need to see when and how this
happened. . . . When the house nigger became master. . . .
The houseworker/mistress relationship in which one
Black woman is the oppressor o f another Black woman is a
cornerstone of the experience o f many Jamaican women.
. . . To be colonized is to be rendered insensitive. To
have those parts necessary to sustain life numbed. And this is in
some cases—in my case—perceived as privilege. The test o f a
colonized person is to walk through a shantytown in Kingston and
not bat an eye. This I cannot do [now]. Because part o f me
lives there—and as I grasp more of this part I realize what needs
to be done with the rest o f my life. . . . Jamaica is a place in
which we/they/I connect and disconnect—change place.
(Cliff, "If I Could Write This in Fire")

"All what you tellin me? Bout hearts an shit? Sound magic.
Gotta be magic for cause I don’t unnerstand. Like churchy shit."
. . . [Lyon had] been a strange sort of boy, so delicatelooking yet so totally self-sufficient: like a prototype of
something new or a reprogram of something very old that was
better equipped to survive. Evolution in action. The shape of
things to come. Shape changers.
. . . "It like you like puttin your stupid life in
somebody’s hands . . . like you checkin to see if they know what
it worth . . . now you go an do it again! Put it on ME! Like a
magic curse!"
Ty’s knuckles paled as he clenched his fists and thought about a
race o f people, and a whole generation within that race, being
punished for the sins o f a few. . . . And who were that few . . .
really? Were they the hungry or unwanted kids who’d never had
anything good in their lives and saw no future ahead? O r were
they the unseen white tip o f the pyramid who sucked up the
profit from it all?
(Mowry, Way Past Cool)

88
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The notions in classical psychoanalytic theory, that mothers, by virtue o f their function
within the family, encourage dependency, and also that autonomy requires a break from attachments
that are understood to be symbiotic and confining, have antecedents in the notions promoted by the
nineteenth-century cult o f domesticity. That ideology, which separated the world into the public
sphere o f politics and citizenship and the private sphere of home and family, relegated women to the
"domestic" realm o f affective relationships and o f actions guided by moral sentiment. If
contemporary cultural critics like Benjamin and Brenkman have attempted to "correct” for what they
consider to be the masculinized bias of psychoanalytic theories o f development by making space for
the practices o f care in a notion o f intersubjective autonomy, other contemporary cultural critics
worry that a renewed focus on care and caregiving could serve to remove women from the public
realm o f contemporary politics and return them to the confines of the home and to private matters
of affective relationships.
These concerns have arisen chiefly in response to contemporary theories that argue for the
recognition o f an ethic o f care in descriptive and normative accounts of moral development. Like
the revisions to theories of psychoanalytic development that I have discussed, these theories have
been introduced as an attempt to critique limited, masculinized formulations o f moral development
that focus, according to Carol Gilligan, for example, on the blind application o f universal principles
of justice. Because of its "blind" conception o f "equality" and "fairness," the traditional
formulation ignores, or even dismisses, a contextual approach to moral issues that concerns itself
with the consequences o f moral choices on specific people, including others, the self, and the
relationships between them. The revised formulations, which are highly concerned with maintaining
caring relationships, assign a significant role to care in moral decision-making. These emphases, as
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explained in ethic of care theories, are grounded in traditionally female activities of nurturing,
though they are not exclusive or even essential to females.1
An ethic of care can be, and is often, challenged as an inappropriate tool for feminist
freedom movement because it was precisely by assigning caregiving roles to women that nineteenthcentury patriarchy was able to justify and, more or less successfully, maintain a system of inequality
that confined women to the domestic sphere. As Cole and Coultrap-McQuin note, contemporary
feminists worry that an ethic o f care caters to a patriarchal fantasy which enshrines women in the
image o f the Angel in the House (5-6). Margaret Urban W alker, who instead chooses to defend
caregiving as an alternative epistemology, eloquently summarizes such objections to feminist
reconstructions of care: the ethic is seen as "retrograde.” As part o f "our oppressive history, not
our liberating future," it can only create "a familiar ghetto rather than a liberated space' (166).
While "melodramas of beset manhood," like the stories told by many of the men in lem m ing's
fictions, worry that domesticating women confine men and inhibit male freedom, many feminist
thinkers who object to an ethic o f care worry that domesticated women are themselves confined and
denied freedom.
Other critics, however, define and dismiss an ethic o f care, like the nineteenth-century
ideology which promoted domesticity, as a sentimental practice—one that ignores issues of freedom,
justice, and the need for political change. John Broughton, for example, challenges Gilligan’s

1 Two early visions of an ethic of care to which the subsequent debates most frequently
respond were articulated by Carol Gilligan in A Different Voice, 1982, and Net Noddings in Caring:
A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education, 1984. Sara Ruddick’s vision of a related ethic
in Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics o f Peace, 1989, has also generated much debate, as has Jean
Bethke Elshtain’s vision of maternal values in Public Man, Private Woman, 1981, and subsequent
writings. The literature which engages these visions is extensive. Just a few of the significant
contributions, and the ones which I address most explicitly, include: the collection of essays edited by
Eve Browning Cole and Susan Coultrap-McQuin, Explorations in Feminist Ethics-, Mary J. Dietz,
"Citizenship with a Maternal Face: the Problem with Maternal Thinking"; Joan C. Tronto, "Women
and Caring: What Can Feminists Learn about Morality from Caring?; and Joan C. Williams,
"Domesticity as the Dangerous Supplement o f Liberalism." One special issue of Hypatia (Winter
1996) contributes an indirect, but interesting philosophical perspective to the debate by critically
examining "The Family and Feminist Theory” (Feder and Kittay).
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defense o f care as a mature ethic by noting that, ’Nowhere in Gilligan’s ethic is the need for
freedom voiced" (615). Mary Dietz goes so far as to argue that an ideology o f care cannot and
should not play a central role in political struggles for freedom and justice. She claims that ’the
language o f love and compassion” is inadequate to such struggle because it does not "challenge
nondemocractic and oppressive political institutions’ ; the vocabulary of care does not connect
conceptually with the values of egalitarianism and the exercise o f freedom that are central to
democratic politics, nor does it help bring those values about (34). But Dietz also argues that an
ethic of care is an inappropriate basis for democratic political activity because love and attentiveness
to others are not only "exclusive" but are also "most valuable" when they are "deeply personal and
intensely intimate"; they lose their meaning when they are "diffused” or "applied to a people as a
whole or marshalled for political ends” (32-33).2 Although Dietz argues that politics transcends the
public/private split, she insists on reinforcing that split when it comes to caring activities; she
simply rejects any attempt to make care public or political and any effort to create an ethical polity
that challenges such social structures as an unjust economic system through a politics of compassion
(20-23). These objections appear to be neutral with respect to gender, but, like the notions of
autonomy in psychoanalytic theory, are closely connected with ideas about mothering. Dietz
implicitly accepts the equation of compassion and caregiving with the maternal perspectives and
activities practiced in traditional family arrangements and denies that mothering does or can
contribute to freedom and the development of a democratic polity.

2 Other critics also question the value of care for political activity. In their introduction to a
collection o f essays that question whether the values inherent in care-giving can be expressed in ways
that are liberating, for example, Eve Browning Cole and Susan Coultrap-McQuin suggest that the
difficulty of applying an ethic of care or a relational ethic to the public sphere or to larger-scale,
impersonal situations is one of the major grounds of caution in valorizing an ethic of care (3, 6).
Although Anne Phillips does not argue that an ethic of responsibility or compassion can play no role
in increasing democratization and freedom, she cautions that this ethic is "potentially” limited to those
we can understand (50).
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Even one critic who recognizes that the public/private split is as much ideological
construction as fact, and that the communal values promoted by an ethic o f care are not
incompatible with democratic political activity, criticizes the sentimental aspects o f current theory
which connect it with a feminized, domesticated practice of care. In an essay which characterizes
"Domesticity as the Dangerous Supplement o f Liberalism," Joan C. Williams suggests that the
humane and communal values associated with domesticity had been part o f the republican critique of
self-interested liberalism in the formation o f the United States. In the republican critique, these
virtues belonged to the public sphere. They were domesticated, however, as republicanism and
liberalism struggled to define the guiding principles of social life in the nineteenth century. The
development of domesticity, Williams argues, depoliticized and effected the marginalization of
public-spiritedness by denigrating it as inherently feminine: "The development o f domesticity was
part of a process whereby gender taboos were mobilized to help brand as inherently nonpolitical the
communal values republicanism defined as quintessentially public" (78). Williams also argues that
current [white?] feminists who attempt to mobilize domesticity’s critique by advocating an ethic o f
care often diffuse its "political critique by translating it into personal choice" (80).3
***

But the discourse of sentimentality and domesticity in the nineteenth century, to which
contemporary evaluations of an ethic of care often refer, had a complicated relationship to the
history of freedom and freedom struggles, not least because it was intimately connected with the
contemporaneous debates about slavery and abolition. Contemporary critics o f African-American
literature note the connections between domesticity’s sentimental novels, slave narratives, and early

3 Even though Williams believes that the kind of care advocated by Gilligan and her
followers diffuses the creative political potential o f care, she concedes that even this ethic of care is
not synonymous with domesticity. She notes, for example, that three elements o f domesticity—
submissiveness, piety, and passionlessness—are noticeably absent (71).
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African-American fictio n / Hazel Carby, for example, observes that Black women writers
simultaneously used and questioned the ideology of true womanhood {Reconstructing Womanhood
40). While Carby focuses her attention on the way Black women handled the vexed issue o f sexual
purity, other critics focus attention on the way these writers negotiate the practice o f empathy and
compassion. Dana Nelson suggests that Harriet Jacobs, for example, sought to ’kindle a flame o f
compassion* in the nineteenth-century readers o f her Incidents in the Life o f a Slave Girl, but also
showed that sympathetic identification is unreliable and that its efficacy could be ’coopted by social
models o f dominatio n .’ Nelson argues that Jacobs subtly encouraged her readers ’to use sympathy

unconventionally,' to understand the ’real, material differences that structure human experience in a
society based on unequal distribution o f power. ” Noting that this radical vision depends ’on the
willingness of its audience to listen and to accept the challenge o f self-critique,” Nelson concludes
’that its message might be ju st as relevant today” as it was in the nineteenth century (137-145).
Although the model presented by Jacobs denies that sympathy is ’axiomatically” liberational, it
does, as Nelson acknowledges, believe sympathy is ’potentially” liberational (138). Jacobs’
renegotiation o f the practice o f sympathy challenges the notion, common to nineteenth and
twentieth-century critics, that sympathy assumes sameness and that the practice of care is politically
limited because compassion, by its nature, can only be extended to family, friends, or those we
understand.
Even more significant for my purposes is the recognition that the practice of care and
compassion has also been linked to more militant revolution and political activism. When Lora

* See the introduction to Harriet Wilson’s 1859 novel Our Nig, by Henry Louis Gates, Jr.,
for an extended description o f the ways in which that novel uses and modifies the plot conventions of
nineteenth-century ’women’s fiction* that itself was often written to defend or attack the institution of
slavery. Hazel Carby, observing that the plot conventions o f sentimental novels were also found in
many slave narratives, refines Gates’ analysis to conclude that Wilson’s ’particular use of sentimental
conventions derives from the sentimental novel via slave narratives” and that this particular ’blend”
accounts for the ways in which W ilson’s novel does ’not conform to the parameters o f . . . domestic
fiction" (Reconstructing Womanhood 45, emphasis added).
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Romero, for example, analyzes the accounts o f the domestic woman that domestic ideologues as
well as their critics made popular in the antebellum United States, she concludes that "domestic
womanhood left itself open to different kinds o f enactment' (88). She describes one different kind
o f enactment in the example o f M aria Stewart, a free-bom black abolitionist who spoke in the 1830s
and w ho, according to Romero, not only invoked, but even embraced the norms of domestic
womanhood in order to secure a space for female activism in black nationalist struggles (62).
Romero argues that Stewart challenged the masculinist paradigm o f violent, redeeming struggle, a
paradigm in which women’s sentimental natures were supposed to sabotage patriotism (52, 59).
What interests me most in Romero’s analysis is her claim that Stewart challenges that paradigmatic
split by engaging the vocabulary of domesticity with the vocabulary of black activism and voicing
"connections between violence and nurture" (69). Justifying her distinctly political activity, Stewart
"represents herself as both maternal and militant," as someone who aspires to the honor granted
white ladies and yet 'flagrandy risks" the moral difference claimed by those domestic women when
she places "sword, shield, and helmet on the woman warrior" (62, 68-69).
And in the literature o f slavery and freedom, the discourse of care is not restricted to the
lives o f women. Eric Sundquist, for example, claims that the "literature o f American slavery
transplants the language o f oppression and liberation from the continental Romantic tradition into a
new national setting where it is bound together with the language of sentiment derived from the
Revolution." And he argues that the autobiographies of Frederick Douglass, which commonly
associate freedom with manly resistance and the virtues of self-reliance, also remind us "that the
language o f revolutionary liberation and the rising language of sentiment, with its cultivation o f the
virtues o f compassion and sympathetic identification with an inferior class or the oppressed, are
virtually synonymous, not just in the best antislavery writing but in the whole era’s grappling with
the problem of bondage" (108, 109, emphasis added). He demonstrates that Douglass paid
increasing attention to the value o f fraternal bonds in his struggle for freedom when he revised his
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narratives to denounce wrongs and to interpret the meaning of his life rather than simply to narrate
the facts o f slavery which the abolitionists had requested (90, 131).s In an argument which builds
on such analyses, Stephanie Smith agrees that Douglass used a "strategic sentimentality" in his
autobiographical revisions to "enable a new politics,’ but she turns the discussion away from strictly
fraternal bonding to a focus on community and even potential female rebellion in those revisions
(196). According to Smith, his sentimental revisions complicate the associations o f freedom with
Emersonian and masculine self-reliance that the earlier Narrative emphasizes and "seek to rescript a
politics o f community so that the ties that bind the flesh do not mean enslavement" (194, 202).
***

Contemporary debates on an ethic o f care are taking place in a context that has several
striking resemblances with the nineteenth-century context in which domesticity, sentimentality,
slavery, abolition, and issues of freedom—for women, Blacks, and other members o f "minority"
populations—were interconnected. At the end o f the twentieth century, the freedom struggles of
women and African-Americans (among others) are again central to social and political life in the
United States and are sometimes violent; and these multiple struggles for freedom have dynamic
connections and disconnections that generate both solidarity and conflict. Conservative politics,

5 P. Gabrielle Foreman also focuses on Douglass’s "complicated negotiation o f sentiment" in
his later writings which become increasingly concerned with political agency, but she criticizes the
male bias inherent in that negotiation (191). Foreman argues that he uses a discourse of "sentimental
abolition" to gain "status as an independent agent in the sphere of political rights.” When he
translates the rhetoric o f affection from the maternal to the fraternal sphere, however, he creates an
"erotically fraternal" version of sentimental abolition that "writes women’s voices out of his texts"
(195, 200).
One critic has observed, and condemned, a similar focus on "homosocial bonding’ in the
freedom narratives of contemporary male revolutionaries like Che Guevara. Ileana Rodriguez argues
that male guerillas have used the discourse o f "tenderness" in their narratives o f insurgency and state
construction to express and solidify a male solidarity that excludes women from the political life of
the country ("Tenderness").
As will become evident, the presence o f "tenderness" and sympathy as a component of
revolutionary movement in the narratives I examine, whether that discourse is embraced by men or
women, is not so hostile to the interests o f women. In the analyses by Foreman and Rodriguez, the
discourse of tenderness and love is eroticized, connected to eros; in mine, it is more closely
associated with care or cantos.
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now as then, also promote an ideology of "care,* this time in the rhetoric o f "family values," in
order to counter demands for radical justice and systemic change; in attempting to re-domesticate
and re-privatize the practice o f care, this political movement seeks to diffuse the political potential
o f care. And just as the nineteenth-century struggles in the United States took place within, and
were consciously connected to, more widespread struggles for emancipation, the twentieth-century
struggles within the United States are taking place within the context of global struggles for
independence and decolonization.
In contrast to arguments which reject the practice o f care as opposed to the practice of
freedom, a growing body o f theory suggests, for example, that the ability to enter and sustain caring
relationships is a necessary feature of free society.6 A global perspective, moreover, suggests that
the arguments which reject care because it confines women are ethnocentric. For such arguments
against the role o f care in political action often fail to respond to those who must struggle for
survival. Charlotte Bunch, for example, demonstrates that ethics is at the heart of human survival
and is thus "a critical part o f politics not to be confused with moralism; ethics should inform
political decisions which then embody and make concrete ethical commitments." Bunch then
suggests that feminists should develop their understanding o f politically meaningful ethics by looking
at the survival snuggles o f various disenfranchised groups to consider the ethics which come out of

6 Several contributors to the Hypatia Special Issue on "The Family and Feminist Theory"
(Feder and Kittay) focus on the caregiving aspects of family life, or other forms of intimate
association, and suggest, m ore or less implicitly, that the ability to enter and sustain caring
relationships is a necessary feature of free society. Two of the more detailed and perceptive
arguments are presented by M artha Minow and Mary Lyndon Shanley, "Relational Rights and
Responsibilities; Revisioning the Family in Liberal Politics and Law” (4-29), and by Karen Streuning,
"Feminist Challenges to the New Familialism: Lifestyle Experimentation and the Freedom o f Intimate
Association" (135-154). W hile they characteristically describe individual rights, chiefly to be free
from interference, as a m atter o f freedom, and the care involved in relationships as a matter of
responsibility, they also suggest that freedom demands the freedom to enter caring relationships.
Recent attempts to legalize gay or lesbian marriage in the face of strong opposition also illustrate the
fact that the ability to form intimate associations is a fundamental kind of freedom (I would add that
freedom might demand that the ability to form such "marital” arrangements be extended to include
partnerships formed not simply on a sexual or procreative basis, but on any basis, including socio
economic ones). Without that ability, the practice o f freedom is seriously curtailed.
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such struggle (177-178, 182).7 I look at the work o f two contemporary writers who concern
themselves with such struggles for survival in two different locations to consider the ethics which
they associate with struggles to achieve and practice freedom.
Michelle Cliff, like George Lamming, comes from the Caribbean—specifically, Jamaica.
The protagonist o f her first two novels, Abeng and No Telephone to Heaven, like G in Lanuning's

In the Castle o f My Skin, has dual ancestors in Prospero and Caliban. That dual ancestry is
highlighted in Cliff’s protagonist, Clare Savage, because she has a "white” father and a "dark*
mother. While G ’s relative privilege over his peers in the village arises solely from his ability at
school, Clare enjoys a greater relative privilege both because she is light-skinned and also because
her socio-economic status, though decidedly modest in comparison with the standards o f the
American middle class, is higher than that o f many others in Jamaica at the time o f the story. In a
sense Cliff’s character inherits the legacy both o f the ladies and also o f the slaves and household
servants—the female versions of Prospero and Caliban—for whom the ideology o f domesticity and
sentiment were so central in the nineteenth century. Cliff’s work struggles with that particular dual
ancestry to negotiate an appropriate role for that female character o f relative privilege in
contemporary politics o f freedom and survival. Clare is presented as a character whose initial
concern with freedom is to worry about her own confinement, especially as a female, and to
struggle for personal autonomy; her practice o f freedom is guided by her sense o f her own
oppression. As Clare matures, she begins to recognize the different oppression o f the darker and
poorer classes in Jamaica and to rethink her notion o f freedom; she learns to broaden and revise her
practice o f freedom by connecting with the struggles o f those who are less privileged.
The characters in Jess Mowry’s work, by contrast, are possibly even more confined and
less privileged than those in Lamming’s village. Like G and his friends, they are young boys,

7 In making this appeal to feminists, Bunch is supporting an argument made by Gita Sen
during a 1988 lecture at Radcliffe College on a feminist perspective for "Ethics in Third World
Development" (185).
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primarily Black, but they seem to have even less prospect than G o f freeing themselves through the
traditional education system. While Cliff considers the connection between care and freedom for
those who are relatively privileged, Mowry examines the connection between the two practices for
those who are among the least privileged in the United States. Some fem inist critics may be
worried that an ethic o f care may return women, as Margaret Urban Walker observed, to the
"ghetto" o f the private home and domesticity, but the boys in Mowry’s Way Past Cool must
struggle to achieve some degree o f freedom within the confines o f a literal ghetto in Oakland,
California. Their struggle for freedom and survival is presented, from the start, as a group struggle
as much as an individual one. In this context, Mowry presents the practice o f care as a means to
greater rather than lesser, even though limited, freedom.
Contemporary critics of African-American literature like Henry Louis Gates, Jr., observe
that slave narratives have provided the basic paradigm for more than two-hundred years of AfricanAmerican literature.® With her novel Free Enterprise, Cliff places herself in the growing body of
novelists since 1960 who write "neo-slave narratives" that deal directly with slavery and the struggle
for freedom in the last century; her novel rewrites the story of John Brown’s 1859 rebellion and its
aftermath from the perspective o f Black females who helped to finance and also participated in that
rebellion.9 Although Jess Mowry has not written a "neo-slave narrative" that deals directly with
slavery, Reggie Young classifies M owry’s Way Past Cool as a "contemporary slave narrative" that

®See, for example, Gates’ analysis of the continuities in that tradition in his introduction to
The Classic Slave Narratives as well as in The Signifying Monkey.
9 See Deborah McDowell, for example, for her recognition of the "flood" o f novels that have
been written, post-1960, about slavery, and for an extended discussion o f one—Shirley Anne
Williams’ Dessa Rose. In Ashraf Rushdy’s analysis, the growing number o f contemporary narratives
of slavery that have been written post-1968, after the publication of Styron’s Confessions o f Nat
Turner and the collection edited by John Henrik Clarke, William Styron’s Nat Turner: Ten Black
Writers Respond, have their origins in a set o f interrelated factors that included, together with a desire
to respond or react to Styron’s novel, generational shifts within the African-American community that
took up the duty of supplementing oral ancestral tales and that emerged with the Black Power
movement that began in the late 1960s.
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addresses urban bondage and freedom rather than slavery itself (371-372). The continuities between
the two kinds of work may evidence continuities between slavery-in-fact and what Cliff herself has
called emancipation-in-practically -name-only. In setting the work of Cliff and Mowry in the context
of this earlier tradition, however, I am less concerned with the formal similarities that Gates, for
example, has identified in this African-American tradition, than in exploring one example o f what
Gates calls a "concord o f sensibilities” between Cliff and Mowry, in whatever genre they write, and
the nineteenth-century slave narratives to which I have been referring (Signifying Monkey, 128).
That concord of sensibilities concerns their interconnected negotiations o f freedom and care. The
complexity o f the nineteenth-century enactment of care, especially within the African-American
tradition, suggests that care is not necessarily a purely domesticated practice that is divorced from
political action or even revolutionary violence. That tradition is expanded in the twentieth-century
texts by Cliff and Mowry. W hile Cliff continues that tradition in the realm of ”high” literature,
Mowry continues it in the realm o f ’popular” literature and, like revised accounts of the nineteenthcentury’s domestic literature, reclaims that realm for serious cultural work.
In these twentieth-century "descendants" of those nineteenth-century texts, two aspects of
care become vital to the imagination of freedom with justice: the emotion of empathy or compassion
and the act of nurturing. As Joan Tronto argues, in order for caring to be more than good
intentions, acts of caring for others must fulfill the feeling of caring about others (’Women and
Caring* 185). Cliff and Mowry appropriately join the two dimensions in a politicized practice that
challenges care’s history o f domestication. ”Caring about” slaves, the poor, the oppressed,
motivates characters to engage in struggles for freedom; and "taking care” of others—feeding and
healing them, fighting for them, or simply living and working alongside them-becomes a vital
practice in struggles for freedom and for living in a more free, just community.
Care is redefined as a quintessentially "social,” rather than a "private," act, and both love
and hate exist in complicated relationship in this revolutionary practice of care. For, in the context
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o f freedom struggles, care is not simply associated with the home, but with the battlefield—o r the
’home front.” Mowry and Cliff both attempt to negotiate the terrain o f violence and care and do so
with a practice I call warrior-caregiving.10 To help conceptualize that negotiation, they each refer
back to earlier freedom fighters. In retrieving ancestors for her practice. Cliff highlights the legacy
o f the Maroons, who fought the British in Jamaica from 16SS to 1740, and o f one particular leader
in that first Maroon War, Nanny. Mowry appropriates the legacy o f the Black Panthers who were
active in the late Civil Rights and the Black Power movements o f the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Like the violent actions of the characters in their novels, the violent activities o f the Maroons, the
slaves, and the Black Panthers are condemned by the dominant culture as insurrections, unlawful
rebellions, or simply crimes, rather than heralded as revolutions or wars o f independence,
emancipation, or freedom. But one way that Cliff and Mowry each attempt to deal with the issue of
violence is to retrieve and highlight a practice o f care-of empathy and o f nurturing, especially in
the form o f healing-in the actions o f these earlier freedom fighters.
They re-fuse the absolute separation between the work o f w ar or contest and the work of
care that Nel Noddings posits in her feminist examination of morality. Women and Evil. The virtue
o f war, according to her reading o f the nineteenth-century philosopher William James, is
"hardihood,” and the test of that tradition is winning contests and defeating others. The test of an
alternative tradition of service and o f caring for others, she argues, is enhancing the quality of
’relations” between people, meaning the quality of connections "characterized by some affective

10 The connections between care and violence or peace, generally, is a subject of debate.
Sara Ruddick and feminists who adopt her prescriptions for revolutionary politics according to the
practices o f maternal care argue that acts o f nurturing and identification with the mothers o f enemy
soldiers tends, as indicated in the subtitle o f her book, "toward a politics o f peace.” That formulation
has been contested with arguments that mothers support wars precisely because they are concerned
with the interests of their own children which compete with the interests o f "enemy” children. The
slave tradition, moreover, acknowledges that mothers may do violence to their own children out of
care for those children; recent novels like Beloved by Toni Morrison show how and why some slave
mothers murdered their own children in order to save them from the horrors o f slavery and also as a
means o f combatting the interests o f slave masters.

R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

101
awareness” (180-184).

The warrior-caregiving portrayed in the work of Cliff and Mowry joins the

tradition of agon or contest with the tradition o f service or care.
If the stories that Cliff and Mowry retrieve and create show that care is an intricate pan of
violence rather than opposed to violence, they also demonstrate that the connection between care
and caregiving with violence is fraught with tension. While they undomesticate care by joining it to
violence that seeks to be revolutionary, they also seek to explore the contexts in which caregiving
itself is redefined as a revolutionary act.
Their focus on care as potentially revolutionary activity places them in a growing body of
thinkers within the African-American community like bell hooks and Cornell West, who, following
the lead of Martin Luther King, Jr. and other civil rights theologians, argue for a politics that
recognizes love and care as practices of freedom and for a politics that reconnects discussions of
care with the political, social, and economic practices that inhibit or promote freedom ." Like any
political ideology, the rhetoric of care can be mobilized for conservative or progressive ends.
Kobena Mercer has brilliantly demonstrated how conservative politicians in England have
appropriated the signs o f the democratic revolutions o f the 1960s, such as their recognition of links
between student protests, civil rights and Black power movements, and decolonizing revolutions, to
promote counter-revolutionary policies and attitudes (”1968"). The discourse and practice o f care
also lend themselves to competing interests. As Shirley Samuels observes in The Culture o f

Sentiment, the discourse of sympathy in the nineteenth century could be deployed in a conservative
way, to endorse a 'passive sympathy,” or in a more radical way, to mobilize action (5). In their
twentieth-century texts. Cliff and Mowry attempt to model and promote a practice o f care that tends
toward political action on behalf of greater freedom. And their particular combination of warriorcaregiving, I argue, is an expression o f care that is particularly threatening to counter-revolutionary

" See, for example, bell hooks, "Love as the Practice of Freedom," in Outlaw Culture, and
Cornell West, Race Matters.
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movement. The significance of that threat is indicated by a conservative insistence on distinguishing
the nurse from the warrior, the Angel in the House from the Destroying Demon, and the gentle,
happy, nurturing Negro servant from the fierce and vengeful savage.
If conservative ideologies which advocate care and domesticity have demeaned and
depoliticized care, women, and others who are connected with caregiving activities, including
domestic servants, ideologies which seek to be progressive by refusing an ethic of care may support
the conservative cause by reinforcing the notion that care is apolitical and that those who practice
care are engaged in demeaning work. Care and caregiving are neither inherently conservative nor
progressive, but the context in which and the conditions under which they are practiced may make
them one or the other or some combination of the two. As Tronto’s work suggests, the important
point to consider is not whether to care, as much moral theory does, but how to engage in the
activity of caring ("Women and Caring" 175). The solution may not be to refuse care, but to
revalue and repoliticize it and to broaden its practice.
The nature of autonomy, as I discussed it in Part One, is a crucial issue in theories of
moral development. Kohlberg’s theory of moral development, which is put into question by an
ethic of care like Gilligan’s, requires a sense of an autonomous self that is clearly differentiated
from others (Tronto, "Women and Caring" 180). As Jessica Benjamin suggests, however, the
desire for freedom in the form o f self-sufficiency and radical autonomy is sometimes an admission
of, and perhaps a substitute for, social and political powerlessness. The desire to join the practice
of freedom with a practice of care may attempt to provide both a motive and a means to powerful
action. And "individuals who view themselves as connected to others" may have a greater ability to
use "both an ethic of care and claims about justice” in moral and political decision-making (Tronto,
"Women and Caring" 180).12

12 Observing that such moral decisions require one to balance interests of self and others,
Tronto concludes that "autonomy is a problem that people must deal with all the time’ in moral
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Still, Cliff and Mowry must each negotiate the possibility o f failure or only limited success
in their effort to attain power through a practice o f freedom with care. That potential compels
them, in part, to couple the possibility of success with a long historical imagination that sees one
'failed” revolution as leading to another more successful revolution and also with a belief in
'm agic” that they inherit from the legacy of conjure. The possibility for success also lies largely in
the response o f their readers. Like the authors o f slave narratives, they are interested not simply to
represent these dynamics in the actions of their protagonists, but to mobilize readers towards an
'unconventional sympathy” that may catalyze action.

choices (180, emphasis added). Pan of that 'problem ,” however, may be resolved by revisions to the
concept o f autonomy like those proposed by Benjamin, Brenkman, and Keller.
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F r o m M a m m ie s t o M il it a n t s :
U n -D o m e s t i c a t in g C a r e in M ic h e l l e C l i f f ’s P r a c t i c e

of

R e v o l u t io n

In an essay called "The Garden,” Michelle Cliff demonstrates that she is susceptible to the
kind of thinking that defines and dismisses care as a ’sentimental* practice. In that essay, she
metaphorically relates gardening to nurturing and then observes that she gar lens/nurtures in
response to her 'm other’s challenge that everything will die." While she worries, on the one hand,
that her inability to keep all the plants alive might indicate that she is, as her mother charged,
unloving and unnurturing, she also worries that her self-imposed "challenge to assure that
everything lives* may have become a 'sentimental obstacle' {Look Behind 49).'
But the Jamaican freedom struggles that Cliff concerns herself w ith are deeply entwined
with matters of survival. When she searches, as a person of relative privilege, for an appropriate
role in such struggle, she cannot simply dismiss an ethic o f care as sentimental, because she knows
that lives depend on its practice and she recognizes a moral obligation to discern and alleviate real
suffering and injustice. She knows that the freedom o f persons o f relative privilege in an unjust
system has often been tied to the attitude enshrined in a common plantation name, Sans Souci.2

1 When I cite Cliff’s work parenthetically, I will abbreviate her titles as follows. For her
novels and her collections o f essays and short stories: Abeng {Abeng); Claiming an Identity They

Taught Me to Despise {Claiming)- Free Enterprise {Free); The Land o f Look Behind {Look Behind);
No Telephone to Heaven {No Telephone). For selected essays from The Land o f Look Behind'.
"Claiming an Identity They Taught Me to Despise" ("Claiming"); "If I Could Write This in Fire, I
Would Write This in Fire" ("Fire"); "A Visit to the Secret Annex" ("V isit"). For interviews with:
Opal Palmer Adisa ("Interview," OPA); Judith Raiskin ("Interview," JR); Meryl F. Schwartz
("Interview," MFS). For articles published separately: "Caliban’s Daughter: ITie Tempest and the
Teapot" ("Caliban’s"); "Clare Savage as a Crossroads Character" ("Clare").
2 Cliff’s focus on survival, which responds indirectly to Charlotte Bunch’s call for an ethics
that arises in struggles for survival, addresses concerns raised by Bill Puka, who suggests that an
ethic of care may only be appropriate for liberation among those who are subordinate and powerless
and may not be valuable for thinking about freedom in broader terms. C liff’s work, however, does
not draw clear distinctions between those who have some power and those who are victims. And
104

R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

105

In C liffs first two novels, Abeng and its sequel No Telephone to Heaven, Clare Savage, a
light-skinned, middle-class Jamaican, grows to question an insensitivity that allows the privileged
not to care about or for the poor and the oppressed. When a young Clare questions why white
teachers simply stand by as a dark girl suffers an epileptic seizure, she concludes that proper ladies
do not become involved in the sufferings of people beneath their station. C liff s 'ladies* are not the
ministering angels of domestic ideology. But Clare also believes that her mother Kitty, even though
she is no 'lady* and often helps the poor, would not have helped the girl. Then and later, Clare
wonders "What was missing" (Abeng 99).
As an adult, Clare attempts to distinguish herself from those women who held back and
begins to take seriously her mother’s final request to "help your people" (No Telephone 103). After
living and studying in the United States, England, and other places in Europe, she abandons the
kind of life that would align her more closely with the values o f those powerful countries, and
returns to Jamaica. She uncovers and teaches a history of resistance and tenderness to the poor and
dark-skinned children of Jamaica and joins a revolutionary group that wants to improve conditions
for the poor who are starving and dying because of a corrupt political system and an unjust
economic order. Clare’s attempt to ensure that "what was missing” in the women she remembered
from her childhood is not "missing” in her leads her to redefine the practice o f care so that it is
neither sentimental nor an obstacle to political activity.
In part. Cliff deals with potential sentimentality by setting up an uneasy tension and a
complicated relationship between care and hate. She introduces one collection of essays, The Land

o f Look Behind, with an epigraph from Marcus Garvey that warns about the cycles of retribution
that develop from the close connection between hate and injustice: "There is no sense in hate; it
comes back to you. Therefore, make your history so laudable, magnificent, and untarnished, that

those who are relatively privileged are called upon to concern themselves with the survival of others
and to include an ethic of care in their own practice of freedom.

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

106

another generation will not seek to repay [you]. . . . The bones o f injustice have a peculiar way of
rising from the tombs to plague and mock the iniquitous" (9). The collection details the hate with
which the powerful justify their treatment o f those over whom they take power, hi "Battle Royal,"
for example, Cliff cites hate as the final "rule for invaders,” the rule which justifies all others:
"these people are your enemy. Take my word for it. Do not love them" (101). And in the
penultimate piece, a satirical poem called "A Visit from M r. Botha," she condemns the church’s
complicity in making such hate and injustice permissible in South Africa. On a 1984 visit to
Europe, Mr. B advises leaders o f several whitish states: "Using the Bible, conjuring arguments and
tricks/ We’ve figured how hatred can be holy and exist successfully” (113, emphasis added).
As Garvey predicted, outrage against the colonizer’s hate generates its own hatred. Just
before she launches into a scathing indictment o f the bloody British empire in "If I Could Write
This in Fire, I Would Write This in Fire," Cliff notes that her athletic team at school was named
for a white national martyr, Edith Cavell. As she faced a German firing squad in World War I,
Cavell refused to hate her executioners, saying: "‘Patriotism is not enough. I must have no hatred
or bitterness toward anyone.’” Cliff, aware o f continuing injustice, rejects that model and
concludes wryly: ’Sorry to say I grew up to have exactly that" (62). If Cliff agrees with Garvey
that the hate of the powerful and the unjust "makes no sense," she makes it clear that the hate with
which the victim s or opponents o f injustice respond makes very much sense. For the hate that
develops in response to the hate o f the powerful is closely connected with a concern for justice.
One o f the crucial moments in Clare Savage’s Bildung presents the development of a
similar understanding. It occurs when Clare reads an account o f the 1963 bombing at a
Birmingham church in front o f her New York City homeroom, trying not to be moved, not to
embarrass herself in front o f the classmates who appear to ignore the news. The piece notes that
the explosion occurred in the middle of a Sunday School lesson, which was "Love thy neighbor."
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Reading that "a man standing in the nibble” screamed, 'L o v e them? Love them? I hate them ,”
Clare wonders, 'H ow could he not?" {No Telephone 100-101).
Even though Michelle Cliff and Clare Savage were raised not to hate, it is, ironically, a
developing sense of love that motivates their hatred. Cliff, like Clare, ’grew up* to hate her
oppressors by learning to care about others who are even less privileged than she. Their motives
are not simply altruistic. They grow up to hare the white, privileged classes because they feel the
personal consequence o f being raised to emulate those upper classes, which means to reject poorer
and darker-skinned Jamaicans. Arguing that the ’background changed places with the foreground”
when "we (the light-skinned middle-class Jamaicans) [took] over for them as oppressors, ” Cliff
grows up to realize that the most damning mark of colonization is insensitivity: 'The test o f a
colonized person is to walk through a shantytown in Kingston and not bat an eye.” Cliff, an adult
who has learned both to love and hate, says "This I cannot do" {Look Behind, "Fire" 62, 71). The
burden o f Cliff’s writing suggests that the person of relative privilege who wishes to engage in
broader freedom struggles must negotiate this connection between love and hate in an unladylike
practice o f care. Because her participation also depends on negotiating between her positions of
privilege and oppression, she relocates the practice of care, from the domain of the lady, through
the realm of the domestic servant, to the field o f the warrior. The blend of love and hate that is
involved in this relocation shapes the practice I identify as warrior-caregiving in Cliff’s work.
"Ladies," in the world Cliff describes, have little to do with an ethic of care. Like the
teachers who simply watch as a dark-skinned student suffers through an epileptic seizure, ladies are
colonized persons who do not become involved in suffering. Empire depends on such "ladies." In
one of her most scathing early essays, "If I Could Write This in Fire, I Would Write This in Fire,"
Cliff condemns the way the English "tend to use their ladies. Name ages for them. Places for
them. Use them as screens, inspirations, symbols." Noting that even the "swearword‘bloody’ is a
contraction o f ‘by my lady’- a reference to the Virgin M ary," she charges that their "bloody"
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empire, with its economy based on the traffic in human beings and its maps tellingly colored red, is
built on such bloody inspiration (Look Behind 66-67).
Cliff’s w ork reminds readers that caregivers, in this world o f ladylike detachment from the
suffering o f others, are the servants who take care of ladies and gentlemen. It is their work that has
been "domesticated” by ideology, especially in contemporary reenactments that idealize plantation
life as being sans souci. At the time of Clare’s childhood, in Abeng, the old family property at
Runaway Bay is being subdivided for American vacation homes in a development called "Paradise
Plantation.’ In this romance o f the past, the discourse of slavery is replaced by the discourse o f
paradise; as the land is cleared for development, the reminders of the slave quarters are erased and
the canefields are burned, but the ’Great House” is left standing (23-27). The way is being
prepared for those offering tours and ’preserving history” to speak not of slaves, but of ’ ’servants’
who helped in the garden” or o f "villagers" who "pitched in" ("Interview," JR 67; emphasis added).
By translating both forced and paid work into seemingly private and personal acts o f generosity and
care, the continuing discourse o f the slavocracy sanitizes or "domesticates" the labor extracted from
slaves and servants. Patriarchal engagements with the discourse of domesticity attempt to
depoliticize the work o f care not only by domesticating the work of women within the family circle,
but also by domesticating the business of empire and its successors, i.e., the work done by men and
women who are said to be "like one of the family."
Cliff’s focus on such "domestic" labor suggests that more privileged women who resist
patriarchal "domesticity” by rejecting the practice of care may, wittingly or unwittingly, implicate
themselves in the continuing business of empire and domination where ”slavery-in-fact” is replaced
by a "freedom" equivalent to "veiled slavery, the model o f the rest o f the western world" (Abeng
28). Refocusing discussions o f care from the lady of the house to the servant of the house suggests
that past and contemporary devaluations of care may reflect a class bias that is unacceptable in
broad freedom struggles. If it is true, as Joan Williams argues, that an ethic and practice o f care
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was domesticated and depoliticized when it was gendered as feminine, it is also true, as Shellee
Colen argues, that the w ork of care is devalued even further when the work passed on from men to
women within the household is then passed on again "from one woman who chooses not to do it
and can pay for it, to another woman who performs it in someone else’s household'' (54).
The practice o f care in freedom struggles, in C liffs writing, simultaneously revalues the
work of those who serve and repoiiticizes the practice of care, partly through an imagined
connection with the figure known as Nanny. As the narrator in Abeng observes, some women who
are "like one of the family” in contemporary Jamaica "are called Nanny, because they cared for the
children of other women.” Because "they did not know who Nanny had been,” however, the name
has become associated with a domestic caregiver rather than a revolutionary woman (21). The
novel informs readers that the historical Nanny lead Jamaica’s Windward Maroons during the First
Maroon War against the slavocracy, a war that lasted from 1655 to 1740. The contemporary use of
the name indicates that the Nanny who led the Maroons may once have been seen as a caregiver
and Cliff’s portrait of her retrieves that dimension of her work. History, however, has replaced the
figure of the warrior-caregiver with that of the caregiver alone. As Cliff observes in an interview,
the Black woman who participates in revolution, when she is remembered at all, is convened into a
servant ("Interview," JR 65-66).
Cliff’s work seeks to recuperate the revolutionary in this figure of mammydom. Rather
than abandon her caregiving legacy, however, Cliff combines it with the warrior legacy, and
reformulates care as a militant practice. Cliff’s work is filled with a pantheon of characters who are
both warrior and caregiver, including Clare Savage who chooses to right against continuing
imperialism in the name o f Nanny.3 When Clare Savage elects to carry on the work of the

3 In Cliff’s third novel, Free Enterprise, Mary Ellen Pleasant is another character who fits
within this pantheon. A historical black woman who financed and fought alongside John Brown in
the 1859 rebellion that C liff calls the African-American War for Independence, she has been
converted into a servant remembered only as "Mammy” (’Interview,” JR 65-66). John Brown
himself may be seen as another figure in this pantheon. He was a fierce fighter in the cause of
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caregiver and the warrior, she re-fuses the distinctions that the patriarchal practice o f care
maintained between ladies, servants, and warriors.
When Cliff draws on Nanny for her model of caregiving, she dematemalizes the practice.
Although Cliff treats Nanny as one o f the mothers or grandmothers of continuing resistance, she
highlights a practice of care that shifts its focus from the work o f mothers to the work of healers,
like nurses and others who care for those who suffer. Caregivers who are also warriors, especially
Black female ones, are not part o f the patriarchal male fantasy that enshrines women as Angels in
the House. When these women, or men, transfer the care they practice out o f the cradle and onto
the battlefield, caregiving itself is translated from mammydom to militancy.4
When Joan Williams theorizes how the potential political critique in an ethic of care might
be made effective, she advises that domesticity must be transformed ’so that it no longer functions
as the voice o f the victim" 980-82). The warrior-caregiver enhances the potential political
effectiveness by transforming caregiving so that it functions as the voice of the revolutionary. The
articulation of the warrior with the caregiver, which highlights a connection between militancy and
healing or other forms of care, makes two complementary features important in the revolutionary

abolition who was also a nurse and who fought because he was tender-hearted, and moved to pity
over the misery of slaves. As his son said of him, "‘the suffering of others . . . brought out the
woman in him, for he was ever the nurse in sickness, watchful, tireless, tender’" (Wyatt-Brown 17).
4 The allusion here is to Trudier Harris’s influential synopsis of the stages of domestic
servitude, in Black history and fiction, as a progression From Mammies to Militants. Mammies are
domestic servants who adopt the values o f the families they serve and remain subservient to them;
militants are "freer” domestic servants who refuse the values o f these families and eventually confront
those families violently, and often murder them (23-34). Where Harris identifies a variety of
domestic servants, some more militant than others, I am arguing that Cliff reformulates the practice
of caregiving itself to include a militant dimension. This formulation provides an alternative to the
either/or tendency in Harris’s schematic. As I will discuss further in the body of this chapter. Cliff’s
portrait of Christopher in No Telephone to Heaven presents a contrast to Harris’s valorization of the
militants she describes. Christopher, a temporary servant who murders his former employers, is a
servant who most resembles the militant domestic in Harris’s typology. But Christopher’s violence is
not the kind o f militancy that Cliff advocates. His violent act is presented as an understandable, but
contrasting alternative to the kind of militancy practiced by her revolutionaries, like Clare and the
other freedom fighters.
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practice o f freedom. For when Cliff’s writing reformulates care, so that caring emerges as a
revolutionary as well as, or instead of, a domestic practice, it simultaneously reformulates
revolution, so that revolution emerges as a caring practice. The practice o f care in both forms, as I
trace them in the history o f Clare Savage and her involvement in freedom struggles, emerges as an
eminently social act performed in the name of a freedom that strives for greater socio-economic
justice.
E s c a p e F r o m L a d y d o m : T h e S h if t f r o m A u t o n o m y a n d I n d iv id u a l F r e e d o m
C a r e a n d S o c ia l R e v o l u t io n in t h e F r e e d o m S t r u g g l e s o f C l a r e
Savage

to

Clare Savage begins her struggle for freedom, much like the males in Lamming’s Fiction,
as a struggle for autonomy and escape from confinement. In particular, she seeks to escape the
destiny o f becoming a lady, a destiny she is supposed to regard as a sign o f privilege.
Clare flees the efforts of her parents to mold her in their preferred image: as heir to her
father Boy’s white, plantation- and slave-owning ancestors; or as heir to her m other Kitty’s black,
red, and brown ancestors, who were often victim to Clare’s white ancestors. As an adolescent,
Clare focuses her desire for freedom on the attempt to invent herself, in opposition to her parents
and to the societies that they represent. Clare resists their rules chiefly by crossing lines of race,
sex, and class. Clare insists that she is mixed-white and black and red—as she attempts to join the
two worlds of her experience: the town life of her father’s privilege and the King’s English, and the
country life of her mother’s heritage and the island patois.
While each parent encourages Clare to choose a racial affiliation, neither parent allows
Clare to stray from her proper role as a middle-class female, whether black or white or red. When
Clare takes her grandmother’s gun to hunt a wild pig, for example, she imagines that she is
acquiring some power and independence by taking up the male Maroon ritual (Abeng 111-1 IS).
Although her parents are distraught because she accidentally kills her grandmother’s bull, they also
punish her because she "had stepped out o f lin e .. . . She had been caught in rebellion. She was a
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girl* (Abeng 149-150). Kitty, agreeing with Boy, insists that Clare has "‘to leant once and for all
just who you are in this world.” And who Clare is, for her parents, is a girl who is getting to the
age when she needs to be ”*a lady” (Abeng 150). Although Clare will modify her thinking about
racial identity as she matures and becomes politically active, she will continue to reject the role of
the lady for that o f the Maroon warrior. In other words, she will reject the role o f the woman who
is used by empire and those institutions which have replaced it for the role o f the woman who fights
back against empire and those institutions.
Broadly speaking, the politics o f self-invention is a significant form o f liberation horn the
continuing effects o f empire in the Caribbean. Clare’s struggle to define herself serves, on the
individual level, as an example o f the collective effort of many people in the Caribbean to loosen
identity from the rigid categories that colonial rulers used to classify and separate the ruled from the
rulers and also from each other. Since the Caribbean has been inhabited by a wide variety of
people from Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Americas, many o f whom interbred through force or
choice, this politics of self-invention often appeals to the notion of a complex, hybrid, and even
shifting identity. Cliff’s writing highlights and broadens this form of liberation. In No Telephone

To Heaven, for example, the character Harry/Harriet, a male who considers himself a mix of
female and male, serves as an example o f someone who takes Clare's emphasis on multiplicity to
the level of sexual identification. As p a n o f her attempt to counter, or liberate Jamaicans from, the
legacy o f empire, then, Cliff develops an ’identity* politics defined by choices that challenge
supposedly natural categories o f race, color, nationality, gender, and sexuality, and by choices that
rebel against the social prestige assigned to dominant categories.5

5 Many critics who write about C liff have praised those aspects o f her work which show
either that characters define themselves with hybrid identities or that these characters choose identities
that oppose their "natural," meaning socially ascribed, positions. Judith Raiskin offers perhaps the
most extensive and subtle treatment o f Cliff’s transgressive identity politics in "Inverts and Hybrids:
Lesbian Rewritings of Sexual and Racial identities"; she concludes, however, that Clare’s and
Harriet’s final choices, one to be black, the other to be female, are "not . . . chosen freely nor do
they guarantee freedom" (167). For other analyses of the construction o f identity or subjectivity in
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As an adolescent and a young adult, Clare’s perspective on freedom is much like that of
the men who want to escape a corrupt Kingdom in I -amming’s Natives o f My Person. She repeats
their voyage in reverse, when she travels back from the new world island, whose social and
political systems she considers corrupt, to the British motherland. An older Clare, however,
recognizes that she ’courted escape. ’ Like the men who flee what they consider a whoredom, she
’focused her mind on her escape from this mess of a place”; for the place once considered virgin
territory by the colonizers has itself become a kind o f whoredom, a place where ’tourism is
whorism.” And like those men, she felt ’free’ when she was apart from others, when ’she could
walk away” from someone with whom she had been intimate ’and be glad they were done with each
other* (No Telephone 22, 87-89). Although being unattached meant that she was ’unclaimed,' and
thus free, she also, like G inside the Castle o f his skin, felt ’locked off”; she felt bereft because
neither "the giving o r the receiving" o f love o r affection came easy to her (No Telephone 154).

C liffs writing, see Thomas Cartelli, "After the Tempest: Shakespeare, Postcoloniality, and Michelle
C liffs New, New World Miranda”; Belinda Edmondson, "Race, Privilege, and the Politics of
(Re)Writing History"; Simon Gikandi’s chapter on Michelle Cliff, "Narration at the Postcolonial
Moment," in his Writing in Umbo: Modernism and Caribbean Uterature; Lemuel A. Johnson, "Abeng: (Re)Calling the Body In(To) Question’ ; Maria Helena Lima, "Revolutionary Developments:
Michelle C liffs No Telephone to Heaven and Merle Collins’s Angel’ (Lima, however, interprets
C liffs goal to be essentialist, since, Lima argues, Cliff wishes to create wholeness from
fragmentation (38)); Franfoise Lionnet, "Of Mangoes and Maroons: Language, History, and the
Multicultural Subject o f Michelle C liffs Abeng"; and Raiskin’s chapter on Cliff, "With the Logic of a
Creole," in her book, Snow on the Cane Fields. C liffs own analysis of her work supports readings
that associate changes in identity with freedom: in portraying Clare Savage as a crossroads character,
for example, she explains that her work attempts to draw together ’everything I am and have been,
both Caliban and Ariel and a liberated and synthesized version of each” ("Clare” 264); see also her
interview with Judith Raiskin.
But even as she focuses on a kind o f hybrid identity that is common in the Caribbean
imagination o f freedom, Cliff introduces an element of care that modifies the relationship between
certain kinds of identity and the struggle for freedom. Clare is able to enjoy a certain sense of
freedom, coupled with an anxiety that she defines as being split, from rebelling against natural,
meaning socially assigned, categories and from crossing boundaries. Her desires for autonomy and
independence lead her to resist rigid, socially valued categories. But a growing sensitivity to the
situation o f others who are less privileged than she is eventually guides her to choose among
politically available categories.
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C liffs writing neither rejects nor condemns the practice of escape. On the contrary, she
often endorses the act and the value of escape. In ’Filam ents,” one of her early essays, for
example, she defends her own attempt to separate from her mother as an ’earned departure” and is
pleased that, despite her m other’s symbolic attempts to remove her arms and legs in order to make
escape impossible, she is able to remove herself under her own power (Claiming 12). In another
essay, she identifies with a slave woman whom she dreams of as the first black navigator; arguing
with white women historians who insist that the manuscript which pictures the woman at the helm is
a fake, Cliff takes her lesson from the title o f the manuscript, Emergam, which is the first-person
future of the Latin verb that means "to rise up, emerge, free oneself" (Look Behind, "Claiming’ 444S). And Cliff has Annie Christmas, the non-slave Jamaican protagonist of her third novel. Free

Enterprise, emigrate to th e nineteenth-century United States; like Clare and "other runaway
women," Annie begins "her revolting behavior with her own escape" (10-11).6
At the same tim e, however. Cliff’s writing also suggests that the freedom attained through
escape is both limited and potentially disturbing. A "runaway," per se, is not free; "escape," Cliff
implies, is not freedom unless it is respected by others.7 As even one of the emancipated slaves in

6 Unlike Nanny and Mary Ellen Pleasant, Annie Christmas is a fictional character created by
Michelle Cliff. She shares many characteristics with Clare Savage-she is a mixed-blood light
skinned Jamaican who is bom into relative privilege and who rejects that privilege in order to fight
oppression—and, if real, might have served as a nineteenth-century precursor for Clare. Annie’s
name, however, is a nom de guerre taken from a legendary African woman, with the physical
prowess of a John Henry, who lived and fought at the time of the American Revolution (Free 27-29).
As Cliff observes in an interview with Raiskin, this fictional, legendary character is based on an
historical figure, Lucy Parsons, who was "an American revolutionary, a black woman who came
north, whose husband w as one o f the martyrs at the Haymarket riot," and Lucy/Annie should be
included in C liffs pantheon of guerrillas (64).
7 In Free Enterprise, for example, Cliff highlights the greater degree o f freedom enjoyed by
a person with "free papers” than by a "runaway"; even the fact that a Black person whose free papers
are ripped up is subjected to slavery emphasizes the tenuous freedom of an escapee, because the loss
o f those papers reclassifies the person as a runaway (115). The importance o f respect in
strengthening the freedom o f the runaway is emphasized in Abeng, when Cliff remembers that the
first Maroons on Jamaica hoped that their freedom would be more secure under the Spanish, who
"agreed to respect the freedom o f all the Africans on the island, if the rebels won the colony back for
Spain" (22).
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Free Enterprise suggests, you’re not "free’ if you must ’run for your life’ (90). If escape were
respected as freedom, moreover, those who escaped would not have to live in isolation, but would
be free to create community or even to return. But the potential problem with focusing on escape
in defining the ideal o f freedom does not arise simply from the fact that this freedom is partial and
circumscribed.
Another potential problem arises from the fact that the desire for living free o f and separate
from others has a troubling history o f exclusion, both in the settling of the Americas and in the
twentieth-century Holocaust, on which Cliff frequently dwells. The idea, and the practice, o f living

Judenrein and Schwarzenrein raises the disturbing example o f those who wish to live without others,
to live "free o f Jews" or "free o f blacks."* Finally, as I already observed, Clare’s own practice o f
freedom through escape, and as disconnection, disturbingly mimics the practice of the colonizers
described by Lamming. A freedom that contents itself with such escape does nothing to confront
and change the personal, social, political, and economic situations it characterizes as whoredom.
Rather than confronting whoredom, it pursues virginity; and the virgin conditions it establishes are
as disturbing, if not more disturbing, than the whoredom it leaves behind intact. A freedom that is
more than, or other than, independence and freedom from control, a freedom that confronts the
injustice which enhances freedom for some and curtails it for others, requires some action and some
guiding idea that is more than, or other than, escape.9

* Cliff, whose thoughts about freedom or its absence frequently compares the situation o f the
Jews and the dark races, juxtaposes the concepts o f Judenrein and Schwarzenrein in two consecutive
essays. One, "A Visit to the Secret Annex," describes "A Pilgrimage" to the house where Anne
Frank hid with her family, next door to a church whose congregation thought they were Judenrein.
The other, "Europe Becomes Blacker," is offered as "A History Lesson": although "all those gypsies
shoveled into ovens . . . were dark people," she cites a long list o f dark people who have always
lived in Europe and o f "more colored folks [who] are coming home to roost," to claim that "Europe
has not been Schwarzenrein for a long time now’ (Look Behind 104-109).
9 The notion that freedom requires confrontation rather than, or in addition to, escape may
have broad application in the development of a politicized Caribbean literature that is "skeptical about
any liberational claims for modernism and modernity." In the conclusion to his analysis of
modernism and Caribbean literature, for example, Simon Gikandi suggests that Caribbean modernism
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That other practice and guiding idea emerges as a form of care. At thirty-six, Clare
acknowledges a "longing for tribe," a desire for connection rather than separation (No Telephone
91). As she attempts to create a community for herself, she joins with a group o f freedom fighters,
and attempts to create a different kind o f freedom for herself and others. H er effort is made
possible by a developing sense o f and capacity for care. Clare joins the freedom fighters because
she learns to care, for example, that 167 old women were burned up in an almshouse fire or that
children in the Dungle, Kingston’s homeless, are crippled by polio, and that their suffering is the
result of government policy (No Telephone 194-196).'°
It could be said that Clare now recognizes that "the act of liberation is not sufficient for
establishing the practices o f liberty.” This phrase, from Jana Sawicki’s essay on the potential o f
Foucault’s emancipatory theory for feminism, is particularly felicitous for describing the concern
with freedom that underlies Clare’s emerging sense o f care. For Sawicki is reading Foucault’s
essay on "The Ethic o f Care as a Practice of Freedom"; and she reads that essay to conclude, as
Foucault does, that there are more possible freedoms than those envisioned by traditional humanism

(Disciplining Foucault 122-125). For Cliff and Foucault alike, an ethic o f care becomes integral to
the practice o f freedom. The ethic o f care that Foucault invokes, however, is an ethic of the self, a
freedom practiced as self-invention, the kind of freedom that guided Clare’s early efforts at
indepedendence. The ethic of care that Cliff’s writing invokes in Clare’s later freedom struggles is
closer to the moral vision introduced by Carol Gilligan and Nel Noddings and subsequently debated

is "radically different from ‘high’ modernism," in part because "it seeks to confront rather than
escape” history (2, 254). And Jeannette Charles, identifying herself with M aroon ancestors, with
whom she is "one in de spirit," reminds that "We ain’ only run to de hills fe hide yuh know, we use
fe attak" (270).
10 Meryl Schwartz identifies a similar movement in Clare’s bildung. Schwartz focuses on
Clare’s own needs, however, as the motivating factor for Clare’s developing desire for community;
acknowledging that Clare attempts to forge a politically-defined community, Schwartz argues that
such community is the only "cure” available to heal Clare’s own fragmentation or sense of self
division (291).
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in feminist theory. That vision wnphasizes empathy o r compassion and the willingness to care for
others as well as the self.
This focus on care and community that I identify as an alternative to escape and
independence in C liffs imaginatio n o f freedom shares many features with the emphasis on mutual
recognition and the effort to become free within caring relationships that I associate with the
alternative to escape and independence in Latnming’s portrait o f the women in Natives o f My

Person. In particular, both challenge traditional approaches to autonomy as they attempt to imagine
what kinds of attitudes and practices might be necessary to develop a sense o f freedom that is
neither antisocial nor fearful o f domination. While the ethic of care holds a revised sense of
maturity in common with these revisions to traditional psychoanalytic theory, the focus on care as a
social act rather than a focus on individual or interpersonal psychology brings notions o f morality,
justice, and caregiving to the fore in Clare’s practice of freedom.
T h e S h i f t F r o m D o m e s t ic a t e d t o P o l it ic iz e d C a r e :
T h e C o n n e c t io n O f C a r e A n d J u s t ic e I n R e v o l u t io n a r y F r e e d o m S t r u g g l e
When Carol Gilligan formulates the stages or levels o f moral development that comprise an
ethic of care in In a Different Voice, she contrasts them with stages that evaluate levels of fairness
and justice to measure moral development. As I noted in the introduction to Part Two, a number of
critics object to an ethic of care as a basis for political activity because its practice is too personal
and because it ignores issues o f freedom and justice. Gilligan, however, suggests that a mature
level of moral development would recognize the complementarity between the values of care and
justice (164-165).“ The work o f Michelle Cliff, as I read it, suggests an even more profound
connection between the two values: a proper focus on justice depends on the practice of care.
When critics suggest that the political potential o f care or compassion is limited because
"care" is only extended to family, friends, o r those we understand, they often present this limitation

“ Gilligan presents the complementary approaches as having the potential to resolve conflicts
between integrity (or identity) and care (or intimacy).
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as if it were inherent in, or ’natural” to, the practice o f care. Their criticism , however, is limited
and limiting to the practice o f care. As Joan Tronto suggests, ’the impoverishment o f our
vocabulary for discussing care” may result from the ’way caring is privatized, [and is] thus beneath
our social vision’ (’Women and Caring” 185). Part o f the social and political context that such
privatized notions ignore is the different practice o f care by domestic servants and any number of
other individuals or groups.12

12 My argument has much in common with those made by several contributors to a
’Symposium on Care and Justice” in the Spring 1995 issue of Hypatia. Monique Deveaux introduces
the papers in the symposium by asserting simply and forcefully that care ’entails a deep commitment
to transformative politics* (117). Asserting that ’caricatures o f care theory "--as endless self-sacrifice,
for example—’serve to perpetuate social and political inequalities,’ she identifies instead thinkers
whose works ’show the inextricable links between care and justice, and the extent to which the
concerns of each overlap and presuppose one another” (116, 117).
In ’Colonialismand Its Others: Considerations on Rights and Care Discourses,” for
example, Uma Narayan acknowledges that some ’strands o f the ethic o f care” may resonate with ”a
colonialist care discourse” that thinks about responsibility in a paternalistic framework—that assumes
care o f the enslaved by the powerful as a burden (134). Such paternalistic caring can be a form of
domination. Narayan argues that an alternative practice o f care would be connected less with this
sense of responsibility or duty and more with an ability to be ’attentive and reponsive” to the
suffering of the powerless (138). Her analysis makes clear the distinction I am drawing between
responsibility and response-ability. Narayan also concludes, on the one hand, that improved
considerations of justice might provide ’‘enabling conditions’ for the provision o f adequate care,’
and, on the other hand, that improved considerations o f care ’might provide the ‘enabling conditions’
for more adequate forms of justice” (139). If the kind of responsible care provided by the masters is
a colonialist practice, the kind o f responsive care that Cliff presents as necessary for improved justice
may be considered a postcolonial response to that colonial practice of care.
In ’Care as a Basis for Radical Political Judgments,” Tronto asserts that ’care provides the
basis for the most important form of contemporary radical political thinking* because it ’creates the
best climate for good political judgments” (141). She argues that thinking about care as simply
private or parochial leads to ’simplistic avoidance o f the elements of care” and counters that care
"can concern institutions, societies, even global levels of thinking" (145). An ethic of care
incorporates such elements as ’the broad economic concerns that shape the material conditions o f
people’s lives, the very local scope of interpersonal psychological mechanisms, and social
interactions’ (144). Tronto also highlights the importance o f ’attentiveness” in the practice o f care:
’until we care about something, the care process cannot begin” (145). And an endnote suggests that
such responsiveness is distinct from ’responsibility.” For the ’assumption o f responsibility [that is]
inherent in the work ethic* is more closely associated in welfare debates, for example, with the
position that ’justice” and ’fairness* demand that people ’earn’ whatever they have; in a care ethic,
by contrast, "justice" may entitle people to what they need (146, 147). In the name of greater justice
and fairness, Tronto advocates taking care "seriously* and suggests that ’greater and wider forms of
care" will contribute to the "self-interest” of society by maintaining and repairing "our "world" so
that we can live in it as well as possible” (142, 146).
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The phrase fhar 'em ployers” so commonly use to describe the status o f their domestic
servants, that they are 'lik e one o f the fam ily,' participates in naturalizing this conflation of
caregiving activities and intimacy. Clare Savage grows to question that conflation and to recognize
that being "like one o f the family" is not like being 'o n e o f the family." The narrative voice in

Abeng makes the distinction very clear: being ' ‘like one o f the family’ meant staying in a small
room with one light and a table and a bed”; it meant waiting for tea-time and preparing lap trays,
cleaning, mopping, cooking, caring for babies lighter than their own, doing other people’s laundry,
buying other people’s goods. Being like one of the family meant that the family they served was
often more familia r to them than their own fam ily , than the children whom they saw perhaps once a
week, the children who were cared for by mothers and sisters and aunts (17). Being "like" one of
the fam ily is all too often a status that translates a family "bond" into a condition of "bondage."13
Neither the care that servants provide, nor the response that they receive for that care, are naturally
associated with feelings of care or intimacy.
A more reciprocal and equitable practice o f care would, by contrast, emphasize feelings of
care even when those feelings are not "natural." When Shellee Colen interviewed West Indian
women who migrated to New York to better themselves and found employment as domestic
workers, for exam ple, she found that these women feel the oppressiveness of their position most in
being treated neither like members o f the family they care for nor as human beings with families o f
their own. These women often require "employer sponsorship" in order to obtain the green cards
which will allow them residence status and the potential for reunion with their children. But, as one
observes, "‘They just somehow figure because they’re sponsoring you, they own you’" (51). In an

13 In an early fem inist analysis o f race, sex, and class in domestic labor, Bettina Aptheker
forcefully links the positions o f the domestic and the slave. The household worker enters into a
'slavelike arrangem ent" in which she is forced to sell not only her power to labor, but also her
person as a condition o f labor, and is treated more often than not as chattel. And the majority o f
domestic workers well into the twentieth century were Black women, Aptheker argues, "precisely as
a result o f their [own or other Black women’s] status as former slaves” (119-122).
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analysis that echoes Orlando Patterson’s depiction of slavery as social death, another comments:
"‘There is not much difference between working in this situation and slavery. . . . There is no

human recognition" (52, emphasis added). In fact, what they seek more than material
compensation, according to one worker, is *‘a little respect and feelings’" (56). The absence of
reciprocal care and respect is particularly degrading because, as another remarks, "‘when you’re
living that close to someone for 4 1/2 years, if there is no bond between you, then something has to
be radically wrong’" (61). Like the fugitive slaves and ex-slaves who seek to practice freedom in
community, these women find isolation from family and friends one o f the hardest facts of their
situation and often "seek out and recreate networks of kin and M ends” (65).
Clare Savage learns, from her m other and grandmother, some o f that need for reciprocity.
The example o f her female ancestors teaches her that relatively privileged persons ought to take care
o f "strangers," meaning people outside their family, even if that care for strangers leads members
o f their family to feel neglected and to accuse them of caring more for such strangers than they do
for their own family. Clare’s grandmother Mattie, for example, adopts homeless children and
shares "her family’s food with people who had nothing but the enamel cups and bowls—their
‘utensils’—they held up at her back window" (Abeng 137). Kitty, Mattie’s daughter and Clare’s
mother, feels neglected, for Mattie has the daughter of a neighbor take Kitty to the hospital for a
tonsillitis operation, instead of accompanying Kitty herself (Abeng 138-141). But Kitty continues
the pattern; saving some of her paycheck every week, Kitty buys dry goods and other necessities
and has her husband Boy "drive her to the country to find people to give these things to." And
Clare responds as Kitty did to Mattie; yearning for more natural affection from Kitty, Clare objects
that her mother saves "most of her tenderness for people she barely knew" (Abeng 52).

When

Kitty dies, however. Boy accuses Clare o f being "‘too much like [her] m other,’" abandoning her
family for the sake of "strangers" (No Telephone 102). Noting that Clare cried when the young
girls died in the Birmingham church explosion, but does not cry not when Kitty dies, Boy accuses,
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*‘I suppose you have more feeling for niggers than for your own mother’" (No Telephone 104). As
Boy accuses, Clare begins to accept this alignm ent with her mother; she eventually chooses to turn
her own attention to the strangers she feeds from her grandmother’s farm as she prepares for
revolution.14
When Clare joins the group of freedom fighters who are strangers to her, she joins a group
who are, in many senses, strangers to each other. They vary widely in "the shades of their skin,
places traveled to and from, events experienced, things understood, food taken into their bodies,
acts o f violence comitted, books read, music heard, languages recognized, ones they loved, living
family" (No Telephone 4). As a light-skinned daughter o f landowners who joins with many who are
bitter towards others of her kind, Clare prepares to fight "alongside people who easily could have
hated her” (No Telephone S). Clare risks their bitterness and potential hatred only because a sense
o f care has informed her notions of justice and freedom.
When Cliff expands the notion of whom her characters should care for and about, she
aligns her vision with those who criticize privatized notions of care as irresponsible and who charge
proponents of such privatization with responsibility for constructing a narrow vision that contributes
to inequity and injustice. As Tronto observes:
To say that we should only care for those things that come within our immediate
purview ignores the ways in which we are responsible for the construction of our narrow
sphere. When Noddings says that she will respond with caring to the stranger at her door
but not to starving children in Africa, she ignores the ways in which the modem world is
intertwined and the ways in which hundreds of prior public and private decisions affect
where we find ourselves and which strangers show up at our door. ("Women and Caring"
182)
The way C liffs characters take care of "strangers” as much as or more than their own families may
be a way of "changing places” with the darker, and poorer, live-in servants who neglect their own

14 This connection between political activity and the accusation or practice of caring for
strangers permeates all o f C liffs writing and is especially revealing in the title story o f her collection,
Bodies o f Water. When a mother accuses her daughter o f caring more for strangers than for family,
the space is cleared for the "hotheaded" girl to fight for strangers, even though her mother argues that
her desire to change the world is "impossibly dangerous" (149).
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kin as they care for lighter-skinned, surrogate families instead of changing places with the colonial
masters. This way o f "changing places" may enact C liffs revision of the Rasta concept o f "I and
I," in which "we/they/I connect and disconnect—change place" in an attempt to reduce injustice
without having that change mean that the more privileged characters are submitting to domination

(Look Behind, "Fire" 76).

A redefined sense o f care may be required for progressive political activity because the
socio-economic injustices o f current political systems are based, in part, on the very split between
freedom, justice, and care that the critics o f a politicized practice of care assume to be natural,
inevitable, o r even desirable. As Orlando Patterson argues, that split between political freedom, or
democracy, on the one hand, and socio-economic justice, on the other, was instituted in the Greek
origins of freedom. When he seeks to explain how and why freedom was constructed as the
supreme value o f the Western world, he observes that the Greek conception o f freedom was
developed in a slave society, which was based on a slave economy that generated wealth and a
move toward political equality among dominant males o f the master class, but mass inequality for
the many. When the Attic lower classes demanded greater equality through land redistribution and
a share in the wealth, the master class offered them civic freedom or citizenship instead, and raised
this freedom which separated citizens from slaves, aliens, and women into a prized value. As
Patterson observes, "political equality was the price the elite was going to pay for its growing
wealth and increase in the size of the slave population” (59-74).15
As Patterson describes it, the development o f Christianity contributed to the split when the
values o f freedom and love competed for dominance in the development o f the early church (2963 IS). And, contrary to prevailing political theory which argues that an ethic o f care is an

15 The relevance o f the early Greek situation for C liffs contemporary perspectives in Jamaica
is reinforced by Harry/Harriet in No Telephone when he ironically compares conditions in Socrates’
and Plato’s Greece to conditions in Jamaica (122-123).
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inappropriate basis for political justice, the issue o f justice in the early church was aligned with the
command to love others rather than with the concern for individual freedom. When the value of
freedom triumphed over the value of love, it also triumphed over the value o f justice and equality.
Patterson explains that this development undid the kind of radical social change that Jesus
tried to institute. The supreme value that Jesus preached, and by which he lived, was not freedom,
o r even the freedom to love, but the command to love. But his message o f love, which was also
reflected in his life, was radically egalitarian rather than honorific and hierarchical. Because he
shows that 'w e express our love of God by loving our fellow human beings and by recognizing
their complete equality with us,* the implications of his life and message for changing the
organization of the social world are demanding and potentially subversive—so demanding and
subversive that even his followers were unwilling to live by such an ideal. Patterson considers this
valuation of love and equality an ’insistence on,” and 'celebration of, a value infinitely more
challenging, more humane, and more divine” than the valuation of freedom (303). But Jesus’s
followers created a religion that made individual freedom its central dogma. In the Pauline version
that triumphed in the early church, the focus shifted from the life and message o f Jesus to the
salvation he made possible by his sacrificial death. "Freedom in the literal sense o f redemption
became the central religious goal”; and the promise of spiritual freedom was 'expressed in terms
completely isomorphic with the sociological experience" o f release from slavery (315).
Liberal democracies, as Anne Phillips describes them, bear the legacy o f this tension
between equality and freedom. For individual freedom, secured by rights and liberties, may be
threatened by efforts to deal with social and economic inequalities. The balance between the two is
often struck by a focus on political equality, which appears to be more compatible with individual
liberties, in place of socio-economic equality (39-40).
If it can be said that the concept o f freedom is shaped by the reason one thinks about
freedom in the first place, it might be argued that the early Greek and early Christian conceptions of
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freedom were shaped, at least in part, by a desire to circumvent o r replace demands for love and
social and economic equality. The concept of freedom in such instances is defined in a way that
pits it against the values of love and economic equality. When current attempts to theorize or
extend the practice of democracy avoid such contradictions and inequities, according to Anne
Phillips, they retreat from freedom’s grander promise and suffer from failure of the imagination
(127-128).
I would argue that Cliff attempts to restore some image of the "grander promise." Her
writing not only addresses the demands for love and for greater socio-economic equality that are
often split off from concepts of political and individual freedom, but also suggests, in a manner that
echoes Jesus’s call for a radically egalitarian love, that the splitting o f these two demands from
freedom are connected.
The structure of Cliff’s third novel. Free Enterprise, might suggest that the two values are
competing rather than reconcilable or even necessarily connected, because each value is emphasized
by different key characters who set the values in opposition. Mary Ellen Pleasant, the entrepreneur
who helps to finance "John Brown’s rebellion," argues that "freedom without the means to be selfsufficient is a one-armed triumph’ (Free 146). When John Brown contends that "liberation is one
thing," but that her arguments about redistributing wealth or seizing private property are "something
else entirely," he reinforces the perspective that split the value of economic parity from freedom
two millennia earlier (144). The complementary notions that materialism is tawdry and that people
freed from oppression should prefer the nobler or morally superior goal of freedom are frequently
advanced by those, like John Brown, with more privilege and greater economic advantage. When
Mary Ellen argues against his attempt to make them "better than capitalism," or a "shining example
of the impossible” (143, 147), she responds more generally to the nineteenth-century abolitionist
idealism that viewed slavery and emancipation in moral, but not material terms (Littlefield 72-73).
In Free Enterprise, the path preferred by John Brown is followed more closely by Annie Christmas,
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a relatively privileged, light-skinned Jamaican, who moved to the United States and fought alongside
Mary Ellen and John Brown. After the Civil War, she chooses to live on the edge of the world, in
poverty and obscurity, and alongside some of the most despised and disinherited people of her time,
the lepers at Carville.
Because the path chosen by Annie and the path followed by Mary Ellen after the failure of
their insurrection are never reconciled, it could seem that C liff is setting them up as the competing
or opposing approaches that the argument between John Brown and Mary Ellen Pleasant assumes
they are. It is important to notice, however, that the positions from which Annie and Mary Ellen
adopt their strategies are quite different. When Annie, a light-skinned Jamaican from the wealthier
classes, abandons materialism and chooses to live among the poor, she is rejecting a system that
grants her unfair privilege over others. Annie is revolting against the pessimism and callousness
with which her mother insists that “the poor are an investment that will leave you penniless. This
business can lead nowhere but heartache* (9). When Annie settles by the lepers, who elsewhere in
Cliff’s imagination are "confused" with residents of the alms house {Look Behind, "Claiming" 47),
she is making a kind of rebellious investment in the poor. When Mary Ellen demands the right to
pursue material wealth, she is rejecting the system that grants others unfair privilege over her. Both
Mary Ellen and Annie reject the same inequity, and the same system, from different headings.
Both Annie and Mary Ellen "care" about poverty, economic injustice, and the disinheritance o f the
poor. Both revolt against such inequity and neither is willing to engage in any form of business,
commerce, enterprise, or revolution whose currency is "every man for himself" (7).16
The novels which trace the development of Clare Savage highlight C liffs insistence that a
person of relative privilege must re-fuse the split between between the practice o f care and freedom

16 According to Tronto, the traditional separation o f spheres assumes that market relations
and caring relations cannot coexist and resolves the problem by assigning one to the public sphere and
the other to the private sphere. A more radical solution, t/th e y are indeed incompatible, is to
discover a way of life that replaces market relations ("Women and Caring” 179).

R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

126

in order to re-fuse the split between freedom and greater socio-economic justice or equality. This
pair o f novels suggest that a certain degree of care is needed simply to recognize structural
inequality as unjust in a ’free* society and even more to engage in political and revolutionary
attempts to change both the socio-economic structures and the structures o f feeling that support
them.17 When Clare and Kitty Savage challenge the systems o f sexual and racial prejudice without
considering the consequences o f their acts for others who have even less standing than they do, for
example, their rebellious impulses are recognized as "acts of luxury.”
When the Savage family moves to New York City some time after Clare’s rebellion,
Clare’s mother Kitty fails to anticipate the consequences o f her activity for her co-workers when she
begins to "embellish" the "helpful hints” she inserts into the packages of completed laundry at
White’s Sanitary Laundry because she is angered by the racism she has encountered in the United
Stales. Signing herself as "Mrs. White," which is part o f her job, she attempts to reprimand the
businessmen who are the laundry’s customers, which is not part of her job, with such homilies as
"WE CAN CLEAN YOUR CLOTHES BUT NOT YOUR HEART." But frustrated at her seeming
lack o f effect, she eventually darkens the pink face o f M rs. White and announces: "HELLO. MRS.
WHITE IS DEAD. MY NAME IS MRS. BLACK. I KILLED HER." When customers finally
complain and withdraw their business, the owner fires the laundry’s Black women packers rather
than Kitty, because he believes that their "kind" is "no good," "unstable," meaning black and lower
class, while Kitty is a "nice g irl," meaning relatively light and not quite so poor (No Telephone

17 The practice o f care in Cliff’s fiction approximates the conjunction o f care and justice that
Elizabeth Aim Bartlett identifies in Camus’s ethic o f "rebellion." Where Camus’s rebellion refers to
an "action that simultaneously rejects injustice and oppression and affirms human dignity," the
rebellion in Cliff’s work is often literal. Whether the rebellion Cliff depicts is the literal rebellion of
guerrilla warfare or the kinds o f rebellion inherent in revising history or going where one has no
business, for example, her focus on care corroborates three principles with which Bartlett summarizes
the ethic o f rebellion: characters demand justice precisely because they care, because they have a
passionate concern for their own dignity and a compassionate concern for the oppression o f others;
this conjunction of justice and care implies an obligation to community; and demands for justice that
do not remain faithful to their origins in care become vehicles o f oppression rather than justice (8487).
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72-84, emphasis in original). Even though the blame belongs more to the laundry owner than to
Kitty, a C liff character in this instance is called upon to recognize the potential 'luxury'' in even
symbolic acts o f violent rebellion.
The charge is also applicable to Clare’s earlier attempt to rebel against being confined like
a girl, when she attempted to act like a Maroon by hunting for a wild boar. In this instance, it is
one of the less privileged characters in Cliff’s novels, Clare’s poorer and darker-skinned country
companion, Zoe, who attempts to educate Clare about the costs of her personal rebellion. Those
costs potentially include dispossession for Zoe and Zoe’s mother (Abeng 111-122, 131-132). Clare
acknowledges Zoe’s point that the consequences for Zoe are greater than the consequences for Clare
and regrets her rashness, even though she is unwilling to believe that the differences between them
extend beyond the morning’s hunt. The narrative voice continues to educate readers about a certain
naivete in Clare’s insistence on crossing rigid boundaries of sex and race. Noting that Zoe had
emphasized their different relation to 'property,” and that Clare had admitted that she had selfishly
thought o f the hunt as 'h e r right-her property,” without thinking about the consequences for Zoe,
the narrator continues:
Clare’s people owned property and Miss Ruthie [Zoe’s mother] and her daughters had to
beg a piece horn Miss Mattie [Clare’s grandmother] to live on. But Clare thought that she
and Zoe were removed from property as it related to deeds and acreage—in her naivete she
limited the bounds of property there. After all they were girls and this was country, where
Clare thought everyone crossed the lines of possession—indicated by dry walls and barbed
wire—and picked fruit and cut cane from other people’s land. And dug yam wherever they
saw a yam hill rise. She bad no sense o f the nuances of ownership—o f the unevenness of
possession. O r that if she saw a stranger picking oranges from one of Miss Mattie’s trees,
this did not represent privilege but payment—for mending a break in the fence or helping
with the harvest. She did not realize that it was only she who moved across the lines of
ownership—because she was Kitty’s daughter and Miss Mattie’s granddaughter. {Abeng
121).
But Clare does care about Zoe and the seeds of recognition have been planted. The incident
illustrates that, for a progressive politicized practice of freedom with care, the other must be
allowed to respond and to speak her own needs. As Tronto observes in her reflections about 'h o w '
to practice care in a feminist way that pays attention to the political context o f caring: 'There is no
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simple way one can generalize from one’s own experience to what another needs’ ("Women and
Caring* 177).

Zoe’s challenge initiates the process through which Clare learns that ’love’ must

become the "bottom line’ (Look Behind, ’Within the Veil’ 89). For it is only when love becomes
the bottom line that she begins to see the economic bottom line in terms of equity. It is care about
the consequences o f inequitable ways o f practicing freedom in an ’independent’ Jamaica for people
like Zoe that motivates Clare to engage in a different kind of freedom struggle when she, as a
young woman, joins the guerillas who wish to fight against the system .18
A d a p t in g t h e M o d e l
B e t w e e n C o m m u n it y
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When Clare learns to question the limits o f the kind o f freedom she hoped to attain when
she attempted to imitate the Maroons in her youthful and aborted hunt for the wild boar, she does
not abandon the model o f the Maroons. Instead, she and the other freedom fighters she joins as an
adult evoke "the name o f Nanny” in order to move closer to each other (No Telephone 5).
While fugitive slaves sought freedom from the control o f others, they also recognized, as I
indicated in the Introduction to this work, that freedom meant the ability to enter and sustain caring
relationships. If one feature of slavery, control or domination to the point of ownership by another.

18 The sensitivity that Clare begins to develop to distinctions like those between her situation
and Zoe’s also influence her practice of freedom in the matters o f identity. She begins to recognize
that the freedom she hopes to enjoy by choosing a mixed identity and by traveling between worlds is
a luxury that is unavailable to her friend Zoe. Clare may be free not to choose between categories of
identity; both her ’natural” features, which classify Clare as "white” in the Jamaican color system,
and her economic privilege, even on the "colored" side o f her family, leave Clare relatively free to
shift between racial, if not sexual, identities. That freedom is a luxury Zoe does not enjoy; blackness
and poverty make the privilege of choosing or not choosing a particular identity impossible for Zoe.
At 36, an older and more politically sophisticated Clare comes to accept Harry/Harriet’s decree that
’’the time will come for both of us to choose. For we will have to make the choice. Cast our lot.
Cyaan live split. Not in this world” (No Telephone 131). Because she cares about people like Zoe,
who are less privileged than she is, and because she hopes that Harry /Harriet is right when he/she
promises that ’ ‘Things can change here,” Clare, without denying her whiteness, chooses the
Blackness with which she joins the struggle to make Jamaica a freer place for its Black people (No
Telephone 127). H er shift from the apparent openness o f a hybrid or shifting identity to the seeming
restrictiveness o f a single, committed identity, accompanies her switch from a focus on individual,
personal freedom to a focus on collective, social freedom.
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sets up an opposite notion o f autonomy as the ideal of freedom, a second feature of slavery, the
denial of kinship that Orlando Patterson characterizes as 'social death,” suggests that an opposite
notion of com m unity and affiliation might also constitute an ideal o f freedom. In the tradition of
the Maroon communities w hich the fugitive slaves established, freedom does not have to replace
connection with isolation and disconnection. For if connection, in slavery and domination, is
experienced as belonging to, in freedom, it is pursued as belonging with.

Belonging with configures an alternative basis of connection that contrasts not only with the
connection defined by ownership, but also with the connection defined by family ties or blood line.
C liffs fiction emphasizes the importance of such belonging not only for the first Maroons who
settled with Nanny in Jamaica, but for many fugitives in the Americas, including Mary Ellen
Pleasant’s mother who joined a Maroon settlement in the Berkshire Hills, near Tanglewood, and
raised her baby there (Free 129). She also describes such connection in the history of the marrano
Jews who "had company" as they formed 'companies' of rebels "in their hiding places, guerrilla
bands, in the prisons, in the processions, on the ships of Colon and Magellan, across the seven
seas, . . . in the thick undergrowth of the New W orld' (Free 181-183). Citing the belief mentioned
early in Abeng, that all island children were descended from one o f two sisters, Nanny who fled
slavery and Sekesu who remained a slave (18), and the narrative comment that 'it is important to
take it all in, the disconnections and the connections, in order to understand the limits of the
abolition of slavery" (28), Lemuel Johnson aptly characterizes C liffs fiction as a genealogy of
necessary connections, disconnections, and reconnections that "aims at affiliation" (112, 122, 128).19
With this form o f affiliation, the people with whom one establishes bonds may change even
as the importance of connection and care remains vital. So Clare Savage separates from her family,

19 In the instance cited, the narrative comment about understanding necessary connections and
disconnections specifically refers to the connections and disconnections between slavery and other
forms of employment in the western world, between "slavery-in-fact" and "veiled slavery." But
Johnson appropriately extends the comment to epitomize a general methodology in C liff s fiction.
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and travels through Europe and the States, only to return to Jamaica and join with freedom fighters
on her grandmother’s farm, the same land she once 'shared* with her childhood companion, Zoe.
In Free Enterprise, a character who could be Clare’s spiritual ancestor, Annie Christmas, leaves her
family in Jamaica to seek her own redemption, but successively joins with abolitionists and
suffragettes, then Mary Ellen Pleasant and associates o f John Brown, and finally a colony o f lepers
at Carville.20 Like the former slaves, these lepers live in quarters out back while the sisters of St.
Vincent de Paul, who "care for* the lepers, use the handsome brick house for a convent. Yet it is
the fact that these lepers have families with whom they are forbidden contact that seems to make
their situation most resemble the plight of slaves taken from Africa to the colonies of the new
World. Isolated and wondering whether they are even remembered back home, the lepers attempt
to make life in this "colony" more like the free world outside by forging new kinships (Free 38-43).
When Annie settles beside them, she offers and receives "company” as they visit and share stories
of conquest and resistance.21
This "exchange o f partners" emphasizes that the connection and care which accompanies
this revised practice of freedom is not being represented as connection within a one-on-one
relationship like that o f the heterosexual or even gay/lesbian couple or a nuclear family. This kind

20 Lionnet also notes the importance o f "a different narrative o f belonging, inclusion, and
kinship" in the genealogies of slave societies and diaspora, as represented in Cliff’s novel, Abeng.
But she relates the significance of this different narrative of belonging more explicitly to the
construction o f identity and less explicitly to other constructions of freedom. Identifying the mother
as the site o f both filiation and affiliation, Lionnet highlights the significance o f a "web of
multicultural influences” and a broad idea o f community for establishing a multicultural, Creolized
subjectivity (339-340). Lemuel Johnson’s analysis, which focuses on the connections, disconnections,
and reconnections that allow female bodies to "make generations,” or not, is similarly oriented toward
the definition o f a New World consciousness o r identity through these connections and generations
(120-124, 138). Meryl Schwartz describes C liff’s attempts to "forge imagined communities” that
disrupt associations between social position [or family] and political alliance, but she also focuses on
such community as a cure for psychological fragmentation (288, 291).
21 In an interview with Meryl Schwartz, Cliff observes that these lepers are "a colony o f
political activists who have been incarcerated" (598). In part, then, they form another community o f
resistance like the Maroons, even though they are brought together by force.
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o f connection can be seen both as a result o f slavery’s domestic arrangements and as resistance to
the dominant ideology that enshrines the patriarchal nuclear family as the most desirable form of
kinship. That idealized family is marked by an equation o f kinship and property relations—children
"belong to" (are the property of), and inherit property from, their parents. The "mythically revered
privilege of a free and freed community” in the West, as Hortense Spillers presents it in "Mama’s
Baby, Papa’s Maybe’ in a description whose emphases already criticize that arrangement, is a
"family" that values both "the vertical transfer o f a bloodline, o f a patronymic, of titles and
entitlements, o f real estate and the prerogatives o f ‘cold cash,’ from fathers to sons and . . . [also]
the supposedly free exchange of affectional ties between a male and a female of his choice." In
part, the condition o f slavery is defined by a disruption o f these kinship and property relations:
"‘kinship’ loses meaning, since it can be invaded at any given and arbitrary moment by the property

relations"; children don’t belong to the mother and are not related to their owner. As a result,
Spillers surmises in language that highlights the points about connection and an ethic o f care that I
am making, "it is probably truer than we know at this distance . . . that the captive person
developed, time and again, certain ethical and sentimental features that tied her and him, across the
landscape to others, often sold from hand to hand, of the same and different blood in a common
fabric o f memory and inspiration" (74-75). But if the legal arrangements o f slavery "force" slaves,
fugitives, and freed slaves, to modify their practice of care and connection, of family and domestic
relations, that modified practice, in at least some instances, can be seen as a rejection o f the
dominant form o f domestic relations. If the dominant form of the "family” values the conjunction

of kinship and property relations, but allows property relations to supercede those o f kinship in the
case of the slave, sometimes by narrowing the definition o f kin, i.e., denying the blood ties o f the
owner/father, the resistant form values kinship over property relations and broadens the definition of
kin to include many outside the blood relation.
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The exchange o f partners that Cliff portrays accurately represents a historical pattern of
disconnection and reconnection that continues after emancipation and simultaneously highlights the
importance o f "emotional accommodation” in the practice o f freedom. As a social anthropological
study o f the oldest generation of Jamaican women alive in the 1960s concluded, one of the most
distinctive traits o f this first, and successful, generation o f freebom women is ’the ability to adjust
without trauma to changing domesdc units and/or relationships” (Cobham S3, 62).
Cliff’s writing repeatedly grieves that "so much was ranged against the upkeep of . . .
connections” (Abeng 17).

And she suggests to Judith Raiskin that she plays up these connections,

this ’bonding between oppressed peoples,” because playing down the connections serves to tone
down the history o f resistance. When she observes that it is ’heartbreaking" to realize that these
connections in the struggle for freedom are made only to be broken because ’they were so close to
succeeding so many tim es,” she confirms the close association she draws between connections
among people and the successful pursuit and practice of freedom (’Interview, ” JR 66).
But the history o f Nanny and the Maroons, in whose memory Clare and the other guerillas
fight, has been retrieved by unorthodox historians like Clare to reveal Nanny’s ’tenderness” as well
as her "resistance" against slavery (No Telephone 196). For Clare, Nanny has become a
"Magnanimous W arrior," a "warrior who places the blood-cloth on the back of the whipped slave,"
a warrior who "can cure’ as well as "kill" (No Telephone 163-164).
In her early study of The Rebel Woman in the British West Indies During Slavery, Lucille
Mathurin confirms this combination of militancy and nurturing in the example of the Maroons. She
notes that the communities of Jamaica’s first freedom fighters "were not merely camps, but homes
for families." Cultivating the land and supplying food was among their most important activities,
and one of the essential white strategies against them was the attempt to starve the Maroons out of
resistance (29-30). Nanny, who had no children o f her own, took care to secure the safety of the
children in M aroon communities, so that "Grannie" Nanny became revered as the mother of these
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people (36). Although Mathurin reports that the fighting and nurturing activities were generally
divided by sex in the Maroon towns, she otherwise emphasizes the fighting spirit of the black
women who were slaves or fugitives. And Nanny’s case, which demonstrates that the division
between warrior and caregiver, between male and female roles, was not absolute, is the one which
most informs C liffs imagination.22
The importance o f this history for continuing freedom struggle is highlighted by the target
of the rebel group’s revolt--an American and British-backed movie set that is filming a romanticized
version o f Maroon history which translates the story o f resistance and tenderness into a story o f
erotic attachm ent between two Maroon leaders, Nanny and Cudjoe. Among other things, the script
ignores Cudjoe’s bargain with the British and his betrayal of Nanny in order to secure the freedom
of his own group.
The forgetting of this history is associated in C liffs political vision with the continuing
subjection of Jamaica’s poor, especially her old women. Asking what has become o f the
magnanim ous warrior who can cure and kill and who is needed now more than ever, the narrative

voice in No Telephone to Heaven answers that she has burned up in an almshouse fire, or starved to
death, or lies in a bed in a public hospital with sores across her buttocks. By heralding such
women as potential warriors. Cliff simultaneously asserts the need for care in bringing this kind of
warrior back. She reproaches those who do not take care o f these women: "No one turns her in the
bed. . . . We have forgotten her. . . . The nurses ignore her." And she concludes with an appeal:
"Can you remember how to love her?" {No Telephone 163-164).

22 This focus on caring activities insists on recognizing a dimension that is missing in Barbara
Lalla’s recent discussion o f "marronage" in Jamaican fiction. In Lalla’s reading of Jamaican fiction
from the nineteenth century to the present, the "Maroon consciousness" is associated with characters
who are vagrants, rebels, outcasts, lunatics, and other rejects. And the primary perspective that the
Maroon embodies is that of "alienation" (19-20). When Lalla reads the story o f Clare Savage in
Cliff’s two novels, she focuses almost exclusively on isolation and violent resistance, or the tough,
violent hero, as the Maroon legacy that informs Cliff’s work (186-188).
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In C liffs imagination, compassion is not a trap that keeps people from acting politically,
even violently, but the very motive for confronting injustice. In the unjust contexts Cliff describes,
acts of nurturing do not necessarily tend toward peace politics, as they do for Sara Ruddick and
feminists who adopt her prescriptions for reformulating politics according to the practices of
maternal care, but may instead tend toward revolution and even violence.
The kind o f care mothers show children in C liffs fiction, as in the history of slavery, can
differ considerably from the kind o f care on which Ruddick premises her argument. When Mary
Ellen Pleasant is a child, for example, her mother teaches the Maroon settlement in the Berkshires
of Massachusetts how to explode gunpowder; what Mary Ellen inherits from her mother is the
hand-wrought revolver her mother forged as the pupil of a master smith (.Free 129-131). In No

Telephone to Heaven, Cliff also reminds readers that a slave 'm other’s" care for her "children"
might m anifest itself as a refusal to reproduce. When Clare remembers this history, she reflects
that she might be able to join the guerillas precisely because she does not have children (92-93).
In part, Clare’s participation in rebellion reflects a translation o f the "maternal" that she
inherits from Nanny, who had no children but became known as the "mother” of her people only

because she exercised care for children in a highly political and explicitly revolutionary context.23
Clare and the freedom fighters agree that they are willing to kill because they love Jamaica’s
m alnou rish ed , hungry, or dying children and because they care about changing the possibilities for

these children (No Telephone 190-196). And perhaps because they join in revolution through
awareness o f such need, the revolutionaries frequently engage in other caregiving activities. When
Clare and the freedom fighters farm her grandmother’s land in order to buy weapons, she and the
soldiers distribute the surplus food, as Mattie and Kitty used to do, to "people around who did not
have enough land to support them" (No Telephone 12, 106).

23 In Free Enterprise, M ary Ellen Pleasant is also called a "mother o f freedom," but not
because she cares for children. H er "motherhood" is specifically associated with serving as a warrior
and as an entrepreneur in the Cause o f freedom (203).
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On one front. Cliff de-matemalizes, and undomesticates, the ethic o f care by associating
care, even literal or figurative "maternal* care, with revolutionary violence. On another front, she
also de-matemalizes, and undomesticates, care by refocusing her portrait o f care more on the
practice o f healing than on the practice o f mothering, even though the two are sometimes joined.
That focus begins with Clare’s name, which honors the memory of a dark girl from the
Maroon country, Clary, who, unknown to Clare, cared for Clare’s mother Kitty during a case of
severe tonsilitis, by accompanying Kitty to the hospital and "holding her hand night after night,
singing to her, jumping up to get her cool water from the well out back." While Clary is not a
warrior, she exercizes her care for Kitty in a fighting spirit; she refuses to let the doctor operate on
Kitty, for example, unless he allows Clary to remain in the surgery with her (Abeng 140-141).
Clare ironically takes up the Savage family motto, "To me the care o f the future," when her own
turn to caring unknowingly honors the legacy she inherits from Clary (31).
C liffs fiction is filled with a pantheon of caregivers who are healers as well as warriors.34
Nanny may be known as the mother o f her people, but C liffs portrait of the the Magnanimous
Warrior emphasizes her healing powers. Mma Ali is an obeah-'Nomaa. on the plantation of Clare’s
great-great-grandfather, Justice J.E .C . Savage. She is a "one-breasted warrior” who takes care of
slave women with "troubles" and men in "pain" and also helps the dark woman Inez whom J.E.C.
forced to be his mistress to avenge herself on the justice by getting rid of the baby she carried and
by counseling her about how and when to escape (Abeng 34-35, 39). For Clare, however, the most
significant figure in C liffs pantheon of warrior-caregivers may be Harry/Harriet, whose model and
counsel is central to Clare’s Bildung.

24 I am borrowing the notion o f a "pantheon" of characters in Cliff’s fiction from Deborah
McDowell’s review of Free Enterprise. In that review McDowell identifies a "pantheon of
revolutionaries” in Cliff’s fiction (32). My use simultaneoulsy extends the application of the term and
changes its significance.
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Harry/Harriet is the son o f one of Jamaica’s contemporary domestics and is politicized by
the poverty and the injustice that "she" witnesses and also experiences.23 Harry/Harriet befriends
Clare on one o f Clare’s early visits to Jamaica as an adult, persuades Clare that Jamaica needs her
help, and then encourages Clare to join the freedom fighters. During their conversations, for
example, Harry/Harriet: criticizes the whole system o f western education, ironically suggesting that
Jamaica must be in its "golden” age since the Greeks in Plato’s golden age kept slaves and locked
up women; complains that Jamaicans take on the master’s past as their own when they "punish
people by flogging them . . ., expect people to live on commeal and dried fish, . . . [and] name
hotels Plantation Inn and Sans Souci"; and informs Clare that it is "time" to join the guerillas when
homeless people are reduced to eating an iguana that they steal from a local zoo (No Telephone 123,
127, 188).
Harry/Harriet is a nurse who carries on the work of ancestors like Mma Ali and Nanny,
studying "healing practices" both "at the university and with old women in the country, women who
knew the properties of roots and leaves and how to apply spells effectively" (171). "She" nurses
Clare back to health after a miscarriage; and after "she" completes her duties at the hospital where
"she” works, "she" also nurses all manner o f sickness and wound among the poor who inhabit
Kingston’s downtown. Clare looks to Harriet for inspiration because "she" continues to care for
Jamaicans who, Clare suspects, might indulge in elaborate name-calling, or even stoning, if they
suspected that "a male organ swung gently under her bleached and starched skirt." The question
that guided Clare’s formative development was "what was missing?" in people who held back from
helping others. The question that inspires her continuing development is trying to understand how

23 As I observed earlier, Harry/Harriet parallels Clare’s desire to cross boundaries of
identity, on the level of sexual identification. Eventually Harry/Harriet decides, and persuades Clare,
that living "split” is a privilege that neither can enjoy in the context of injustice. As Clare chooses to
identify herself as dark or Black, Harry /Harriet chooses to become Harriet and to identify herself as
"she" (without any operation that changes her body). When I refer to Harry/Harriet with a pronoun,
I will use the feminine form in quotation marks to indicate this choice o f identity.
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Harriet is able to love and nurse even those who do 'n o t suffer freaks gladly” (171). The fact that
Harriet is able to care for others, despite the anxiety that accompanies such care, becomes a model
for Clare’s own participation with those who might have hated her. The importance that all the
guerillas assign to the role o f the nurse in revolution is highlighted by the fact that Harry/Harriet,
the medical officer, is the only freedom fighter who owns a camouflage jacket to herself, while the
other soldiers wear the few jackets they own in strict rotation (No Telephone 7).
Even though C liff demonstrates that revolutionary freedom struggle is necessarily bound
with the practice o f care, she does not simply glorify violence. The figure o f Christopher, for
example, exists as a counterpoint to the kind o f revolutionary violence that is practiced with care.
Christopher is a part-time groundskeeper who brutally kills his employers when they refuse to grant
him a plot o f land to bury his grandmother properly, so that her spirit will be at peace. Christopher
comes close to the kind o f domestic that Trudier Harris identifies as a militant in the recent work of
black writers. His case further highlights the distinction between the militant and the mammy
because he also kills the maid who has served the family faithfully, 'obliterating” her (No

Telephone 24-49). Without condemning Christopher’s act, however. Cliff refrains from endorsing
its brand o f militancy o r equating it with the practice o f Clare or Harry/Harriet. Instead, the novel
explains his act. C liff makes Christopher and his violence understandable, even sympathetic, as she
describes a boy who is orphaned at ten, who spends his childhood in the Dungle, whose spine is
curved because o f malnutrition, who fails at begging because he is too ragged and dirty and does
not charm the tourists because he hangs his head sullenly instead of entertaining them with a lilting
Jamaican turn o f phrase, and as she details the arrogance o f the family who hires servants when it
needs their labor, then dismisses them without concern for their livelihood, not knowing where their
family is or even if they have one. Christopher’s violence is an act of retribution. Understood in
the context of general patterns of exploitation and insensitivity to the poor, it cannot be dismissed as
an 'incident,” or random act o f irrational violence, as Jamaica’s middle class prefers to call it. His

R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

138

violence is tragic, understandable, and perhaps even justified. But it is not revolutionary violence
and contributes little to the practice of freedom in community. As Cliff notes in an interview with
Schwartz, it is only because Christopher has a spark o f decency that he realizes what he did was
wrong, but internalizes that knowledge as insanity. It is not Christopher who provides the preferred
model for revolution, but Harry/Harriet (613-614).26
In another interview. Cliff highlights the difference between the two characters when she
describes Harry/Harriet both as the most 'com plete' character in the novel and as heroic, not
because "she" is willing to kill or to die in battle, but because 's h e ' is able to love and willing to
nurse those w ho most need help, whether or not they respect "her* (OPA 276). Harriet is
courageous, but does not represent the kind o f individualistic, militaristic hardihood that Nel
Noddings condemns in the west’s idealization o f war heroes (Women and Evil 180). Harriet
contributes to revolution not only because "she” fights the powerful in the hopes of changing the
system, but also because "she* actively helps to change the lives of the poor.
Because revolution, even violent revolution, is reformulated to include care in the practice
of the warrior-caregiver, the way is opened to imagine care itself as potentially revolutionary. It
becomes possible for those who abandon or reject violence to claim the legacy o f the warriorcaregiver as they practice revolution by other means. The practice o f militant healing can be
translated from the literal to the figural sense. In the former, militancy and healing are connected
by being practiced together in battle; in the latter, healing itself emerges as militant practice. Care

26 This reading disagrees with Maria Helena Lima, who sees Christopher’s revenge as the
truly revolutionary gesture in the novel (42). In Lima’s reading, Christopher provides an alter ego to
Clare, who is seen as tragically individualistic and as a literary figure whose unsuccessful revolution
is inferior, because more fatalistic, to the communally oriented protagonist o f Merle Collins’s Angel,
who affirms that social transformation is possible, if not guaranteed, through group struggle. Fiona
Barnes ch allen g es Lima and offers a reading that complements mine. Christopher’s violence, in
Barnes’s reading, is an isolated personal revolt that is contrasted both with the alternative model
embodied in Harry/Harriet and with 'C lare’s gradual movement toward collective popular resistance”
(29). Meryl Schwartz also presents Christopher as a counterpoint, but to Clare rather than to
Harry/Harriet. Following Cliff’s observation that Christopher murders the maid out of self-hatred,
Schwartz suggests that Clare must resolve her own self-hatred by another means (292).
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is not opposed to violence; it doesn’t keep us, as Ruddick suggests, from going to war. But care
can form the basis of revolution without violence.
Even so, the role o f the warrior-caregiver emerges as the most revolutionary one in Cliff’s
fiction. Just how objectionable, and potentially threatening, the role that combines caregiving with
militancy was to the nineteenth-century patriarchy that promoted domesticity is indicated by a
contemporaneous reaction to the activities of the abolitionist writer, Lydia Maria Child. Wendy
Hamand Venet reports that an 1859 article in the New Orleans Picayune argued that Child ’did not
deserve the job of nurse” because she ’lacked the ‘soft touch and . . . eyes that beam with gentlest
sympathy’; rather, this woman with her ‘shrewish treble’ spouted only ‘hyena hatreds.”

As Venet

concludes, ’Child might be forgiven her abolitionist polemic, . . . but she could not be forgiven for
being both an activist female and one who made claims to be a ‘ministering angel” (110). The
discursive and practical attempts to separate nineteenth-century slaves into one of two stereotypes—
the gentle, happy, nurturing servant or the fierce and vengeful savage-belie a similar anxiety about
caregivers who might also be warriors.
One instance in Abeng highlights the retribution that slaveowners might inflict on warriorcaregivers. After Mma Ali, the obeah-woman, helps Inez escape shortly before the British
emancipation o f slaves in the Caribbean, Justice Savage burns the people who were still his
property; the narrative observes, ’the fire began at the cabin of Mma A li,” the warrior and healer
(40). The act of Clare’s paternal ancestor is both retaliation and an attempt to control the anxiety
he feels about the impending freedom of his former slaves. The desire of slaveowners and their
spiritual descendents to control or erase the anxiety that warrior-caregivers arouse, to live ’free
from care,’ by enforcing the split between the warrior and the caregiver, is a desire that Cliff
refuses to accomodate. In her world, revolutionary freedom must be practiced with a certain
amount o f anxiety, and with care.
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Buckw heat P a n th er s:
J e s s M o w r y ’s H o m e y V e r s io n o f W a r r io r -C a r e g iv in g

In her depiction of warrior-caregiving, Michelle Cliff focuses on two scenes of
revolutionary violence and care: in Free Enterprise, the nineteenth-century "rebellion1’ of John
Brown, Mary Ellen Pleasant, Annie Christmas, and their comrades in the United States, just before
the Civil War; in No Telephone to Heaven, the twentieth-century guerrilla action o f Clare Savage,
Harry/Harriet, and the group o f self-styled freedom fighters in Jamaica, in the decades following
independence from E ngland, In Jess Mowry’s Way Past Cool, the scene o f violence and care
moves to a twentieth-century location that is still, in an image made famous by Stokely Carmichael
at the height o f the Black Power movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s, a "colony” within the
United States-a black ghetto that can only "be liberated" if a "totally different America [is] bom"
(601-602). Carmichael's analysis connects the struggles for freedom that take place within the
urban ghettoes o f the United States with the independence struggles o f colonies like those in Africa
and the Caribbean. And the picture that Mowry draws, o f the struggles of young boys in a 1990s
Oakland enclave that they name "Oaktown” to liberate themselves from the traps created by
governmental and economic structures and also by the ways, including drugs, that some inner-city
youth have developed to deal w ith those traps, complements and expands the vision of freedom
struggle that I identified in the w ork of Lamming and Cliff. Where Cliff advocates warriorcaregiving as a practice o f freedom for the relatively privileged, however, Mowry advocates a
version o f warrior-caregiving fo r those who are among the least privileged, for blacks whose
experience o f "freedom" is among the most restricted in the United States today.
M owiy’s novel provides a vision that could serve as a counterpoint to imaginative
recreations o f ex-slaves as "folk emerging from and still influenced by the slave condition”recreations that, according to Hazel Carby, dominate the concerns of African-American critics and
140
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repress "the urban imagination and urban histories” o f African-Americans and deny "the
transformative power o f both historical and urban consciousness.” When the ex-slave consciousness
becomes a "folk* consciousness that romanticizes the selfhood and humanity of ex-slaves, the
vernacular that expresses that consciousness is the "blues” ("Ideologies o f Black Folk” 126-127,
140). When Mowry’s picture o f urban youth is read as a contemporary urban slave narrative, by
contrast, the vernacular of that struggle for freedom is aligned more closely with hip-hop or rap
culture.1 The subject and style o f his novel, urban gan g s and the rap that is associated with them,
are both vilified in the popular im agination

The "folk” figures who populate mass cultural

representations of blacks are, as Carby observes, often devoted servants who allay white anxiety
about black emancipation. The young black males who populate the urban ghettoes and Mowry’s
novel, by contrast, more often epitomize the fear of chaos that is associated with black emancipation
in mass culture mythology. In that anxiety-ridden mythology, as Carby analyzes it, "free" black
males are "uncontrolled” black males who threaten to destroy civilization. The only way to
preserve civilization and decrease that anxiety is to control those males and restrict their freedom
("Ideologies of Black Folk" 130-131).
Mowry sympathizes with the plight of young black boys who are confined to urban
ghettoes and rejects the nearly automatic equation of these boys, and neighborhood gangs, with
drugs, destruction, and the mindless killing of their own. He writes his novels fo r them and

1 In "On Stepping into Footprints," Reggie Young identifies his own novel, Crimes in
Bluesville (1990), and Mowry’s Way Past Cool as contemporary slave narratives that narrate struggles
for liberation from states o f urban bondage. The language o f Way Past Cool makes it a "rap novel,”
but one that "distinguishes itself from the commercialized forms o f rap m usic,” especially the forms
of "gangsta" rap which focus on "glorified images of violence" rather than contributions to true
liberation (372). I will discuss the "rap" motif and Young’s evaluation o f this "slave narrative" more
fully below.
Ishmael Reed, in a positive discussion o f the novel and o f Mowry himself, concludes that the
"brilliant wordplay of rap music and the prose of Jess M owry, the Homer of inner-city youth,
indicate a full-blown word renaissance among black youth” (164).
A review that criticizes the novel for its cliches also associates it with "rap,” but not
necessarily in a way that challenges the vision of "gangsta” rap. For Nelson George, Way Past Cool
"is the literary equivalent o f "Juice" or of Ice Cube’s latest single" (21).
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observes: "‘I think the only thing I done that ain’t been done before is try to show these kids as
human beings’" ("Goodbye, Cool World"). In Way Past Cool he recovers the sense of care and
resistance that mark their struggles for survival and greater freedom, and that connect their violence
with revolution and their story w ith the slave narratives of the nineteenth century.
***

The main action o f Way Past Cool takes place over the course o f two days, a Thursday and
a Friday. A kiddie-gang named the Friends are drive-byed on Thursday morning and a neighboring
gang named the Crew are drive-byed that afternoon. Both drive-bys have been arranged by Deek, a
drug dealer who hopes to trick one o f the gangs into working for him and who murders the
outsiders he hired to do the drive-bys on Thursday evening. The Friends and the Crew get together
on Friday afternoon to decide how they will respond to the drive-bys and then engage Deek and two
corrupt cops in a shoot-out at an abandoned car wash on Friday night. A brief denouement occurs
on Sunday when Ty, Deek’s bodyguard, recovers from a wound he received during the shoot-out.
The boys, who are mostly between twelve and fourteen and refer to each other as "kids,"
are trying to free themselves from two kinds of traps that threaten to keep them caged. One kind,
represented by the cops, is a white trap created by the dom inant economic and political order which
restricts their opportunity to participate in the benefits of the wider society and threatens to confine
them in the ghetto for life. Another kind, represented by the drug dealer, is a black trap created by
inhabitants o f the ghetto in collusion with the cops and the outside order—a trap that often leads to
further confinement, in prison, o r to death.
The neighborhood in which the Friends live is itself a kind o f cage. Its borders, which
they create and defend in order to protect themselves and to allow themselves some freedom of
movement within, simultaneously lock other gangs out and themselves in. The borders, however,
are often breached. Cops, drug dealers, and criminals surveil, and sometimes attack, them within
these borders. Markita, a young single mother who becomes involved with Ty, reflects that, sooner
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or later, anyone without money ends up in a cage and she wonders whether black men and boys
seem weaker than women simply because they wear 'themselves out so fast by shaking the bars of
their cages' (160, 165). The sensitivity to being caged is so strong that a wounded boy refuses to
get assistance at a youth center because he thinks it is 'just like prison,' a place where they lock
you in; and Markita’s friend Leroy warns her that love can also be confin in g , that she should not let
Ty think he’s in some kind of cage, 'even a nice one” (53, 247). Ty himself observes that life
seems like "‘nuthin but some long line o f cages’” and that those cages "‘keep on gettin smaller and
smaller’" (169).
Markita recognizes that acting cool is one way boys pretend that they don’t care. Being
bad is the only protection Ty has that can’t be stolen (292). The youth know, however, that this
kind of protection is ineffective. It only puts them in another cage, a black one. Deek, for
example, prepares his own downfall by refusing to believe that kids can figure any other way out.
Pointing out that the 'juvies" [homes for juvenile offenders], jails, and prisons are full of 'stupid”
black kids, Deek tells Ty that "‘all them little suckers think it so way fuckin past cool to be endin
up dead or spendin their lives in cages like animals cause they figure it the badge o f bein black.’'
The irony, he jokes, is that they think being "‘stuck behind the bars of whitey’s cage’" is what
makes them bad (101). But when one member of the Friends, Lyon, tests Ty’s little brother Danny
by remarking that the 'word* on the street, or the accepted wisdom, says being caged goes with
being black because it ' ‘mean you way past bad,’” Danny responds, ”‘word fulla shit sometimes’”
(139).
But it is Ty, the character who feels trapped in the world of drug dealing, who most
directly articulates the knowledge that a black cage is no better than whitey’s cage. Like the black
and white cops who seem to ”look alike” (16), the black and white cages both confine black youth.
Having stepped into the trap of being cool, Ty reflects that blacks who are sucked into drug dealing
simply ’decorate their cages with gold chains” (238). When Deek, in Ty’s presence, murders two
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outsiders whom he hired to execute the drive-by shootings near the Friends and the Crew, Ty tells
Markita that "‘It like a cage he make for m e’" (169). In essence, Ty recognizes that the white cage
and the black cage are intimately connected. "Being bad” places kids in one or the other and
frequently both.
In presenting a model that might help young black readers free themselves from the cages
that they also live in, Mowry rejects two forms o f freedom that are connected with each o th erindividual independence and escape. Ty’s brother Danny, for example, enters the novel as a
character who, like G in Lamming’s Castle and the young Clare in Cliff’s Abeng and No Telephone,
insists that his freedom depends on complete independence or sovereignty over himself, on his sense
that nobody "*gots no say over me” and that his life belongs only to him: "‘It M Y life,” he insists,
"‘MINE!’” (110). By the close, however, he realizes that independence is more o f a trap than
community is and that community holds more promise for freedom, or getting out o f the cage, than
independence does. And even though Mowry allows one character to "escape," like the young
Clare Savage or many of the males in Lamming’s fiction, by moving out of the ghetto, Mowry
objects to the model provided by the successful few who get out and abandon those who remain. In

Way Past Cool, he has one of the Friends criticize M. C. Hammer for a lack of "’sponsibility"
when he remembers a story about Hammer "‘scorin himself a six-million-dollar house an bail
Oakland” (74). Mowry, whose own life provides the basis for the grim reality as well as the
hopeful vision o f his fiction, also rejects that path o f escape for himself. When he earned enough
money from writing to move from an abandoned bus in a junkyard to an apartment, he chose to
return to the ghetto. He maintained the bus for his office, kept collecting cans to stay "in practice,"
and used his money to help neighborhood youth (MacRae 126). And the place where he requires
his characters to transform the practice of freedom is also within that community. The way to a
"future" that is not defined by the Uzi that a 16-year-old Deek offers these 12-to- 14-year-olds
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involves collective fighting, with guns if necessary, but fighting that is guided by practices of
"heart" and that might be called a homey version o f warrior-caregiving.
If a large, strong boy named Gordon leads the Friends officially, a fragile-looking skinny
boy named Lyon leads them unofficially. The Friends look to Lyon for the kind o f imagination that
bell hooks complains is absent from far too many portraits o f black youth (Outlaw Culture, "What’s
Passion Got to Do W ith It?”). Lyon helps them learn the power of what he calls ’heart” magic,
whose primary weapon is trust. The traditional weapons they use in their fight against the drug
dealer Deek and two corrupt cops supplement, but also complement, the weapons o f the heart.
Trust allows the two adjoining gangs, the Friends and the Crew, to establish rules that allow them
to negotiate peacefully with each other, and it also allows them to kill the drug dealer, who
alternates between threatening them and attempting to seduce them. Lyon recognizes that heart
magic alone is not yet sufficient to combat the forces that threaten to trap the boys in cages of crime
and despair. But he prophecies that heart will be sufficient someday if its practice starts with the
pre-adolescents they all think of as *kids* (200).
When Lyon dies in the gun battle against Deek and the cops, the novel might seem to fit
hooks’ definition o f anti-utopian, and thus anti-revolutionary, fiction: fictions that ”shut down the
imagination” because the only characters who dream o f a way out are "blown aw ay.” But Mowry
escapes this charge by focusing on a second character, Ty, who also begins to imagine a way out
and who does, as hooks might say, 'survive the genocide” (Outlaw Culture 46).
As Deek’s bodyguard, Ty seems an unlikely candidate to lead a revolutionary movement.
Early in the novel, he even characterizes himself as someone for whom it is "too late” to escape the
cage. Although his faith is less steady than and not quite as optimistic as Lyon’s, he also sees the
kids who are ’standing at the door of the cage” as a "last defense" (61, 169). Attracted by the
figure of Lyon, whom he sees but does not know, Ty independently begins to reflect on the system
that traps them and on the power of love for offering a way out.
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Ty’s faith in kids and the possibility of another way is strengthened when the actions o f his
little brother, Danny, bring Ty in contact with the Friends and the Crew. Once Ty recognizes the
power o f the kids’ resolve to save him while they fight Deek, he shifts his own efforts at protection
from Deek to the kids. He is redeemed by Lyon, the kids, and also by the imagination which has
prepared him for this response to them. At the close of the novel, Ty has emerged as Lyon’s
complement, an unofficial leader who prophecies that a new game is just beginning (310).
If Lyon serves as the prototype o f something new, Ty is the figure who will carry his
promise through. By setting Ty up as a character who joins the kids in the search for a way out,
M owry’s novel has the advantage o f suggesting that it is not too late for redemption, provided
someone cares. Ty’s case is especially appropriate for challenging what Cornell West identifies as
the nihilistic threat to black survival: the ’loss of hope” that shuts down the future, the ”absence of
meaning" that prevents struggle, and the "lovelessness” that fosters both {Race Matters 22-23).
R e a d i n g W a y Pa s t C o o l a s a C o n t e m p o r a r y S l a v e N a r r a t i v e :
O n L it e r a c y a n d N o s t a l g ic E n g a g e m e n t W it h S e n t im e n t a l a n d
R e v o l u t io n a r y C u l t u r e
When Reggie Young reads the boys’ struggle to liberate themselves from ghettoized
bondage as a contemporary slave narrative that "examines literacy and violence as methods o f
revolt,” he calls Way Past Cool ”one o f the most interesting narratives of African-American urban
bondage produced in the early 1990s” ("On Stepping” 372). But he concludes, in essence, that
Mowry narrates a failed attempt at liberation. While I believe that Mowry’s novel extends the
tradition of the slave narrative, especially the tradition begun by the autobiographies of Frederick
Douglass, I question two assumptions that contribute to Young’s judgment.
One is that liberation is synonymous with escape, because those who remain in the ghetto
can attain nothing better than survival. Young concludes that Ty, for example, merely survives the
violence, but *does little to escape not only his physical enslavement but also the disenlightening,
dehumanizing, social and psychological nature of his bondage* (374). Young’s formulation implies
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that Ty (and perhaps Mowry) could remain within the ghetto physically and yet escape bondage
psychologically—a situation that would m irror Douglass’s claim, after his fight with the overseer
Covey, that he might "remain a slave in form ," but not "in fact” (299; ch. 10). But the bulk of
Young’s writing suggests that even psychological escape requires physical escape. He argues that
the boys exist in an "unenlightened setting” where many boys suffer the consequences of being "real
cool," ignoring the fact that Mowry focuses on boys who struggle to be ‘way past cool’ (375-376).
Young also reinforces the connection he makes between physical escape and even psychological
freedom when he describes himself as someone who, like Douglass, physically "escapes to give
voice to ” the story of those in bondage in "the outside world” and defends his own choice to remain
a "refugee" from the Chicago ghetto in which he was raised because return would mean separation
from the enlightened world and going back to bondage ("Literacy" 57, 73-74). But Mowry’s novel,
as I already indicated, is written by someone who believes in return and who writes for those inside
the ghetto as much as or more than for those in the outside world. Young’s perspective may also
be inappropriate for evaluating Mowry’s choices because it seems to involve a class bias that
regards certain kinds of labor as demeaning—a bias that is absent from Mowry’s vision. I would
argue, for example, that Mowry presents Ty’s choice-to follow in his father’s footsteps (footsteps
similar to those taken by Mowry’s own father) by buying a truck in order to salvage scrap—as a
choice to support his family with honorable labor and as a sign o f Ty’s escape from at least one
kind o f dehumanizing bondage; indeed, regarding such labor as denigrating can lead youth in the
ghetto into the black trap of drug dealing. Young, however, reads Ty’s choice as a "kind of urban
menial sharecropping" and implies that all such choices are disenlightening and dehumanizing ("On
Stepping” 376).2

2 1 would argue, with Young, that his defense of his own choice to live in and to write for
the "outside world" represents a position that must be allowed if African-Americans are not to be
confined to limited possibilities. But I would also argue, against Young, that his choice is not
necessarily more liberatory than the kind that Mowry depicts in his novel.
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Young’s other assumption deals with literacy and is connected with his bias toward physical
as well as mental escape. He cites Robert Stepto’s study of African-American narrative in From

Behind the Veil (1991) to emphasize the association o f freedom with literacy ("On Stepping" 375).
Even though Frederick Douglass identifies his physical fight with Covey, as well as literacy, as
steps to freedom. Young argues that the violence in Mowry’s novel is part of their day-to-day
existence of bondage rather than an act associated with liberation. And even though Young suggests
that African-Americans can use various "forms o f literacies" to liberate themselves, he privileges a
"specific type o f literacy," the literacy o f the 'w ritten word" that is dominant in the outside society,
a "book learning" to which Mowry’s characters, according to Young, do not have access (369, 372,
375). Young concludes that neither the violence nor the other literacies o f the residents of Mowry’s
Oaktown are liberatory because they do not allow the boys to move beyond survival to an escape
defined by getting out of the ghetto.
M owry’s characters, however, do use literacy as a path toward greater freedom. At least
one of the m ain characters, Lyon, does read. Even though he only owns a few clothes, he owns
many books that he arranges neatly on shelves along one wall o f his room and is familiar with at
least one William Blake poem, "The Tyger" (74, 120). He becomes a leader whom the other boys
respect partly because his literacy, which comes from reading books as well as reflecting on street
life, often helps to save the Friends from the violence that threatens them and also informs Lyon’s
faith in a liberation achieved by trusting the "heart." In Mowry’s story, the practices of literacy are
not divorced from, but connected with the practice of violence, and both are connected with the
practices of care.
But another kind of literacy, one that deals with popular or mass culture, is equally
important in the boys’ struggle for freedom from the white and black traps that threaten them and
for freedom to interact with each other more freely and cooperatively. The potential that Mowry
associates with such literacy is highlighted by his own choice of genre, a young-adult novel that is
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more readily classified as part o f mass culture than as the kind o f "literature* which Young and the
dominant society associates with book learning. Inner-city youth are not forbidden from watching
TV and movies as slaves were forbidden from reading and writing; in fact, they may even be
encouraged to watch and imbibe such popular entertainment. But they are expected to be
consumers o f mass culture rather than critical viewers. They are not expected to analyze the
messages and images o f the mass media and to use their analyses to develop strategies o f resistance.
Ty, the drug dealer’s bodyguard, however, has used a TV show about the Great Pyramids
of Egypt to analyze the dynamics of the social structure that keeps black youth trapped. He
imagines that hungry and unwanted kids are the foundation o f a pyramid built on ’power and money
and greed” and cemented with ’hate and fear and hopelessness,* and he decides that the primary sin
of those close to the bottom is preying on others who are younger, weaker, or alone, ”[w]ithout
friends" (62-63). As he considers the dynamics more closely, he also begins to question whether
the few for whose sins the race is being punished are really those black kids who make up the
foundation, as mainstream scripts suggest, or the white few at the top who profit from black
violence and corruption (235). He speculates that those at the bottom are simply ”[k]ids playing TV
games for keeps* and directs his criticism at the powerful few who ’wrote the scripts” (155).
Although Ty refuses to blame the hungry and unwanted children at the bottom, he has little hope at
the beginning o f the novel that they will be able to resist those scripts, partly because he thinks that
they only watch cartoons instead o f news stories that they, like he, could see through if they paid
attention (63).
The Friends, however, are quite literate, to the extent that at least one reviewer, Kimberly,
accuses them of thinking too much like adults (47).3 The younger boys also watch news programs
as well as cartoons and other shows and have learned something about the "reality* o f the world.

3 The objection uncannily echoes the attitudes o f critics from earlier centuries who wished to
deny the authenticity of the work o f writers like Douglass, Harriet Jacobs, Harriet W ilson, and others
because, those critics contended, the works were too literate.
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They have learned, for example, that the world doesn’t think young black boys in an urban ghetto
are worth much. Gordon advises the youngest members of his group, the twins Ric and Rac, that
few people care about them; in fact, alluding to news reports about saving whales and endangered
species or about the fight for anim al rights, he sneers, "‘people like otters and little white rats
better’n you’" (14-15). From watching the news, they have learned that national conflicts over
power and territory are as prevalent and disturbing and as difficult to solve as their own.
Observing, for example, that nations in the Middle East have problems maintaining a "Balance of
Power,” they find little instruction in conflict-resolutionfrom hearing about the behavior of adults in
the "real" world (78).
The boys also recognize a difference between showtime and teal time in the scripts that
supposedly describe armed heroics. When one member, Curtis, is shot in the shoulder during the
drive-by, the young twins, Ric and Rac, wish they could be shot in the arm where the scar is visible
since being shot is supposed to mean they are "way past bad.” But Gordon quickly reproaches
them. Calling one "raisin-brain," he educates them against such a showtime attitude: "‘Gettin shot
more like to make you way past DEAD! Ever hear of somebody bein actual shot in the arm real
time? That ain’t nuthin but TV dogshit, sucker!’" (6). Lyon also recognizes the distinction
between showtime and real time when he follows Danny and Ty to a meeting with Deek and
considers how he can get Danny’s attention without alerting Ty and Deek. He reflects that a TV
"hero would creep up behind some unsuspecting dude, press the gun to his head, and whisper
something showtime like ‘Freeze, sucker!’" But Lyon knows the maneuver wouldn’t work in real
time because "the dude would likely give a yell." He also rejects another TV solution like knocking
the dude out with the gun for just long enough to "do whatever heroics needed to be done," since
knowing "how hard to hit them and exactly where" would take a lot of practice (132-133).
If literacy for Young frequently involves a positive embrace of enlightened and humanistic
values available in the dominant literature, literacy for these boys more often involves a criticism of
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the disenlightened and racist attitudes in the popular media. The boys know that what is presented
as realism on TV is black kids being bad and ending up dead and that such ’realism” is presented
for the entertainment o f the white audience. Gordon comments that the TV audiences "lik e seein
us fight. Hope we kill each other.’* Lyon agrees and remembers reading that the KKK ’ ’liked to
get us fightin so’s they could watch and laugh over it.” Such realism is something the Friends
could live without. The young Curtis learns quickly, and concludes: ’ ’Well, shit. Seem like we be
pretty fuckin stupid to go puttin on showtime for them assholes!” (21-22).
Their ability to recognize that somebody else is writing scripts for them poses the same
kind of threat that Douglass’s master Hugh Auld predicted if slaves learned to read: reading would
make them ’discontented and unhappy,” ’ unmanageable,* and ’unfit' to be slaves—in other words,
disobedient to their masters. That threat in Douglass’s narrative arises not simply from reading
books, but also from reading newspaper accounts o f abolition. It is because of literacy’s association
with such disaffection and resistance that Douglass first began to see reading as ’the pathway from
slavery to freedom"(274-275, ch. 6).
In Fugitive Cultures, Giroux affirms the notion from cultural studies that media culture,
including television and film, is a significant site o f contemporary education. He then identifies
media culture—in particular, the news media’s coverage of youth violence and cinematic
representations o f violence—as ’the central terrain on which the new racism has emerged” (58).
The pedagogy at work in these media reinforces, on the one hand, the ’popular perception that
everyday black urban life and violent crime mutually define each other” and, on the other hand, a
sense o f ’nihilism" among its youthfrd urban viewers (43, 56). He argues that ’progressives and
other cultural workers . . . can no longer sit back and allow [these] popular teaching machines to go
unchecked” in their contribution to mean-spirited social policies that are enacted in the name of
crime reform and family values (23, 30, 56). In particular, Giroux challenges them to become
"educators” who ’formulate ways in which a critical pedagogy might be employed to appropriate
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the more radical aspects o f children’s culture’ and who ’prepare youth and others to think through
representations o f violence”—to understand these representations critically, in words he borrows
from Ed Guerrero, as “ vehicles through which society’s racial [sic], contradictions, injustices, and
failed policies are mediated” (33, 58). I want to suggest that Mowry writes like such an educator
and that the ’literacy” which his characters practice as they analyze and appropriate popular culture
may enhance the ability o f his young audiences to ’read’ media culture critically and even to
’misread” its images when resistant readings are more conducive to freedom struggle.
***

Where Clare Savage retrieved and revised the scripts about Nanny and the Maroons as a
model for Jamaican freedom struggles, the Friends find models for their own struggles by rewriting
the scripts about two groups in twentieth-century culture: one from the history o f mainstream
popular culture—the fictional "gang” o f young children in the Bowery, known as the Little Rascals;
and one from the history o f black struggle-the militant ’gang” founded in Oakland at the height of
the Black Power movement, the Black Panthers. When the Friends make recourse to and reread
these models, they might be accused of participating in a politics o f nostalgia. And when they
choose to appropriate the image o f Buckwheat and the other Rascals, they might, to paraphrase
Harry/Harriet from C liffs novel, be derided for trying to take the master’s nostalgia for their own.
The kind of politics which looks to the past, for example, informs the contemporary
version o f domesticity which seeks to return middle-class white women to the home and motherhood
and poor unwed black mothers to the workplace, all in the name o f family values. And, as Michael
Eric Dyson observes in ’We Never Were What We Used To Be," a similar black nostalgia which
also ’recreates as much as it recalls” is used to repudiate black youth as ethically depraved (Race

Rules 111-119). Dyson argues that such nostalgia is "destructive” when it is used to browbeat black
youth and when, because it separates the past from the present, it loses ’sight of the resources for
ethical engagement that are carried forward from the past into our own thinking, believing, hoping.
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praying, and doing* (139). But, he suggests, nostalgia, and even romanticization, may be useful
’to jump-start our flagging efforts in the present* (139). And, his argument implies, nostalgia may
be valuable if it recovers "resources for ethical engagement” from the past. Nostalgia, then, is
another discourse that may be mobilized for conservative or progressive ends. Nostalgic recreation,
which is often used to advocate a conservative return to a world that never was, can also be used
for a revolutionary struggle to create a world that is yet to be. In their nostalgic adaptation of the
Little Rascals and the Black Panthers, the inhabitants o f Mowry’s Oaktown strive for a more
progressive outcome by renegotiating two kinds o f stereotypes with which young black males have
been associated—a sentimental image of amiable children who accept a subservient position in
society and a fearsome image o f violent criminals who constitute a menace to society.4 The
combination serves to blur the distinction between the ”folk* consciousness that has been
romanticized in criticism o f African-American culture and the "urban* consciousness that is ignored
or feared. Paradoxically, their subversive renegotiation serves to reclaim and to combine two rights
which these males have been denied—to be children and to engage in revolution.
If the first kind o f youth is seen as preferable in mainstream mass culture, the second kind
is seen as realistic. The dominant preference for black children who act like Buckwheat, a
character drawn as a watermelon-eating caricature o f black youth with an exaggerated accent and
features, might suggest that adoption of the Little Rascals model plays into racist stereotypes that

4 Dyson observes that the contemporary nostalgia which vilifies rap culture and yearns for a
more respectable past ignores the history of popular culture in which jazz, for example, was
associated with gin and sex and reviled as immoral {Race Rules 125-127). He analyzes several
features o f the rap aesthetic which might describe the method by which Way Past Cool nostalgically
negotiates with past culture. Analysis of these features would extend the argument that the book is a
rap novel because of its method as well as its language. For hip-hop features, such as ’aesthetic
loops,” which rework and repeat fragments of existing songs in new musical contexts, and
’sampling," which revives and reinvents what has been forgotten in past culture, reshape ’what’s
been neglected by removing it from the context. . . in which it originally came to life.” Dyson
suggests that such ’creative piracy,” which irreverently pairs the culturally sacred and profane, might
be made more compelling if those who use its techniques were more aware of the historical tradition
(120-124). Such awareness might distinguish the nostalgia o f Mowry as author of this rap novel from
the nostalgia of the characters within the novel.

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

154

characterized the tradition of minstrelsy in the early part of the twentieth century. But the
implication is complicated by the fact that mainstream America in the 1990s excludes inner-city
gangs from the definition of childhood that shows like the Little Rascals sought to enshrine. In the
eyes of the d o m inant culture, it is illegitimate for members of inner-city gangs, who are assumed to
be violent crim in als, to affiliate themselves with a sentimental gang o f amiable children. When the
Friends transgress the color line to read white popular culture, they affirm, in the discourse o f a
growing approach tc American culture, that ’cultural exchange [takes place] between AfricanAmerican and ‘mainstream’ expressive traditions* (Wonham 12-13). And when they re-use the
model of the Little Rascals, even in a romanticized way, in a context that denies the humanity of
black children, their appropriation may be subversive. That subversion continues the tradition of
nineteenth-century slave narratives that claimed sentimental virtues of domesticity as signs o f
humanity and resistance.
Mowry insists on separating the notion of gangs from drugs and argues that 'fo u r kids on
the comer,* the Little Rascals, and the juveniles about whom he writes all belong to "good* gangs
('Goodbye, Cool World"). He also claims affiliation with the Little Rascals for himself: his own
gang was named Buckwheat and he playfully describes his philanthropy as "Buckwheat does Mother
Teresa" (MacRae 127). What reflects on Mowry and the Friends is less the original portrait of the
Little Rascals, than what Mowry and the Friends get out of that affiliation. If, on the one hand,
they recreate the Little Rascals in a way that attests to their own humanity, they also highlight, on
the other hand, the ways in which the Little Rascals acted to protect their community. In the 1990s
context of the urban ghetto, that protection can involve a significant degree of violence. As Mowry
describes the Friends, they are "Little Rascals with Uzis" (MacRae 127).
The Friends revive both models, the Black Panthers as well as the Little Rascals, to inform
their practice of caring community as well as their fight against local and systemic corruption. As
will be shown more fully below, they contest the dominant perception of the Panthers as violent
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criminals, a perception promoted by the FBI, and retrieve the Panthers’ legacy o f resistance against
police violence, o f community protection, and o f care, which they demonstrated in such programs
as providing free breakfast for children, free health clinics open to all, and free clothing for those
who needed it.s
The historian Claybome Carson, in an analysis that focuses primarily on the activities of
the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, but also refers to the Black Panthers, charges that
"purposeful amnesia about recent Afro-American history has enabled many contemporary blacks to
ignore the fact that they enjoy the benefits o f sacrifices made by earlier generations" (301). In
reviving and reconceiving the model of the Panthers, Mowry contributes to a renewed appreciation
for the idealistic rebellions of the 1960s that is also evident in 1990s song lyrics and in the 1995
movie Panther, whose theme song is "Freedom." Reviewing the film directed by Mario and
Melvin Van Peebles, Dyson notes that the numerous cameo appearances by black personalities
indicate how "fashionable" the Panthers have become in black popular culture. And, in a mostly
positive analysis o f the way the movie exposes police violence and the FBI campaign to wipe out
the group, Dyson concludes that the film is valuable for contrasting the "rebellion and solidarity" of

5 See, for example, an ethnographic study o f Panthers conducted over a two-year period
which contests the erroneous descriptions put forth by journalists, commentators, and social scientists
who lack any direct knowledge of the subject. While the authors focus primarily on the
misconception of the Panthers as self-destructive or suicidal, they challenge most mainstream analyses
of Panther behavior and commend the Panthers they observed for their hard work in projects such as
the ones listed (Valentine 284). The October 1966 Black Panther Party Platform also shows evidence
of their concern for "bread, housing, education, clothing, justice, and peace" (available from "The
Sixties Project: Primary Documents Collection" at http://jefferson.village.virginia.edu/sixties/htmldocs/primary/manifestos/panther-platform.html).
Historian Herbert Haines similarly concludes that the activities o f the Panthers "were varied
and, contrary to the image created by the press at the time, largely of a rather ‘mild’ nature: they
established ‘liberation schools’ and breakfast programs for ghetto children, for example. [But] the
activities which drew the most attention involved their militaristic posturing and their program of
‘policing the police,’ whom they viewed as an army of occupation" (56). One example o f a 1967
press story that was published in the New York Times and that focuses graphically, at length, and
almost exclusively on the violent threat posed by the Panthers is reprinted in a 1991 collection edited
by August Meier et al, Black Protest in the Sixties (Stem).
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the Panthers with the 'gratuitous violence’ o f current 'gang bangers who prey on the black
community" {Between God and Gangsta Rap 116).
The boys in M owry’s 1990s gang, however, are, like this description o f the Panthers,
idealistic, rebellious, and committed to expanding solidarity. These inner-city youth associate both
the Little Rascals and the Black Panthers with protection, care, resistance, and integration and see
these activities as paths to freedom. The 'transformative power of . . . urban consciousness,' as
depicted in M owry’s novel, is encapsulated in a brief rap that Lyon creates when he criticizes the
mainstream perception o f black youth: ’ ’You ain’t furry and cute, so’s you way cool to shoot, be a
whale or a seal, then you got some appeal’" (14). In the popular imagination, black youth are
commonly associated with beasts of prey. The more accurate depiction, according to the novel,
would see them as caged animals and endangered species. The social critique exemplified in Lyon’s
rap, however, moves the youth in Mowry’s novel to claim the 'appeal' of the Little Rascals and to
embrace the revolutionary legacy of the Black Panthers. Their reading o f contemporary social
conditions serves two purposes of literacy that Hazel Carby identifies in the tradition o f slave
narratives—literacy is valuable as ’a means of asserting humanity’ and 'a s a means by which . . .
characters recognize the necessity of revolution" ("Historical Novel" 138).
M o d e l in g a H o m e y V e r s io n o f W a r r io r - C a r e g iv in g :
B l e n d in g t h e L i t t l e R a s c a l s w it h t h e B l a c k P a n t h e r s
The significance that the Friends attach to the Little Rascals is first suggested when,
returning to Gordon’s house after the drive-by shooting, they become engrossed in watching one
episode 'w ith more interest than they usually showed for cartoons' even though Lyon has already
seen and seems to remember every episode (73, 75). Their attitude is nostalgic. Reflecting on how
much better it must have been to be a kid in the "‘olden days,” even if kids back then did have to
’’ride the butt end of buses,” Goidon concludes that the Rascals were "‘a way cool” gang because
he likes how one black and one white boy, Buckwheat and Spanky, work together like brothers (77,
79). It may be cynicism about that kind of naivete that leads Deek to dismiss the Friends as ”’just
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another little Buckwheat gang’” (224).

If the Little Rascals scripts are naive, however, the

supposedly realistic, but showtimey scripts o f the 1990s, as already discussed, are cynical and work
to keep youth trapped at the bottom o f the pyramid. The boys’ reading o f the Little Rascals, by
contrast, proves more effective for resisting the threat that Deek poses than he gives them credit
for.
Lyon, for example, reads the Little Rascals as both good and street smart. Agreeing with
Gordon, he posits, "‘That the way gangs oughta be, man, good, but not takin no shit off nobody
neither” (77). The boys respect Spanky and his gang for being able to see through "slimy*
operators, like a scheming man who wants to seduce their favorite teacher. Miss Crabtree, into
marrying him (74-75). It is the scripts in which the Little Rascals end "by saving the day" that the
Friends try to emulate (79). They defeat a junkie who attempts to break into the apartment of an
elderly neighbor, a lady who, like Miss Crabtree, is nice and "way cool" (92—97). And they
eventually save the "‘little kids” in their neighborhood, those even younger than the gang members,
from the drugs and money that Deek offers because they are able to "see through” his schemes.
When the Friends meet the Crew in the abandoned car wash, for example, Wes, the leader
of the Crew, begins to explain what Deek has been telling the Crew. But Gordon quickly stops the
explanation, suggesting that Deek’s plans are transparent: "‘Lemme guess,” he interrupts cynically,
"‘Deek tellin y a it some big dudes wanna move our grounds. An he wantin to front a Uzi to work
for him” (213). Gordon guesses correctly because Deek had approached the Friends with a similar
warning just before they watched that Little Rascals episode (70). The gangs conclude that Deek is
responsible for the drive-bys because he seemed to know about the attack on the Friends as, or even
before, the drive-by occurred. Ironically, Deek, who killed the youth he hired to execute the drivebys because they knew too much, is found out and eventually killed because the gangs figure he
"know[s] too much" about the drive-bys to be sincere about his seeming concern (223). When
Deek tries to tempt them into believing they can "be somebody” instead o f just another "Buckwheat
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gang,” they conclude that his enticements simply make for more problems. Bullets for the Uzis he
offers are more than they can afford and taking more ground would require them to devote almost
all of their time to gang activities. Wesley, the leader o f the Crew, says he has also figured out
that Deek is simply "‘shit-disturbin.’" According to his perceptive analysis, Deek is "‘too puss to
go messin with the big dogs, so he schemin on us’* (224-225).
If the Friends’ concern for their community and the fight against Deek and the cops are
associated with the model o f the Little Rascals, Ty and Maridta’s participation in Deek’s eventual
downfall is associated with the model of the Black Panthers. And if the gang’s reading of the
amiable Rascals revives their spirit of 'saving the day,* their reading of the Panthers, whose focus
on power is more commonly associated with violence, revives the sense in which community care
was also included in their notion o f power and the struggle for freedom.
Although the black power movement associated with the Panthers is mentioned only twice,
in conversations between Deek and Ty, Mowry positions the two references immediately before and
immediately following the chapter which describes the kids watching the Little Rascals. Readers
can assume that the references to the Black Panthers are part of a single conversation which takes
place while the kids are discussing the Little Rascals. Deek informs Ty that the two o f them are
supposed to meet a new kid who wants a jo b with Deek; they are supposed to meet at the Burger
King where M arkita works and Deek wonders whether Markita will be working then. When Ty
predicts that she won’t, because child labor laws will prevent her working so many hours, even if
she is as black as IV himself is, Deek snickers: ”‘It just too fiickin bad there ain’t no more Panthers
around. You be a natural.’” But, he advises, Ty would be a fool to try to revive their practice,
since *‘Black pride an brotherhood be a long time dead, stupid, case you ain’t figured it out yet’”
(70-71). When the conversation continues and Ty argues that kids aren’t as stupid as Deek thinks
and are not simply interested in being "baaad," as Deek claims, but that they sometimes deal in
drugs for "good" reasons like feeding and supporting themselves and their families, Deek advises
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him to "‘get real.’" Once again Deek admonishes Ty for thinking too much like the Black
Panthers: "‘What your prob is, you bom bout thirty years too late. Ain’t no more Panthers, my
man. Ain’t nobody fighdn to make nuthin better’" (101). Deek’s comments suggest that, if black
males are an endangered species, who die at younger and younger ages o r are incarcerated in larger
and larger numbers, then it may be because Black Panthers are an endangered species. History
shows that the FBI waged a deliberate program of extinction against the Panthers and that the FBI
program was abetted by the popular press. If the press and the larger community is now concerned
with saving the whales and seals that they once hunted, the youth in Mowry’s novel are more
concerned to save the legacy o f the Panthers and Bobby Seale.
The Friends are already fighting to make things better because they believe, like Lyon
does, that "‘being black is a major ‘sponsibility," and that "nobody gonna be happy nowheres till
everybody happy everywheres’" (74). And fighting to make something better is also what Ty and
Markita take on, as a matter o f responsibility, and by associating their defiance with the image of
panthers.
After Deek murders the boys he hired to do the drive-bys, Markita comes upon Ty in an
alley by her apartment; he is crying, thinking about shooting himself, and bleeding from a knife
wound Danny gave him earlier in the day. She takes him to her apartment and tends his wound.
As she cares for him, "her slim , supple body and graceful movements [make] him think of young
panthers” (176). The care with which she has made her apartment into a refuge, keeping it clean,
lemony, and feminine, and protecting herself and her two-year-old son from the world outside, also
strike him as a measure of her defiance (174-175). In the context o f this urban ghetto, in which so
many are forced to live in run-down or even abandoned buildings and in which so many mothers
cannot care for their children as they would like, her domestic activities can be be seen as the
defiant activities o f a warrior and her mode of defiance, as Ty imagines it, can be understood as a
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kind o f warrior-caregiving.6 As Markita prepares to clean his wound, she also thinks that Ty looks
like *a young panther,” but one who is "caged and dying slow, and not caring any more to test the
bars.” When she tells him that the peroxide will hurt, however, she imagines that his face changes
from that o f a gentle boy to one that reminds her o f African warrior masks (179). She imagines Ty
in much the same way he imagines her, as simultaneously a gentle and fierce warrior.
The models o f the Little Rascals and the Black Panthers are brought together in the
structure o f the novel when Lyon befriends T y’s brother Danny and the following action draws Ty
into the world o f the Friends. But the models already have much in common, as do Lyon and Ty.
The models are already blended in the images associated with the two complementary heroes. Ty,
for example, reminds Markita of ’Buckwheat with a flattop” (165). Lyon’s name, obviously,
associates him with a powerful cat. Even though Lyon tells Danny that the "‘only real lions left be
in cages,’" Danny believes there is "power" in his name, and Lyon’s history suggests that Danny is
right. His mother named him because he survived her abandoning him in a dumpster the night after
he was bom ; she later explained that ‘only a lion” could ‘live through’ that night as ”cold as hell”
(139). But Lyon, like Ty, thinks more about panthers than about the conventional king of the
jungle

When Lyon and Gordon talk about the naivete of the young twins, Ric and Rac, as they

6 When Nina Baym criticized classic American novels for ignoring, excluding, and/or
con dem ning women as opponents o f freedom, she called those novels ’Melodramas o f Beset

Manhood.” Although Mowry’s characters are often distant from women, because their mothers, for
example, are working women, they are not "beset” by women. And they eventually include Markita,
a teenage unwed mother, in their community. Not only does the novel avoid portraying her as a
fallen woman, but it also includes her as an outlaw warrior-caregiver whose actions are vital to the
gang ’s sturggle against its enemies.
In clu d in g Markita as a "panther” also serves to acknowledge the fact that female Panthers,
like F lain e Brown or Kathleen Cleaver, made important contributions to the movement. When the
novel is read in the tradition of the slave narrative, moreover, this focus on a female warriorcaregiver in an essentially male narrative also revises the tradition of the male slave narrative in the
direction begun by Douglass’s 1854 and 1881 revisions to his 1845 Narrative. See, for example,
Stephanie Smith’s analysis of Douglass’s revisions, which indicates that his portraits o f women
increasingly emphasized their agency and rebellion.
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watch the Little Rascals, Lyon observes enigmatically: "‘Tigers bum bright. But I think panthers
brighter” (74).
Gordon seems confused by the statement, asking "‘Huh?”
some kinda magic talk, man?”

When he then wonders, "That

Lyon responds **Naw” and shrugs the question off. But his

comment is worth remarking. For its allusions complicate the "magic" that Lyon so often talks
about and places Lyon’s ideas in a longstanding literary tradition.
His allusion is to Blake’s poem "The Tyger," which is included in Blake’s Songs o f

Experience and complements the poem "The Lamb" from his Songs o f Innocence.1 The eyes of
innocence see a lamb that is tended by its creator, who feeds and clothes it. The lamb is itself soft
and tender and associated with its creator, who is also meek, mild, and like a little child. The
tyger, by contrast, must stalk the forest for its living and is associated with fire and daring. The
tyger inspires fear and terror rather than comfort and joy, and Blake’s narrator wonders whether its
creator smiles at seeing this creation. The voice o f experience, however, is compelled to ask a
question whose answer must be yes: "Did he who made the lamb make thee?" The "fearful
symmetry" that describes the tyger in this song of experience may also characterize the symmetry
that exists between the lamb and the tyger in the combined perspective of the Songs o f Innocence

and Experience.
The allusion to these poems by an African-American descendent of slaves should remind
readers that the lamb was one of Britain’s domesticated creatures while the tiger was one of the
fierce, untamed creatures feared by the English who ventured to the coasts of India and Africa in
Blake’s time. Lyon’s comment, that panthers are "brighter," suggests, on one level, that a black
panther is even more fierce and dreadful than the tiger that both fascinated Blake’s contemporaries

7 Mowry may already have been alluding to Blake when he used animal imagery to describe
the boys, and when, like Blake who spelled "tyger” with a "y” rather than an "i," Mowry chose to
spell Lyon’s name with a "y" rather than an "i."
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and inspired them with fear. If twentieth-century whites are Less fearful of literal tigers, they are
perhaps even more fearful of bright human Panthers who emerge from twentieth-century ghettos and
indicate, on another level, that the Panther’s strategy is also smarter.
The magic that Lyon espouses, however, steins not only from the realization that all
creatures share the same creator but also from the recognition that the tender and the dreadful may
coexist in the one creature. For the panthers, in M owry’s novel, are themselves little children and
the quality that Lyon recognizes in them is tenderness. Arguing that even black dudes can be
*gentle," he emphasizes the activity of caring when he tells Gordon that "‘Even a bad-ass ole
panther take time out to be gentle to its cubs’” (81).
In fact, the primary image associated with panthers in the novel is care, even though
Markita doubts the connection between care and black power movements. She condemns Black
Muslims who focus on revenge and worries that blacks who attain power won’t "‘run the zoo’" any
better than the whites (180-181). But Mowiy’s appropriation of the Black Panther image redirects
liberation struggle in a way that complements the strategy espoused by bell hooks in her recent
essay called "Love as the Practice of Freedom." Hooks argues that the civil rights movement of the
1960s was a powerful move toward racial justice, even though its focus was limited to reform,
"because it was profoundly rooted in a love ethic.” When the Black Power movement which
developed out of that civil rights struggle shifted its efforts toward revolution rather rhan reform, it
simultaneously shifted its focus from love to power. Those shifts intensified sexism within black
liberation struggles and equated freedom with "patriarchal manhood” and the willingness to use
weapons of domination (Outlaw Culture 244-245). True freedom, hooks argues, must move beyond
resistance to transformation, and the "weapons* needed for such transformation are compassion and
insight (249-250).
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Compassion and insight are precisely the weapons that M owiy’s "Buckwheat Panthers” add
to guns in their fight for an alternative future.* For both Lyon and Ty independently, but
simultaneously, begin to develop ideas about the value o f love in chapters that alternate focus
between the two. Where Lyon speaks the language of ’heart,” Ty speaks a complementary
language o f ’warmth.”
"W a y P a s t C o o l ": H e a r t , W a r m t h ,

and

R e d e m p t i v e V io l e n c e

Mowry highlights the importance o f heart in the first scene o f the novel. During the
driveby which Deek has arranged, Lyon’s young friend Curtis is shot in the shoulder. As Lyon
wipes the blood away, he suggests that the wound is not serious because it is “ Nowhere near his
heart. That be all what matter” (5). As the novel develops, it becomes clear that his meaning is
not only literal, but also metaphorical. Physical heart and symbolic heart are equally vital.
The meaning o f heart is first expanded when Gordon notices that his watch is no longer
working and he acts perturbed. H e eyes the watch several times, frowns as he studies it, and tries
to whack it into starting. One of the young boys, Ric, sneers that Gordon can’t expect anything
better from a watch purchased “ for two ninety-eight at K m art” (12). His twin, Rac, however,
has begun to think in Lyon’s terms. Having already advised Gordon to “ check if it still tickin,”
he warns his brother Ric to shut up because the watch is “ a heart th in g ." Rac reminds Ric that
the watch was a birthday present from Gordon’s mom, a gift “ from the heart” (10, 12).
The boys prize love between family members, particularly the love of a mother for her
child, and know that such love cannot be taken for granted. Lyon, for example, cares that his mom
loves him even though she works "independently” and he had "been an unwelcome accident* (120).
His belief that her love is stronger than that o f many mothers in the neighborhood is at least

8 If Mowry’s use of the Black Panther model has more in common with the movement before
it shifted focus from care and community involvement to power and violence, he also revises the
practices associated even with that early form of the movement by making his gang less hierarchical
and its focus on ’rules” more flexible. His model of choice blends the Little Rascals and the Black
Panthers.
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partially confirmed when Deek indicates that he does not receive such love. In a conversation with
Ty, Deek half concedes and half complains that “‘At least your folks warned you’” (36). Ty knows
that his own mother’s love is important to him. He goes home to see her, both *for dinner’ and
“for love.” He also admires her for working even though welfare would pay more than her job and
he accepts that she probably prays for him (31). But the mother who plays the most significant role
in their lives now is Markita. A teenager with a two-year-old son, J ’row, she is probably the age
many o f their own mothers were when they gave birth to the boys in the gang.
Even though Mowry focuses on the behavior and thoughts o f the young boys, Markita also
plays an important role as someone who chooses to act as a warrior-caregiver because she reflects
on the responsibility of motherhood and the possibility of a freer future for the children of the
community. She begins to prepare herself for action early in the novel, when she watches Ty,
whom she doesn’t yet know, attack a young boy, Danny, who has been sitting in Burger King.
Before she discovers that Ty and Danny are brothers and that the fight she is witnessing is a family
thing that is itself a kind of warrior-caregiving, she thinks about calling the cops. When a co
worker named Leroy holds her back, she tells him angrily that this kind o f stuff always happens
because "‘Nobody NEVER does nuthin!’" (106). The first time she chooses to act is when she
hears someone, who turns out to be Ty, crying in an alley near her apartment at midnight. She is
frightened about stopping, because she thinks that anybody who could cry like that might be "past
caring about himself [and] wouldn’t be very concerned about others.” But she remembers that the
alley was once safe for carefree children who had played there and now was a place where wornout children died. Deciding that blacks must take the responsibility for helping blacks, she enters
the alley with her can of Mace drawn (162-163). She discovers Ty and finds herself responding to
him the way a mother does to a child. She listens to his grief over the murders he witnessed and
takes him to her apartment to dress his wounds. Her acts o f courage and defiance prepare her to
join the battle at the car wash when the opportunity arises the next night. Hearing gun shots and
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observing that the cops who had just taken her Mace away had not called for backup when they
entered the car wash, she has to decide whether to do something or run home and be comforted by
her mother, with whom she and her son live. H er instincts tell her to be 'c o o l,” which means to
'stay away.* But she reflects that such coolness is a pitiful kind of protection, a pretense that one
'didn’t give a shit.” Markita, however, must 'g iv e a shit.” She must care because she can’t
promise her son J ’row that everything will be all right when he’s frightened unless she does
something to change the way things are (290-292). She snatches her Mace from the police car, rips
out their radio, and runs into the car wash. She observes that the cops are on Deek’s side and sees
the white one shoot at Danny and the other kids. She also sees Ty shoot Deek and decides to help.
When the black cop bolts for the cruiser, she sprays him with mace, grabs his club, and attacks the
white cop, who is Anally killed by Lyon as he dies himself (295-297). Her last act o f caregiving is
more conventional, but it is still deflant and illegal. Sheltering Ty in her apartment, she calls in a
doctor who has immigrated from South Africa to care for Ty’s gun wound; she then nurses Ty back
to consciousness (303). In the context of battle, even these conventional tools of caregiving have
been transformed into the tools of a warrior-caregiver.
Ty had already begun to speak his own language of the heart, whose operative word is
'warm* rather than "cool,” when he first discovered that his little brother Danny wanted to work
for Deek. As the oldest child in his family, Ty has long joined his mother in playing the role of
caregiver. He received his early nickname from responding to his siblings’ requests to tie their
shoes (186-187). He helps support them now w ith the money he makes as bodyguard to Deek (31).
When Danny tries to work for Deek, however, Ty feels responsible and probably guilty for the
example he has given his younger siblings. Furious and concerned, he struggles to keep Danny
away from Deek and suggests that they spend the following day shopping for the family instead,
explaining that he loves Danny. When Danny says that Ty’s speaking of love sounds 'fu n n y ,' Ty
responds: "‘Yeah. Well, maybe true stuff . . . stuff from your h e a rt. . . sometime sound uncooF"
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(114). For Ty, being "cool” begins to lose its street association with pride and courage. Instead it
begins to symbolize a callous disregard for life. When Deek brutally murders the boys he hired to
perform the drive-bys, for example, Ty seems to "freak” as he attempts to undo their deaths. After
Deek subdues him, Deek wants to know if Ty is "cool” yet, if he is "chilled.” Responding to the
horror o f Deek’s action and to the connection between being cool and being trapped, Ty begins
speaking o f warmth as an alternative to cool. He recognizes that he has been "chilled," though not
in the sense that Deek means, and thinks of himself as "the motherfuckin iceman, the iceberg."
Defiantly, he begins to ask himself, "What in hell was wrong with being black and warm?" (155).
Street code had defined Deek’s absence of horror and his total control as a sign of being "way past
cool." Ty, however, wants to redefine "warmth," feelings based on concern for others, as the state
o f being way past cool. So when Markita later praises Danny for being "way cool," Ty challenges
her use o f the term, arguing that Danny is "‘a warm boy, right on the edge of goin cool” (169).
For Ty, being warm has something to do with figuring out the meaning of love, sex,
family, masculine pride, and the connections among them. His reflections redirect the meaning of
manhood, which also informed Frederick Douglass’s notion of freedom, from its more common
association with violence and fighting in the classic male slave narrative to an association with
family responsibility and care.
Like Lyon, who once informed Gordon about the difficulty of "real lovin," as opposed to
sex, Ty, during the night he spends with Markita, struggles to sort out the complicated meanings of
love in his life (83, 186-189). Although Ty’s and M arkita’s thoughts about their lovemaking are
frequently romanticized and adolescent, the issues Ty raises for himself are serious and reflective.
Before he met Markita, he thought that love was only "what you gave and got from your family"
and that ”[s]ex didn’t seem to have much to do with it" (33). Now he begins to envision something
that had seemed so mysterious to him before—how he might start a family to love. The feeling that
he loves Markita also sets him thinking that "you [or he] could never be happy yourself when those
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you loved were not* (188). As his thoughts on love shift between sex and caring and responsibility,
he considers his love for Markita beside his love for his brother and his family in general.
Although he worries about the possible conflict created by his love for Markita and his love for his
family, he assumes the responsibility o f trying to make choices that will be 'th e right ones’ (189).
In order to understand which choices are right, he reflects on several models: a Vietnamese
family who run a local neighborhood restaurant; his dead father, whose work as a scrap salvager
showed Ty how to care for a family with dignity; and Leroy, a gentle student who works with
Markita at Burger King. As he reflects, Ty considers the significance of puberty, or the difference
between a man and a boy, at a literal and a metaphoric level (238-245). After the murders and his
night with Markita, Ty uses a public telephone in a rib shop run by a Vietnamese family. Still
thinking that any attempt to be cool is simply a trap, he concludes that blacks could take a lesson
from this family who ’seemed to work happily together the way Ty had always imagined a family
should” (240). He remembers that ’Markita had mentioned that in primitive societies a boy became
a m an when he could father other children’ (243). But he begins to question the meaning of the
word "father” and thus the quality that distinguishes a boy from a man. He decides that the ability
to fuck and procreate is not sufficient to define a man o r a father. Both manliness and fatherhood
encompass a strong sense of responsibility for family. He has one example of responsible fathering
in the memory of his own father. Remembering that helping his father while he salvaged scrap had
made Ty feel ’proud” at the end o f the day, Ty decides that he wants to offer Danny the same
experience and estimates that he can earn enough to buy an old flatbed truck in a month (144-146).
He hasn’t yet figured out how to detach this dream o f honest labor and family responsibility from
the trap o f working with Deek, but he has begun to imagine another future.
As Ty develops his insights about care and responsibility, he is willing to include the larger
black community in his indictment o f those who keep children on the bottom of the pyramid. The
incident during which he accuses them for their lack o f compassion begins, not coincidentally, with

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

168
Ty thinking that his own heart is too tired to manage any sympathy for a kid who has been
withholding money from Deek (262). But when Ty fights off the young boy’s frightened attacks in
a fog and breaks the boy’s wrist, he hears not only the rumble o f Deek’s Trans-Am, but also what
he thinks is the kid’s heartbeat and, "from light-years away, . . . the faint, sweet singing of angels”
(26S). W hat he hears is the singing o f a church choir, which reminds him of the storefront church
that he attended with his mother when he was six. As he remembers a childish picture of a black
Jesus, he thinks that there can be "no miracles in Oakland”; no one will die for this kid’s sins
except him self (265-266). But Ty is moved by the memory o f his brother Danny, who had attacked
him the day before, by the the memory o f lovemaking with Markita, and by the sound of the choir,
whom he imagines as dark angels. Instead of kicking the boy as Deek urges, Ty gathers "him up
and [slings] him over one shoulder” (269). Although he staggers under the weight, Ty carries him
into the church and lays him on the altar. Then, pointing his gun at the people in whom, except for
the little girls, he has seen no compassion, he admonishes them: ”‘HE the one dyin for your sin.’”
Ty empties his gun into the "heart o f the picture" of Jesus and then preaches quietly and sadly that
the churchgoers will have to redeem themselves not through Jesus but through the kids in the
neighborhood. "‘Save him, niggers,’” he warns. "‘That the onliest way you save yourselfs”
(271). Associating gang members with Christ’s suffering as well as with his rage against hypocrisy
in the temple, Mowry reverses the more usual conception of black youth as ethically depraved and
presents them as figures of redemption. Churchgoers, by contrast, are presented as needing
reminders o f Christ’s message of compassion and care, as they were in the classic slave narratives
of the nineteenth century.
In an extended analysis o f the role of 'Christian violence” in maintaining the system of
American slavery, SallyAnn Ferguson suggests that parish priests helped make slavery acceptable
for churchgoing slavemasters by presenting the redemptive suffering o f a divine child as the hope of
the world (300). Ty’s outrage simultaneously presents the children o f the ghetto as Jesus-like
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sufferers and berates the community for accepting such suffering instead o f saving the children. In
essence, he indicts the kind of Christian mentality, described by Ferguson, which relies on a kind of
"child abuse," through which sins o f the community are projected onto and exorcised through the
sacrifice o f children for their own salvation (300). If he presents the young boys as redemptive, it
is not simply because they suffer and die for the sins of others, but because they try to do
something to decrease that suffering. That "something" includes violent revolt guided by the
wisdom o f the heart and a concern for justice.
The redemption that comes from being "warm" or attending to the "heart" is split between
the characters o f Lyon and Ty, and is also shared with the kids o f both gangs. Mowry’s focus on
the com m unal nature o f the redemptive path toward freedom revises the pattern of classic slave
narratives which more often focus on the efforts o f an extraordinary individual, like Frederick
Douglass.9 It also fits with Cornell W est’s suggestion that a "politics o f conversion’ should usher
forth "humble freedom fighters" who come from "toiling everyday people" (31).
Lyon physically dies for the sins o f the neighborhood and o f the system during the battle on
Friday. The novel suggests that Lyon was fated for such an end from the moment of his
miraculous birth.10 Lyon voices this feeling when he tells Curtis that he sometimes thinks that he

9 Although Douglass does attempt to make his case representative, his descriptions of his
efforts toward freedom in his 1845 Narrative often lend themselves to the pattern of the self-made
man. In part, his focus on his own actions may be related to his desire, as he describes it in chapter
11, to protect others who helped him and to keep that path of escape open to others. As I noted
earlier, the revised versions of his autobiography, which have not been as well received critically, pay
more attention to the value he places on companionship and community effort which he describes only
briefly in the 1845 version. See also William Andrews’ To Tell a Free Story for an analysis which
argues that the aim o f the 1855 revision, My Bondage and My Freedom , was to "divest him
[Douglass] of singularity as a hero in order to endow him with more familiarity as a representative
human being" (287).
10 Lyon’s miraculous character, redemptive sacrifice, and prophetic vision, as well as his
association with Blake’s "Tyger," may also connect his portrait with the literary tradition of Beat
poets as described by James de Jongh. When he looks at the role o f Black Harlem in the literaiy
imagination, de Jongh observes that Ginsburg and other beat poets associate Harlem and its suffering
with visions o f Blake. In particular, Ginsburg’s poem, "The Lion for Real," in which the lion
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really died that first night in the dumpster, but that somebody or something shadowy revived him
for a purpose. He can almost see the figure in his dreams and explains it as a "collector,* an
ancient, mythical figure who collects the spirits of dead kids and who seems to have stuck "a whole
sackful" o f them in Lyon that night in the dumpster (200). Reflecting on this possibility, Lyon
explains his sense o f mission: "‘Times I get thinkin my life ain’t my own” (198). The image of
the collector and the story o f Lyon’s birth suggest that bis life is meant to represent all the kids who
are not wanted and to establish some hope for their lives. That sense of mission is reinforced by
Markita who sees Lyon following Danny and Ty and tells him that he looks as if he is on some kind
o f quest. When Lyon denies that anybody seeks truth o r justice anymore, she quietly reaffirms her
position, encouraging him to "‘Keep on seekin, little warrior” (127). It is also M arkita who
introduces a paradox into the portrait o f Lyon. Both Ty and an impersonal narrative voice imagine
that Lyon is too "fragile," too "delicate" or too "fine" to "survive" in the world around him (60,
250). Lyon’s death might suggest that this perspective is correct. The simplicity o f that perspective
is challenged, however, when Deek, who seems "fully equipped" for the game o f survival, is also
killed (24). And as the common fate of drug dealers and their associates show, participating in that
game rarely translates into long-term survival. With the portrait of Lyon, then, Mowry may be
trying to redefine the basis o f survival, which may be suggested by Markita’s thinking. Noting that
Lyon is "so delicate-looking yet so totally self-sufficient,” Markita reflects that Lyon is "like a
prototype of something new or a reprogram o f something very old that was better equipped to
survive. Evolution in action. The shape of things to come” (162). Lyon’s death is redemptive,
while Deek’s is not. Lyon may not survive personally, but his insistence on the power o f love and
trust, even in an evil world, does survive as the "shape o f things to come" in the world Mowry
begins to establish. Lyon’s approach is carried on, after his death, by Ty. Appropriately, Mowry

symbolizes the "starved and ancient presence” of the Lord, contributes to a sense o f his poetry as pan
of a tradition o f magic prophecy (131-133).
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portrays the second aspect o f Christ’s redemption, his resurrection, in Ty, whose Christian name is
Theodore—o r gift o f God.
After Ty confronts the congregation, he and Deek prepare for their meeting w ith the Crew
and Ty finds "himself whispering a prayer that he wouldn’t have to shoot any kids." He finds the
thought "funny, sad, and frightening’ (275-276). What he discovers at the car wash, however, in a
reverse o f positions, is his brother Danny, who is prepared to shoot Ty in order to save him.
Holding a gun to Ty’s chest, Danny whispers: "‘You gotta trust me, man! Listen! Last night, you
say you love me so much you could kill me. I know what that mean now! An I love YOU that
much, man! Believe, Please'." (281). When Ty dismisses Danny’s faith as a joke, as senseless
child logic, and prepares to warn Deek, Danny shoots him, Ty thinks that he is dying, o r dead,
and, in his confusion, he has another vision o f black angels. This time, however, he doesn’t hear
them as the voices of a choir, but sees them as "small, dark angels, like bare-chested boys" who
climb over the fence with "expressions o f vengeance" as they prepare to do battle (284). When the
cops begin shooting at the little kids instead o f Deek, Ty finally hears a voice like the one he heard
earlier. Coming either from God, or from inside himself, the voice challenges: "Y ou be sellin ALL

your little brothers, fo o l!" (290). The words, he thinks, are set free by Lyon’s magic. During the
confusion in which he tries, unsuccessfully, to sort out magic, miracles, and ordinary reality, Ty
kills Deek, Lyon draws the fire meant for Ty—dying even as he kills the cop who has been shooting
at the kids, and the warrior angels who surround Ty return to figures o f ordinary kids (293-297).
Mowry’s treatment, however, suggests that the battle has been far from ordinary. Or,
more precisely, his treatment blurs the distinction between the ordinary and the miraculous, the
profane and the sacred. His depiction alludes to and revises the "apocalyptic” visions o f urban
violence that characterize contemporary films about black youth in the mass media, visions that
perpetuate the notion that most black males are caught up in mindless killing of their own.
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Two reviews o f the novel suggest that Way Past Cool is inferior to these movies which
depict the "inferno* o f the African-American ghetto, because, according to one, it is less
"authentic” than those films ("Unhappy Days"). According to another, "ghettocentric" cliches
diminish the power o f a book that competes with the "brutal messages of rap and the hard-edged
images of the recent boom in films about urban blacks" (George). The novelist Ishmael Reed, by
contrast, argues that Mowry really understands the ghetto and the behavior of these kids and that his
work is more "sincere and authentic" than the films o f "those who are marketing black pathology
for money" (163). Mowry, according to Reed, knows that publishers and potential filmmakers
would like to market "an image of black males with which a racist society is comfortable," an
image of violence in which black youth are depicted as "the number one menace to society" (162).
When Giroux analyzes the cinematic representations o f violence, he argues, on the one
hand, that the "documentary style of violence" in the black films in which Hollywood is willing to
invest reinforces the equation o f race and crime and the assumption that there are no complex or
positive choices and, on the other hand, that the "appeal to gutsy realism" in the genre of "hyperreal violence” that pays homage to the pulp crime genre represents a "moral indifference coupled
with cultural slumming"; both "legitimate rather than contest, by virtue of their documentary appeal
to what is, the spreading acts of symbolic and real violence rooted in and shaped by a larger racist
culture" (43-44, 65). Such realistic representations o f violence "do not rupture or challenge
automatically the dominant ideologies that justify or celebrate violence in real life" (78). He
suggests that "symbolic" representations of violence, by contrast, can work pedagogically to
reference a broader set o f insights: whereas "an uncritical appeal to realism does not allow
audiences to think imaginatively about ways to disrupt what have become conventional patterns of
violence," symbolic depictions of violence offer "an ethical language with which to engage acts of
humanity" (78). As an effort at the kind of critical pedagogy that Giroux encourages, Mowry’s
treatment of violence moves toward enabling his audience to "move between dominant and
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oppositional appropriations o f violence* and to distinguish between what Giroux calls the ’violence
of the spectacle and the representational violence that allows them to identify with the suffering of
others, display empathy, and bring their own ethical commitments to bear’ (64, 65).
Mowry’s strategy in presenting this scene of violence, then, attempts to interfere in the way
viewers respond to "showtimey" movies that feed a popular desire to see black children fighting and
killing each other. In part, Mowry focuses as much or more on the thoughts, feelings, and motives
of his characters during the battle as on the actual violence. He highlights the quality of care
involved in an occasion o f militant resistance and the radically redemptive nature of the
conventionally "apocalyptic" scene. When Patrick Taylor discusses the role of violence in AfroCaribbean liberation narrative, he suggests that the "quality” of violence is significant in liberation
struggle. The depiction o f violence must avoid the "cult o f spontaneity" if violence is to be
channeled in a way that does not reduce it to a matter o f "endless struggle" (90). While Mowry
avoids depicting spontaneous and mindless killing, he also avoids the messages of the mass media
which, according to bell hooks, "teach us to see rage as useless’ by showing black males "wreaking
havoc upon the ‘innocent’" (Killing Rage 18). While his vision presents violence as an appropriate
response to injustice, it avoids glorifying that violence. For if rage is "not processed
constructively," as hooks observes, it "can lead to pathological behavior" (26). Mowry’s allegorical
derealization o f the violent encounters presented in the mass media, then, acknowledges the
revolutionary dimensions o f killing rage but also refocuses the perception of revolutionary hope
away from violence per se to the care which motivates and may even replace that violence in his
vision of the future.
Although Ty only thinks he has died when Danny shoots him in the shoulder and when he
sees little kids who look like black angels, once he kills Deek and the battle ends, he does die
symbolically. He surrenders his need to focus as the "blackness" takes him away; that blackness
refers simultaneously to the fog which closes in on him and to the boys who carry him to Markita’s

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

174
apartment (298). He awakes on Sunday, three days later, like Jesus on the original Easter morning
(302). Ty is not only redeemed, but also assumes the role o f redeemer. Although Lyon, his
sacrifice, and the courage o f the kids must receive much credit for Ty’s redemption, his own values
and actions have prepared him for assuming Lyon’s role in the group.
His glimpses o f other people who work honestly and peaceably have also provided him
with visions of m anliness at a symbolic level. Thus he reflects that the boy who washes dishes at
the V ietnam ese rib shop is "going somewhere" and is more on his way to manliness than Deek
(243). Leroy, Markita’s friend, is also "going somewhere," because he completes his high school
education at night even though he works with Markita in Burger King. By the end o f the novel Ty
is making plans to follow Leroy’s example and to finish school, because he has already decided that
it "took real balls” to choose "a life that didn’t hurt anybody” (204, 306). Mowry insists on
challenging the image o f manliness associated with the hard-edged images in the mass media. By
being willing to associate nurturance, care, cooperation, and consideration for the needs o f others
with "manhood," he repudiates the "equation of patriarchal manhood with freedom" that, according
to bell hooks, marks too many o f the messages offered by mass media to black youth (Killing Rage
73-76).
In the closing scenes, Ty is still a panther even though he gives up his gun and makes plans
to continue his schooling and to earn money by salvaging scrap. Danny briefly worries that Ty will
give up fighting when Ty says that he doesn’t know what he would do with his gun now. But Ty
comforts Danny by explaining that he still intends to fight, only not with guns: "‘there other ways
to fight this shit, man,’" he explains, "‘You can’t just go round shootin down every hungry kid
dealin on the comers’" (305). Ty intends to remodel the practice of young kids in South Africa
who are fighting for " Uhuru," or justice. His desire to find another way is most probably informed
by his own experience and by the memory that Danny also nearly joined the drug dealers. What his
new way will not reject from the way o f armed resistance, however, is cooperation among the kids
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who live in the neighborhood. They will continue to work as a gang even though the news
condemns them and blames all the violence in the community on drugs and guns rather than
corruption and injustice. Ty snorts that public attempts to bust up the gangs would be "‘like tryin to
bust up them Little Rascals’" (304).
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R e c l a im in g t h e L e g a c y o f M a g ic :
T r u s t in t h e F u t u r e

Michelle Cliff and Jess Mowry both revive models o f revolutions that "failed,” at least in
the military sense. The First Maroon War ended in 1740 with Great Britain and the plantation
slavocracy in a position of continued dominance in Jamaica. The war ended soon after Cudjoe, the
leader o f the Leeward Maroons, made peace with the British and was granted freedom in return for
hunting down other Maroon rebels. But Clare Savage and the guerrillas in No Telephone to Heaven
wage their struggle for freedom and justice in the name of Nanny, the leader of the Windward
Maroons who were betrayed by Cudjoe and his followers. The 1859 rebellion which informs Free

Enterprise, John Brown’s seizure o f a federal arsenal at Harpers Ferry, with the help o f five
African-Americans and other rebels, failed to ignite a slave rebellion that would end slavery;
instead. Brown was hanged for murder, treason, and insurrection. The Black Panthers whose
memory Mowry revives in Way Past Cool were not able to rid African-American urban ghettoes of
police repression. Instead, concerted law enforcement efforts helped to destroy the Party through
covert activities such as the use o f informants, raids on Party property, murder of Party members,
and numerous arrests o f Party members on charges of assualt, murder, inciting riots, and other
conspiracies. Also subject to factional rivalries, the Panthers succumbed to a gradual demise by the
end of the 1970s.
In many respects, the guerrilla action that concludes C liffs No Telephone to Heaven
continues that tradition of "failure." The freedom fighters are betrayed by a quashee; Clare and
others are killed by government forces and the romanticized filming of Nanny and Cudjoe, which
serves to keep the history of resistance unknown, continues unabated. While the Friends and the
Crew in Way Past Cool win their skirmish with the drug dealer and the corrupt cops, killing Deek
and one white cop in the process, and avoid arrest, their victory seems an isolated one that will
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□either elim inate future threats to trap them in the cages of the drug culture nor eradicate the
systemic power imbalances that trap them at the bottom of the pyramid that Ty describes. If that
battle is not a failure, its success is limited.
And yet the conclusion of M owry’s novel is read as hopeful and the conclusion of C liff s
novel can be.1 Macrae, for example, claims that Way Past Cool ends ’full o f hope for the future,
weakening [its] strong trajector[y] that forecasts] little hope’ (97). And resistance, in C liffs
vision, is never futile even though it needs to be carried on. Her belief assumes that struggle is
handed down from generation to generation to be carried on and suggests that struggle is itself part
o f the practice o f freedom. In other words, revolution is not achieved, but handed down. It must
be continually renewed since freedom, as well as care, is as much a practice as a condition. When
they discuss No Telephone in an interview. Cliff and Schwartz suggest that its ending can be read as
a preface to further struggle-perhaps by Harry/Harriet, the "real revolutionary" whose death is
uncertain, or by readers who are motivated to take up the struggle (602-603).
C liffs models highlight the realistic chances of such a hopeful reading for the long term,
since Maroon resistance in Jamaica resumed after Nanny’s death and continued until 1834 when
British slaves were finally emancipated, and the efforts of John Brown and Mary Ellen Pleasant at
Harpers Ferry were followed by the Civil War or, as Cliff calls it, the last engagements in the
African-American War for Independence, which resulted in emancipation for slaves in the United
States in 1863. That same kind of hope for future revolution that continues past and current
resistance may also motivate Mowry’s recourse to the model o f the Black Panthers and may define

1 See Lima for a contrasting perspective on the ending, which suggests that the forces of
capitalism and political oppression are so powerful that substantial change is unlikely or even that
’social transformation [is] a tragic impossibility" (52). Lima’s unequivocally pessimistic reading of
No Telephone is based partly on a teleological reading of the end, whose closure she attributes to
the structure o f the novel rather than to her reading, and partly on her belief that Cliff creates an
ahistorical narrative that ’removes the possibility of human agency* and therefore cannot operate as
a ’call to arms’ (52). Although I agree with Lima that C liffs "commitment to an emancipatory
project cannot offer any guarantee that [her] narratives will indeed be liberatory,’ I disagree that
Cliff deemphasizes the notion that people are agents of history, just as I disagree with Lima’s
assertion that Christopher is the true revolutionary in No Telephone (42, 45, 52).
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the kind of ’optimism” that concludes the novels by both authors. That kind o f vision is consistent
with the tradition o f slave narratives. As Hazel Carby observes in a discussion o f Black Thunder by
Ama Bontemps, "death, in a narrative of slave rebellion, offers a figure of future revolution” or of
’change that has not come" by ’representing the collective acts of a black community as signs for
future collective acts of rebellion and liberation’ (’Ideologies* 140).
Both C liff and Mowry use images that symbolize this potential. Cliff herself suggests that
the ’ruination” o f the land, as well as the freedom fighters whose bodies are burned into the land,
might be seen, like the wilderness of the Maroons, as the fertile ground of continuing struggle
(Caliban’s Daughter* 45-46, "Clare Savage* 265-266). Similarly, in Way Past Cool, Lyon observes
that ’seeds o f young growing things’ fight through ’dead-looking dirt”; although he reflects that
they continue to fight 'n o matter how much shit got dumped on them,” another reading might
suggest that they continue to fight because so much shit fertilizes their struggle (254, emphasis
added). During a review of poetry, Michelle C liff indirectly explains the way such fertile results
might come from seemingly pessimistic conclusions when she observes that ’ Edouard Glissant
speaks of the necessity that the writer engaged in a political struggle o f imagination ‘introduce
temporarily a form of despair which is not resignation. Exhausting this despair . . . means
reopening the wound. . . . Therein does not lie pessimism, but the ultimate resource o f whoever
writes and wishes to fight on his [her] own terrain” ("Poetry is a Way of Reaching Out" 29).
Telling the truth about injustice, repression, and even betrayal, even if the truth reopens wounds, is
necessary for future liberation.
The way such telling moves revolution from failure to success, however, cannot be fully
explained. Instead, for both authors, future hope is associated, to a significant degree, with a belief
in ’magic.” That faith in magic connects their contemporary vision with the power o f "conjure”
that the historian John Blassingame identifies as a central force in promoting resistance by
'preventing the slaves from identifying with the ideals of their masters* (45). That tradition may be
especially important for reading Mowry’s narrative since, as Houston Baker observes, earlier critics
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misread stories in Charles Chestnutt’s collection. The Conjure Woman, as stories o f ’amiable,
chilrUiirp; creatures" because those critics could not understand the power of the black conjurer in the
ideology o f African-American resistance to slavery and a slave mentality (157-158). For Mowry’s
hopeful vision depends not simply on continuing the kind of revolution initiated by the Black
Panthers, but also on reconceiving the magic that inheres in his adaptation of the amiable Little
Rascals.
H e a r t M a g ic : C r e a t in g R u l e s T h a t F a c il it a t e T r u s t
In a communication with Cathi Dunn MacRae, Mowry says that thirteen is a 'pivotal age”
for ghetto children, because it is the age when they first see and must respond to "what is* (97). In

Way Past Cool, Ty says something similar, but adds an element o f magic to that phenomenon.
When he tells Markita that his brother Danny is a 'warm* boy, rather than a cool one, he explains
that Danny is at the "magic” age when kids make lasting choices about their lives (169).
For Ty, that age is magical because he is skeptical about the possibility of choice for older
boys, like himself, who have already become involved in drug dealing. Throughout much o f the
novel he alternates between dreaming, on the one hand, that he can get somewhere by leaving
Deek, salvaging scrap like his father, and attending night school, and expecting, on the other hand,
that it’s too late for him to be saved. But he glimpses the possibility of another kind of magic in
Lyon. As Deek pontificates about how stupid little black kids are and Ty reflects instead on 'how
loyal most of them were, like they’d finally found something to believe in,' Ty keeps having a
vision of Lyon, whom he knows only as 'th at strange slender boy in the shadows.” Reflecting that
he himself 'didn’t believe much more in magic than in God . . . at least he wasn’t sure,” he
contrasts himself with Lyon, for 'it was easy to see that that slim kid believed in something. ” Ty
speculates that Lyon’s belief 'probably had more to do with bones than the Bible' (98-101).
Although Lyon’s belief, as well as the loyalty Ty notices among the boys, are not
connected to "bones,” they are connected to something Lyon and the boys call 'heart magic." That
magic consists in listening to, speaking from, and acting on the heart, all of which develop the
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boys’ sense of trust in themselves and in each other. But their faith in that magic, which Lyon
prophecies will eliminate the need for guns some day in the future, needs to be developed and
tested, in small as well as larger ways, before they can rely more often on its power.
Early in the novel, for example, the incidents o f the morning drive-bys and their aftermath
disillusion Gordon about the power of heart. So when the twins argue about the value of the broken
watch that Gordon received as a "heart" thing from his mother, and Lyon is unable to fix the gang’s
similarly useless and rusty .22, Gordon flings his watch into a trash can and comments acerbically:
"‘Mmmm, s’prised you can’t magic it fixed’" (12). At the moment, at least, Gordon believes that
the magic of heart has little power to help him in ways that he really needs, like keeping them safe
from attack.
But in their struggles against Deek and the cops that weekend, the heart magic that Lyon
advocates is tested several times, especially in interactions between Lyon, Danny, and Ty, and is
largely responsible for the boys’ success. When Lyon follows Ty and his younger brother Danny to
a meeting with Deek, for example, he initiates a series o f life and death encounters in which Deek’s
three potential opponents must put trust to the test. When Lyon first approaches Danny that night,
Danny fears that Lyon has come to kill both Deek and Ty. Desperate to protect his brother, Danny
whips out his knife and holds it to Lyon’s throat. Hoping for a way to avoid bloodshed and also to
turn Danny away from his desire to work for Deek, Lyon sinks to his knees and offers his throat.
Realizing that Lyon would not "‘leave [him]self open like that by accident,’" Danny jerks his knife
away (135-136). When Lyon explains that Danny’s restraint comes from listening to his heart,
Danny complains: "‘All what you tellin me? Bout hearts an shit? Sound magic. Gotta be magic
for cause I don’t understand. Like churchy shit’" (138). Danny’s comment, like the biblical
allusions that Mowry will make during descriptions o f the battle at the carwash, indicate that Lyon’s
belief does have something to do with the Bible, specifically the New Testament and the power of
its radical message, and suggest that both require a faith that goes beyond understanding.
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The next day, when the Friends and the Crew gather to decide how they will handle Deek,
Danny must learn how to exercise that kind of faith and place the same kind o f trust in Lyon.
Danny secretly follows the gangs to an abandoned carwash and gets into a struggle with Turbo, a
member o f the Crew. Not only must he trust Lyon and withdraw his knife when the gang leaders
call the boys off, but he must also follow the rules the gangs have established between themselves
and offer his k n ife and his throat to Turbo because he has drawn Turbo’s blood in the tight (214219). He is tested a second tim e when he must put not only his own life, but the life of a loved
one, his brother Ty, on the line. When Danny hears the gangs debate the possibility of killing both
Deek and Ty at the carwash and considers warning Ty, and thus destroying the boys’ chances for
elim inating Deek, Danny must again trust Lyon who says that Deek must be stopped and that the

boys will do all they can to save Ty. Lyon again tells Danny that he can make the best decision by
listening to and speaking from the heart, when he advises Danny to "‘See the words in your heart
fore you let your mouth make em ’" (226). Only trust offers them any chance to protect both the
boys and Ty. Both Lyon and Danny are highly aware o f the responsibility that they carry when
they must operate on trust. As a frustrated Danny accuses, when Lyon says that one way Danny
could save his brother Ty would be by killing Lyon and escaping to warn Ty and Deek of the
planned ambush: "‘It like you like puttin your stupid life in somebody’s hands . . . like you checkin
to see if they know what it worth. . . . now you go and do it again! Put it on ME! Like a magic
curse” (260).
But Danny has learned to trust more than he did before meeting Lyon. He accepts the
responsibility that goes with acting on trust and heart magic to such an extent that he chooses to
place similar demands on Ty during the battle at the carwash. Ty must trust both Danny, who
shoots Ty in the shoulder in order to prevent him from warning Deek, and the other kids whom
Danny has decided to trust, when the kids ambush Deek that night at the carwash (282-297).2 Ty’s

2 See Chapter 4 for a description of Ty’s response to the redemption offered by trust in the
boys.
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own conversion, as I suggested earlier, may be related to his independent reflections on love, whose
magic may be symbolized in the power o f a gift he received from his mother, a pow er that is
revealed when Ty carries the young boy into the church. That gift is a medallion o f St. Christopher
carrying the Christ child, a medallion which Ty wears around his neck and which he fingers,
suggestively, at the very moment when he feels a possible sympathy with Lyon but contrasts Lyon’s
belief with his own skepticism. When Markita later notices that medallion, Ty dismisses it as a
"silly ole thing” whose only significance lies in the fact that his mother gave it to him . But Markita
challenges him, as she once challenged Lyon when he denied that he was on a quest, by explaining
that St. Christopher was supposed to be lucky for travelers and for somebody else when she notices
that St. Christopher is "‘cariyin somethin on his shoulder’" (190). At the close o f the novel, Ty
acknowledges the symbolic value of what Danny once called that "churchy kind o f shit” by giving
Danny the medallion as a reminder of the magic to which they are all being initiated (307).
The trust that the young gangs leam to practice is a potentially powerful antidote to the
poison that Deek represents because it forcefully rejects the basis on which Deek founds his
oppression. Distrust lies at the heart o f Deek’s complicity with a corrupt system and poisons any
potential for sympathy among the residents o f the ’hood. The extent of that distrust is highlighted
when Ty objects to Deek’s murder of the outsiders he hired to perform the driveby shootings.
When Ty suggests that there might have been another way to handle the situation, Deek counters:
"’Never trust nobody, man’" (158). But distrust, and the paranoia that can accompany it, keep the
boys subject to Deek’s threats. Distrust restricts movement and inhibits collective action, and thus
fortifies one o f the black cages that residents create for themselves. Mowry’s focus on the necessity
of trust in developing greater freedom aligns itself with the argument made by Cornell West that
"every historic effort to forge a democratic project has been undermined by two fundamental
realities: poverty and paranoia. The persistance o f poverty generates levels of despair that deepen
social conflict; the escalation of paranoia produces levels of distrust that reinforce cultural division"
(155). In M owry’s model, trust is necessary to combat the despair that stems from the persistance
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o f poverty and oppression and to generate collective action against the forces that poison hope for
change.
But trust is also a risky antidote. F or trust in this context cannot be reserved for friends
whose loyalty is relatively certain. Trust, as demonstrated in the examples between Lyon and
Danny, must be extended to those who might have conflicting loyalties, in situations where
'paranoia* is historically warranted. Trust is also a dangerous quality to cultivate because relatively
powerful figures like Deek may seek to instill trust only so they can ultimately abuse it. Just before
he kills the outsiders he hired to do the drive-by shootings, for example, Deek keeps them off guard
by flattering them with his trust. Announcing, *T knowed I could trust you,’* he promises to give
them a "bonus" (150). He similarly hopes to entrap the Crew by presenting them with an Uzi as a
measure o f his "good faith." When Ty appears to question his wisdom, Deek snickers that "‘Kids
LIKE to be trusted’" (143). Deek expects that the Crew will be beholden to him and will either
hold the Friends in check o r do them in. Trust is dangerous because the fear which might seem
like paranoia elsewhere, the worry that everyone is an enemy, is too often reality in this
neighborhood. It is even dangerous among those who, unlike Deek, are well-intentioned. When it
seems as though the gangs will not be able to figure out a way to kill Deek without taking out Ty,
his bodyguard, first, the gangs know that Danny might sabotage their efforts by trying to warn off
his brother Ty or, failing that, that Danny would feel compelled to retaliate. He "would hunt them
down and kill them one by one, or until he was killed himself." If self-protection would then
require the gangs to kill Danny, Lyon, the one person in whom Danny placed most trust, would
have to assume the responsibility of killing Danny since he was responsible for involving Danny
with the Friends. When Lyon contemplates the possibility, even he despairs momentarily over the
impotence o f love and trust in an evil world and complains to his friend Curtis that "Tistenin to
your goddamn heart be way past hazardous to your health round here,” because the love he
believed was good "‘don’t work once you been down with what real’" (252-253).
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So the focus on 'h eart” which Lyon advocates might seem like a fantastic way for the boys
to free themselves from the cages that do or may confine them. Freedom struggle, as demonstrated
historically, is always subject to the possibility o f betrayal. But, as bell hooks notes, the fear that
love, or trust based on acting from the heart, is naive keeps progressive political struggle from
becoming transforming, liberatory movement. Following the philosophy of Martin Luther King,
Jr., she argues that those who wish to avoid nihilistic despair and to know the joy o f freedom must
'choose love” (Outlaw Culture 246-248). She also suggests that 'grappling with betrayal” can lead
to a 'kind o f powerful love” and predicts, in a deliberately utopian gesture, that "any political
movement that can effectively address these needs o f the spirit in the context of liberation struggle
will succeed" (50, 247).
What the youth in Way Past Cool must find is some 'effective” way to turn fantasy to
reality. Since the paranoia that treats everyone as an enemy is itself a cage, they must choose heart
and trust if they are at least to bend, if not break, the bars o f their cage. One way they help turn
fantasy into reality, and create some safety for the practices of the heart that depend on trust, is by
developing rules. In general, the members of one gang believe that members of another gang will
honor rules that are mutually established. Because they trust that rules will be followed, they can
extend the realm o f trust by creating rules that facilitate even greater trust.
The kids have established rules that regulate gang interaction in order to prevent or contain
conflict among themselves. When the Crew and the Friends both experience the drive-by shootings
arranged by Deek, for example, the Crew send an "ambassador" to the Friends and schedule a
meeting on neutral ground. The discussion proceeds according to prearranged rules: the group who
called the meeting lays out the reason and the other group follows with its story. Discussion
follows. The narrator notes that ”[i]f an adult had been listening he would have probably figured
the boys were just following a form learned in school,” since the boys raised their hands to signal
questions and were recognized by the gang leaders. But Mowry insists that "the ritual is ages
older,” even timeless. In part, he suggests that the boys are not naively adopting the forms of a
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system that has been used to oppress them, but are following rules that have been valued by many
cultures in many times. They have learned these rules the same way other groups have learned
them, through experience, through success and failure. The fact that their rules are nearly universal
also suggests that the matters at stake are neither trivial nor textbook matters, but the kind o f
matters that require serious negotiation. The boys are practicing the kind o f diplomacy practiced by
leaders o f nations—in balance o f power negotiations the boys have seen on TV, for example,
between rival powers in the Middle East or even the United States and the Soviet Union. If their
ritual encounters do not always ensure peace or progress, their use o f such traditional methods
suggests that their failure is not due to the rashness and disrepect for life commonly attributed to
uneducated youth who join gangs, but is a failure commonly shared with the leaders of rival powers
in the world of national politics and borders.
In fact, the boys realize that inflexible rules do not always produce desired results. So they
differentiate their rules from the kinds of regulation that "the cops and the TV called law s' (123).
For when rules or laws become ”a system,” Lyon reflects, "they stopped being justice” (252). That
sentiment is shared by many characters. And Markita’s expression aligns that sentiment with the
kind of social protest and critique that Charles Dickens highlighted in his nineteenth-century novels.
When the cops take away Markita’s mace, her primary means o f self-defense, because it is illegal,
she cites Dickens, whose work she read in school, to conclude that any law which makes a crime of
protecting herself must be an ”ass”: "If the law says that,” she remembers reading and mentally
inserts ‘protection is a crime’ for ‘that,’ *then the law is an ass!” (160-161). Adult characters who
have experienced oppressive regulations elsewhere also share their sentiments. The doctor who
tends Ty’s wounds at the end o f the novel has emigrated from South Africa; like the kids, he knows
from experience that laws don’t always mean justice or define the right thing to do (303).
Because the gangs differentiate their rules from the law, the rules must make logical sense;
they must also be applied with discretion and subject to change. As Lyon reflects when he breaks
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the rules and decides not to shoot Ty when he sees Ty skating through Friends’ ground, ”[t]he rules
. . . let you use your brain and your heart to do the right thing* (123).
As the gangs interact and begin not only to use their heads, but also, as Lyon teaches, to
listen to their hearts, their application o f the rules evolves in the direction o f trust. When Tunk, a
member o f the Crew, first enters their territory as an ambassador, for example, the Friends don’t
simply receive him according to the rules, but share their beer and cigarettes with him and offer to
escort him back to his territory. Tunk admires their willingness to *[o]ne up the rules even” and
both sides offer information about the drive-by 'fo r free” (84-89). As Lyon explains, giving
information that the rules don’t require means they are talking with their hearts (91). On the night
Lyon follows Danny and Ty to Deek’s ”crib” [residence], in another example, Lyon explains to
Danny that he can’t promise not to kill Ty when the gangs try to attack Deek. Since Ty might turn
on the gang because he is covering Deek, Lyon can promise not to hurt Ty only if the gang finds a
way to stop Deek without hurting Ty. There is now a danger that Danny, as described earlier,
might put the gangs in jeopardy by warning his brother. Remembering that Danny earlier withdrew
his knife from Lyon’s throat, Lyon says that he won’t harm Danny now, partly because, by rules,
he owes Danny for his life, but more because he trusts Danny’s heart. Danny reciprocates the trust
by releasing Lyon from the rule o f protecting him in the future; he says that Lyon owes him nothing
(140-141). Expanding their mutual trust, Lyon later persuades Gordon to grant Danny a total pass
through their territory, with no strings attached (196). With developing trust, the basis of
interaction shifts from rule-driven exchanges to freely given gifts. While rules have been used to
foster trust, trust must eventually inform all rules and even take precedence over rules.
By the close of the novel, the gangs are able to coin new rules that embody a great degree
of trust. When the gangs succesfully eliminate Deek, they capture three Uzis. In order to avoid an
imbalance o f power between themselves, they each keep one and decide to hide the third in neutral
ground (308). They trust that it will be available only for emergencies and will not be used against
each other.
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In all cases, the novel indicates, the gift o f trust is a grave offering because it entails
responsibility for the safety o f others. When Tunk, the ambassador, speaks from the heart, offering
information to the Friends, he places the Crew at risk. When he further decides to withhold from
the Crew the information that the Friends have a second weapon, because that information might
lead less trusting Crew members to shy away from cooperation, he takes uneasy responsibility for
their lives (91). When Lyon trusts Darmy at their first meeting, he takes responsibility for the
Friends, and when Danny trusts Lyon, he takes responsibility for Ty.
Trust is not extended lightly or carelessly. An early scene in the novel nicely articulates
the double meaning o f care as concern for others and as caution. After the Friends, with Tunk’s
help, attack a junkie who is breaking in to a neighbor’s apartment, another old neighbor thanks
them and advises, "‘You boys be careful now.’" The chapter closes as Gordon repeats the advice
to Lyon and Curtis who are preparing to escort Tunk home (97). The advice carries a double
message in Mowry’s hands. If the boys are not to be careless, they must blend caution, or care for
their own safety and responsibility for themselves, with trust and care for others.
A d a p tin g t h e P o w e r o f t h e Ab en g : R e c la im in g T o o ls o f O p p re s s io n a s
T o o ls o f L ib e r a tio n
Magic is also one o f the qualities associated with Nanny in C liffs vision of freedom
struggle. The historian-narrator of Abeng emphasizes that Nanny was the "magician” of the
revolution which "held out against the forces of the white men longer than any rebel troops."
According to popular legend, her magic powers included the ability to "catch a bullet between her
buttocks and render the bullet harmless.” For the narrator, the magic of her oaths and amulets
allowed her "to unite her people and to consecrate their battles" (14). For Cliff, Nanny originates
and apotheosizes the most powerful aspects of the grandmother, of the old woman who is free: a
warrior and leader, she is not only the source of knowledge, magic, and ancestors, but also of
healing practices, food, and o f "ashe, the-power-to-make-things-happen, as well as the source of the
responsibility to mete justice" ("Caliban’s Daughter" 47; "Clare Savage" 267). When Cliff details
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details these magical powers, she argues that the ’extent to which you can believe in the powers of
Nanny, that they are literal examples of her Africanness and strength,* measures the extent o f your
freedom, ’the extent to which you have decolonized your mind” (’Caliban’s Daughter’ 47).
Another character who shares many of Nanny’s magical powers in Cliff’s first novel is
Mma Alii, an obeah-woman who practices many healing arts and helps slaves escape from the
plantation o f Clare’s great-great-grandfather, Judge Savage. One special tool in her arsenal is an

abeng that she keeps ’oiled with coconut’ and ready for use, suspended from a fishook on the walls
of her cabin. In one o f the epigraphs to the novel, Cliff defines abeng as ’an African word
meaning conch shell.” She then describes the dual use o f this instrument in Jamaica’s history of
slavery and rebellion: ’The blowing of the conch called the slaves to the canefields in the West
Indies. The abeng had another use: it was the instrument used by the Maroon armies to pass their
messages and reach one another. ” The abeng on Mma Alli’s wall is ready to serve the slaves on
the Savage plantation in their struggles against the Judge and other planters. Presumably that
particular abeng, or conch shell, is destroyed in the fire that Judge Savage sets to all the cabins on
the eve of emanicpation. But the memory of the abeng remains as a magical symbol o f all the tools
that might be used by the masters as instruments of oppression but could also be used by the
oppressed as instruments of resistance and liberation. The liberatory potential of the ’ rules” which
the boys create and use democratically in Way Past Cool, for example, which contrast with the
’law” that serves to confine them, might even be understood in terms of the power o f the abeng.
The symbol o f the abeng suggests that those engaged in freedom struggle may resist the
master by using his own tools to subvert his intention. One instance in Cliff’s novel Free

Enterprise, for example, shows that Mary Ellen Pleasant’s father uses a slave ship in precisely this
way. A seafaring man, Captain Parsons owns a ship that had once been used in the slave trade and
he continues to disguise it as ”a guineaman, a ship fitted out for the trade.” While he appears to be
one of those rare dark men who had bought himself into the master’s trade, however, he uses the
ship to smuggle fugitives into runagate settlements from which rebels wage ’the war o f the flea”
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long before the Civil W ar (108-110). Another instance, more closely related to traditional roles of
caregiving, shows that Mary Ellen Pleasant begins her own enterprise o f helping fugitives escape
’by embodying Mammydom.’ Disguised as a ’dignified, unobtrusive houseservant,* she builds a
West Coast empire in which she takes ’care o f the guests in her hotels, washing their linens in her
laundries, satisfying them in her restaurants,’ and employing fugitives as an ’impeccably outfitted
staff" who serve guests in expected silence before they set out for Canada (104-106).
If the power o f the abeng were restricted to this kind o f use, it might still be subject to the
objection, raised by many feminists who have expanded on Audre Lorde’s famous warning in ’The
Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s House*: that it tends to leave the master’s house
intact. The premise behind this caution is that even subversive use o f the master’s tools is limited
and often co-opted. Subversion is not revolution; it takes place within the master’s house, without
taking it down.
What many critics fail to recognize when thay object to any recourse to tools used by the
masters, however, is that many o f the tools used by the masters do not belong to the masters. Like
the abeng, they may have a history outside the master’s house. That history defines the abeng as
som ething more than, or other than, a subversive tool that is limited by the potential of subversion.

The fact that abeng is an African word for an African item means that the conch shell, as Gikandi
suggests, has a use outside the dialectic of master and slave, or displacement and resistance: in
Africa, the conch "may be an agent o f sound, speech, and the inner experiences of self" (237, 251).
That tool may have been usurped and perverted by the master and used against Africans, but it has
a use outside the master’s house, not simply within or even in resistance to the master’s house. If
the function o f the conch has been adjusted and transformed in New World politics, the symbolic
power of the abeng suggests, its other function may yet be reconceived and built upon.3

3 Because o f this feature, the image of the abeng in Cliff’s fiction offers greater potential
for creating a different kind o f freedom than does the image o f the castle with which G tries to
secure a space of freedom for himself in Lamming’s first novel. For G’s castle uses the master’s
house as a kind of kumbla. As Rhonda Cobham describes this Caribbean symbol, taken from an
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Whether a tool is assumed to belong to the master or known to have a history and use
outside the master’s house, the power o f the abeng as a symbol implies that the way we use a tool
and the purpose for which we use it may make a difference in whether or not we can construct a
different house with it. This quality o f the abeng is implicit even in Lorde’s original warning
against attempts to use the master’s tools to dismantle the master’s house. Addressing mainly
white, middle-class feminists at a Second Sex Conference in 1979, Lorde argued that, because
racism and homophobia are inseparable from sexism in the master’s house, feminists who didn’t
make common cause with poor, black, and lesbian women left that house intact. Difference, in her
argument, is the tool which closely resembles an abeng. While the master uses difference to divide
and conquer, feminists making common cause can use difference to define and empower. It is not
difference per se that is the master’s tool, but the vision of difference as a cause for separation and
suspicion. And it is precisely the uncritical rejection o f difference, as something to be avoided,
rather than the creative use of difference for another purpose, that leaves the master’s house intact
( 112).
In like manner, Lorde implies that nurturing is a similar tool. She claims that "it is only in
the patriarchal model of nurturance that women ‘who attempt to emancipate themselves pay perhaps
too high a price for the results.”' M aintaining that "the need and desire to nurture each other is not
pathological but redemptive,” she argues forcefully that fem inists must acknowledge
interdependency and create systems of shared support as the way to freedom (111). The suspicion
and rejection of care, like the suspicion and rejection of difference, inhibit rather than promote the

Anancy story, the very success o f a kumbla is its greatest liability. Referring to a protective
disguise, the kumbla functions as a symbol of strategies used to ensure survival. But its protection
is disfiguring (49). As Eraa Brodber warns in the novel Cobham analyzes, ”the trouble with the
kumbla is the getting out o f the kumbla. . . . If you dwell too long in it, it makes you delicate.
Makes you an albino: skin white but not by genes' (Jane and Louisa 130). The castle belongs to
the master. When G copies or inverts the function o f the master’s house by hiding in the castle of
his skin, in order to protect himself, he leaves the master’s house intact and locks himself within
another. The abeng, by contrast, represents tools which were only assumed by masters and those
who imitate them to belong to the master, but which did once and can still serve a different
function.
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ability to imagine freedom with community. And without community, as Lorde sees it, there is no
freedom: ’Without community there is no liberation, only the most vulnerable and temporary
armistice between an individual and her oppression’ (112).
C liffs fiction also suggests that the practices o f care, which have been used by the master
to confine female slaves and their emancipated descendants in domestic servitude, share in the
history and liberatory power o f the abeng. For the obeah, the magical healing and subversive arts
practiced by the ’one-breasted warrior woman,” M ma Alii, ’represented a tradition which was
older than the one which had enslaved them” (Abeng 34).4 The notion that women's healing powers
may challenge rather than serve the wishes o f the patriarchy can be observed even in patriarchal
objections to such women’s work. As John Brenkman observes when he analyzes the mother/whore
dichotomy with which psychoanalysis has refashioned male ambivalence about oedipal attraction to
mothers, ’women’s healing” was once considered a ’hexing practice" associated with witchcraft and
was considered a challenge to male dominance (174-175). If patriarchal prescriptions for care can
be considered in terms o f an attempt to domesticate such healing practices, more radical and
political calls for care might be understood as an attempt to reclaim an earlier power.
Many practices in C liffs work which have a history and use outside the master’s house,
including women’s passion, history making, and the act o f storytelling itself, may embody the
magical power of the abeng. Another has to do with the quality of romance that is embodied in the
very concept o f magic and the abeng, as well as in mainstream appropriations of resistance history.

4 See Bill Puka for an argument which suggests, by contrast, that the effectiveness o f the
practices o f care, even if they do not simply take up the master’s tool, might yet be limited to a
kind of circumscribed opposition. According to his "care as liberation” hypothesis, the ethic of
care, particularly as Giliigan portrays it, is associated with struggles for liberation. But it is best
understood less as a liberating experience based on ’insight into the validity o f benevolent virtues
and compassionate response,” and more as a set o f ’coping strategies’ for dealing with sexism or
other forms of oppression. These ’circumscribed moral coping skills” are, according to Puka,
’tailored to gender-specific and oppressive contexts” and run the risk o f ’legitimizing subjugation’
by ’transforming victimization into virtue” (58-59, 62-64). Puka does not claim that the practice of
care is necessarily limited to such coping strategies, but that appeals for a care-based morality must
be mindful o f oppositional uses that reinforce a conventional and oppressive system. The liberatory
practice o f care, or concern for and nurturance of others, must be used with care, or caution.
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and with the power of such romance to develop sympathetic readers who might practice freedom
with care.5
M a k in g

it
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Jess Mowry, as I have already noted, has said that he writes his books fo r, as well as

about, the 'black kids” who live in inner-city ghettoes, especially the young males who are an
'endangered species.” These youth are neglected by publishers, librarians, and educators who are
uncomfortable with such gritty material and who assume that these boys 'are not supposed to be
able to read” (MacRae 96). And Ishmael Reed believes that M owiy has succeeded where educators
have not: 'h e has gotten those kids deemed ‘incorrigible’ . . . to read books, to become interested
in intellectual activity” (163). The gritty and idealized way he chooses to present his material, as
described in the previous chapter, plays a significant role in his ability to reach those 'k id s ' and to
influence their willingness to free themselves from the cage o f being 'cool."
Michelle Cliff similarly believes that Caribbean people must engage in their own freedom
struggle, insisting that they 'cannot depend on anybody to free them from their situation. They
have to get out of it themselves” ('Interview ,' Adisa 276). But her work also assumes that neither
the need nor the ability of some people to develop self-reliance absolves others of the obligation to
help. As I noted at the beginning o f this chapter, Cliff suggests that the hope for carrying on the

5 In an interview with Cliff, Meryl F. Schwartz identifies Clare Savage with the image of
the abeng, noting that "Clare has the choice to become an instrument o f oppressive or resistant
forces' (608). Frangoise Lionnet notes that the conch shell is, in particular, an instrument o f
communication, and that its distinguishing feature is that it can be used to pass different messages to
different receivers. She then suggests that language itself, especially its 'noise' that can be
perceived either as interference or as another message, and also the performative rewriting o f the
multicultural influences in the Caribbean function like the abeng in Cliff’s fiction (323, 339).
Either of these suggestions are consistent with my analysis o f the abeng and indicate that the image
has a wide-ranging structural significance in Cliff’s writing.
While Jeannette Charles notes simply that ”De abeng . . . is a symbol of de oppression we
face and de fight we fought’ (269), Lemuel Johnson implies that its opposing uses might be viewed
"as threat and as condition of possibility” (112). He suggests that history, menstrual blood, and
even the genealogy of new world consciousness or identity function as threat or promise in Cliff’s
Abeng. Picking up on Johnson’s notion, Gikandi implies that "fragmentation,' in terms o f identity
and narrative form, may function like the abeng since it may be defined as a threat or a condition o f
possibility (234-237).
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kinds o f revolution she narrates in her novels lies partly with her readers, who are not simply or
even primarily the Caribbean people, but include outsiders who often experience greater privilege.
Readers who follow the model that Clare Savage and Harry/Harriet adopt must be willing
to forego a definition o f freedom based on individual autonomy and separation and, as Schwartz
observes, to form an "imagined community” by choosing alliance with those who are less privileged
and by "acting on* the knowledge that their stories contain (305). Although Cliff may wish to
stimulate her readers to abandon privilege and to engage in broad freedom struggle based on
compassion, her novels suggest that the actions she encourages in her readers have less to do with
armed rebellion and more to do with the remembrance o f "tenderness" and "resistance," as Clare
suggests {No Telephone 196). That concern for reader response may, as in Mowry’s case,
influence the way C liffs novels depict their stories o f resistance.
When Richard Yarborough discusses the work o f Frederick Douglass, he offers one reason
why slave narrators might downplay the depiction of slave violence in freedom struggle and have
recourse to the conventions of sentimental romance in order to create sympathy and to mobilize
readers to work actively in the cause o f freedom. As he explains it, narratives which "make their
heroic figures too independent, too aggressive," which imply that freedom can be attained through
individual violence or complete self-reliance, "might permit white readers to evade acknowledging
that they themselves must intervene in order to end the horrors o f slavery" (174, 179). Such
concerns may influence both C liff and Mowry, whose novel, even though it is written for black
youth, also works to create sympathy in and a need for response from a broader audience.
In order to create such response, both Cliff and Mowry must reeducate readers who may
have relied on inadequate histories and mass entertainment for their perceptions of the conditions of
oppression and also o f the possibilities for resistance and change. Cliff, like Mowry, challenges
some o f those perceptions, in a way that mimics the power o f the abeng, by making use o f certain
imaginative cinematic strategies and conventions. For if freedom and care depend on a better sense
of reality, of "what is,” they also depend on a stronger sense o f imagination, of what might be.
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On the one hand. C liff writes precisely because she objects to the sort o f history made and
written by Empire, where the "sense o f history [is] lost in romance.” Imperial history remembers
that Jamaica had been a slave society. But it emphasizes that England was the first country to free
its slaves, simultaneously criminalizing and co-opting the history of slave rebellion. As history
lessons mix slave rebels with pirates and convert lands claimed through revolution into gifts granted
by conscientious Empire, the "politics o f freedmen pale[s] besides the politics o f commonwealth”
CAbeng 30). The "extraordinary extent of ordinary people involved in a centuries’ long struggle"
has been made "unimaginable" by official histories that have been successful at erasing stories of
resistance o r converting them into fantastic romances with little instructive value for current
resistance (Cliff, "History as Fiction" 199). The way Cliff chooses, like the Caribbean writer from
Puerto Rico whom she cites. Iris Zavala, to write about "the reciprocal basis o f truth and liberty
and the possibility o f freedom" and compassion, is intended to counter such colonizing fantasies
("Caliban’s Daughter" 38).
Capitalist entertainment industries have similarly exchanged fantasy for reality. The
development and tourist industries, for example, convert the horrific slave plantation into the exotic
Paradise Plantation. Jamaica, as Harry/Harriet explains, is turned into a "stage set,' where the past
is reformed so that Americans who buy vacation homes, as well as other tourists, can enjoy a taste
of the master’s past sans souci. The fantasy is so seductive that Jamaicans are also in danger of
ralring that master’s past as their own and of practicing their own freedom sans souci (No Telephone
121-127).
The British and American film industries similarly convert the history o f Maroon resistance
into a romantic story in which a strapping Cudjoe, leader of the Leeward Maroons, rescues an
elegant Nanny, clad in leather britches and a silk shirt, when she is attacked by a monster. Even
though Nanny was reputed to be a naked old woman who wore only a necklace made from the teeth
of white men, and the historical Cudjoe was a tiny, humpbacked man who betrayed Nanny and the
Windward Maroons to the E ng lish in exchange for the freedom of his own group of rebels, who
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became known as the King’s Negroes, the director tellingly initiates the action by instructing his
crew to ’ ’make it real” {Abeng 20-22, No Telephone 206-207). These treatments which distort
history replace reality with fantasy, but nevertheless become ’real” by having real effects in the
world, such as gn ash in g the potential for revolution. The descendants o f slaves have been colonized
to believe that Nanny offers no model for her descendants. When Clare Savage attempts to shoot
the wild boar in Abeng, for example, Zoe criticizes Clare for ’living inside one dream ,” for
thinking she is ’Maroon smaddy* (117). As the film-maker sees it, the islanders are ’ ’used to
selling themselves. I don’t think they know from revolution” {No Telephone 202). But he
conveniently ignores the fact that his filmic treatment o f past revolutionaries helps to check such
revolution.
Although Cliff objects to the fantasies with which the film industry replaces history, she
envies the ’magic" by which television and movies can conjure the images they wish. Clare
Savage, for example, is ’taken by the magic of television’ in the U.S. and is saddened that Jamaica
does not have this sort o f magic, this choice and control over man-made images {No Telephone 93).
Cliff does not reject "dreams” or fanatasies of a Maroon-like struggle for freedom. If
history demonstrates that there is "NO TELEPHONE TO HEAVEN," "no voice to God," "no
miracles," and that they must "fight fire with fire," then, like the "fact" o f the slave women who
refused to reproduce for their masters, "magic" will have to "mek it so" {No Telephone 15-20, 50,
93; Free Enterprise 193).
In part, that magic involves appropriating the power of romance, o f imagining an alternate
reality, to convert the "reel" into the "real." For "Women’s Work," which consists in building
images o f knowledge and also in igniting the fuse o f that knowledge, requires both a sense of rage,
against brutality and the colonizing fantasies that cover brutality over, and also a sense o f romance

{Land o f Look Behind 40-42). Because freedom depends on a sense o f the possible, o f what does
not yet exist, "imagination is the deepest need o f freedom” ("Caliban’s Daughter" 38). Because
colonizers attempt to deprive the colonized of the ability to dream, or even deny that the colonized
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have the capacity to dream, those who would fight back and liberate themselves must be able to
'construct a dream [that is] errant and unsettling* ('V irginia W o o lf 97, 102). Reality and dream
must inform each other.6
So Cliff, like Mowry, borrows a technique from the same film industry that has so
successfully depoliticized the history of resistance. Her freedom fighters use the techniques of
cinema veritd, like wearing camouflage clothing and caps like their comrades in the ANC, to make
them feel like real freedom fighters. But, her narrator insists, what they fe lt they were was what
they were, in fact (7). As they model themselves on the Maroons, they become Maroons.
The dreams of Cliff and Mowry, which hope to convert the practice of freedom with care
from romantic vision to reality, may be utopian, fantasies o f what does not yet exist, or exist only
in pieces. But they are fantasies that politicize the potential o f care in the pursuit o f freedom, and it
is precisely that utopian dimension that is vital to struggles for a more substantial, more widespread,
and more egalitarian freedom.
If film-makers can make their fantasies reel/real, and would-be rebels can make themselves
into real freedom fighters, and young black males in an Oakland ghetto can act like the Little
Rascals and the Black Panthers w ith whom they identify, then perhaps readers in a society with little
or no experience of freedom with care can take on the face o f the compassionate freedom fighter
and practice such freedom by acting as if it were real. Confidence in that future can only be
developed with practice. While Rais kin concludes that the betrayer or quashee exposes the ambition
of Clare and Harry/Harriet as a 'rom antic dream, impossible at this time" ("With the Logic of a
Creole’ 203), for example, M owry shows that trust is possible, even in situations that might

6 This strategy has much in common with Kaja Silverman’s project in The Threshold o f the
Visible World. In her attempt to make love a repectable object o f inquiry and to argue that love is
'as indispensable in the political domain as in the psychic realm,* Silverman suggests that
'idealization is . . . a crucial political tool’ (1, 2). Idealization, like romance, can b e seen to
function like an abeng when she argues that feminists 'have made a serious strategic mistake’
because they 'left the existing system of ideals unchallenged” when they 'argued against
idealization, that psychic activity a t the heart of love, rather than imagining the new uses to which it
might be put" (2).
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warrant paranoia, and that confidence in trust and the possibility o f another future is developed on
the small scale, with daily practice. With these models, perhaps, an imaginative society can expose
the freedom practiced sans souci as a fantasy based on oppression and begin to make freedom
practiced with care into a daily reality.
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P art T hree
R e - placing t h e T erm s o f F reedom a n d P r o p e r t y :
M o bile H o m e s , "W o r l d "-T r a v ellin g , a n d C a re
Old Woman: Pa, tell me from yuh heart straight to my
face why you want to buy this land. W hat it is at the bottom of
yuh heart or Mr. Slime heart or any o f them that make you want
to own it. . . .
Old Man: . . . ‘Tis only right . . . . ‘Tis the ambition
o ’ every man to do that same said thing, an’ he say it ain’t only
poor simple people like you an’ me, but ’tis the way the big folk
think too. They think it safe to own . . .
Old Woman: . . . You and the rest make yuh big
preparation for today an’ you never ever give a single thought
’bout what goin’ happen tomorrow. A n’ you don’t care, but it
seem to me that what goin’ happen tomorow though it’s in front,
it got somethin’ to do with what happen-in’ today. . . . I don’t
care who want land or who take land, the nations or anybody
else. I’d only like to ask all o ’ them put together what they goin’
do with it. . . . You can’t carry it with you. Pa, can you?
Old Man: ‘Tis as what I say to myself . . . . You can’t
carry it with you, an 'tis that that frighten me. . . . You can’t
take anything with you, an’ I ask m yself why.
(Lamming, In the Castle o f My Skin)
If you go to Antigua as a tourist, this is what you will
see. If you come by aeroplane, you will land at the V. C. Bird
International Airport. . . . As your plane descends to land, you
might say. What a beautiful island Antigua is—more beautiful
than any of the other islands you have seen, . . . they were much
too green, much too lush with vegetation, which indicated to you,
the tourist, that they got quite a bit o f rainfall, and rain is the
very thing that you, just now, do not want, for you are thinking
o f the hard and cold and dark and long days you spent working
in North America (or, worse, Europe), earning some money so
that you could stay in this place (Antigua) where the sun always
shines and where the climate is deliciously hot and dry for the
four to ten days you are going to be staying there; and since you
are on your holiday, since you are a tourist, the thought of what
it might be like for someone who had to live day in, day out in a
place that suffers constantly from drought, and so has to watch
carefully every drop o f fresh water used . . ., must never cross
your mind.
(Kincaid, A Small Place)
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The ability to own property is often heralded as the ’ground” o f freedom. In his 1782

Letters from an American Farmer, for example, J. Hector St. John de Crevecouer associates
freedom in America with ’the bright idea o f property, o f exclusive right, of independence.’ Unlike
European peasants, American farmers are free because property ’has established all our rights; on it
is founded our rank, our freedom, our power as citizens’ (853; Letter II). In 'Myne Owne

Ground’: Race and Freedom on Virginia’s Eastern Shore, 1640-1676, historians Breen and Innes
argue that only property could provide the ’basis of genuine freedom” for blacks as well as whites
in this early American society (5, 144). The difference between ’free” blacks at the close of the
seventeenth century—when the society was well on its way to constituting itself as a racialized free
country-and ’free* blacks in the middle of the century—when the possibility of a multiracial free
society still existed—was property. Without property, the freedom of ex-slaves or former indentured
servants was ’hollow” and ’desperately insecure” (5, 6). Citing the 1645 words o f a black planter
named Anthony Johnson—”‘Mr. Taylor and I have devided our Come And I am very glad of it [for]
now I know myne owne, hee finds fault with mee that I doe not worke, but now I know myne owne
ground and I will worke when I please and play when I Please” —they assert that the ability to have
and to know one’s own ground is ’the necessary condition of liberty’ in the twentieth century as
well as the seventeenth (6).
The association o f property with freedom is symbolic as well as material. In his influential
reading of seventeenth-century ideas on life, liberty, and property, for example, C. B. Macpherson
translates the theory of property into the liberal-democratic theory of "possessive individualism."
That theory is summarized as follows: ’since the freedom, and therefore the humanity, of the
individual depend on his freedom to enter into self-interested relations with other individuals, and
since his ability to enter into such relations depends on his having exclusive control o f (rights in) his
own person and capacities, and since proprietorship is the generalized form of such exclusive
control, the individual is essentially the proprietor o f his own person and capacities” (263). Or,
more succintly, when freedom is a function o f possession, individual freedom is understood as
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ownership of one’s person. But full proprietorship o f one’s own person also requires "property in
tilings," for "those without property are, Locke recognizes, dependent for their very livelihood on
those with property and are unable to alter their own circumstances" (231).
That American dream of full freedom which has become associated in popular mythology
with "owning your own hom e' and being "king o f your castle," or free from anyone else’s control,
is the kind of notion that G symbolically appropriates when he attempts to establish his freedom and
independence within "the castle of [his] skin. * But, as the debates about nineteenth-century
domesticity and twentieth-century ethic of care formulations demonstrate, the notion of home as a
location of freedom is often contested. For home is often a patriarchal space in which the
distribution o f freedom is uneven, at best. And, as feminists Biddy Martin and Chandra Talpade
Mohanty explain in one o f the early and influential pieces which question ’What’s Home Got to Do
With It?," home is a place we may have to leave, physically and metaphorically, in order to resist
the racism, sexism, and homophobia that too often reside there. Because home and property have
been implicated in colonial or imperial as well as patriarchal systems of oppression, contemporary
critiques sometimes argue that the possibility for critical consciousness, progressive change, and
greater freedom depends on a willingness to embrace an alternative value conceived as some form
of mobility. The postcolonial critic Edward Said suggests that "potentates" [this concept, in
translation, includes property owners who are kings o f their castles] are motivated by power,
authority, and the maintenance of fixed positions, and he proposes that a "traveller” is a preferred
model for critical consciousness and the expansion o f freedom. His ideal traveller owns none of the
territory he voyages in, but is "at home everywhere in it" (80). As the title o f Said’s article—
"Identity, Authority, and Freedom"-indicates, his discussion of freedom focuses on the
development o f freer identities. A similar focus is prominent in much theoretical discussion which
suggests that literal and metaphorical travel enhances the possibility o f constructing more open,
flexible, fluid, and multiple identities in place o f the single, fixed, and closed identities that are
encouraged by staying at home.
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But almost as soon as theoretical discourse began to celebrate such notions as nomadism,
for example, for contesting the structures o f imperialism, others began to question the uncritical use
o f ahistorical and ungrounded metaphors of travel. When Christopher Miller, for example,
examines A Thousand Plateaus, the work by Deleuze and Guattari that affirms nomad thought as an
approach to more open and less oppressive identities and whose concepts of "becoming nomad"
have been influential in discussions of mobility, he complains that their "project of nomadology," as
the authors themselves acknowledge, has little to do with actual nomads.1 Their "intellectual
nomadism," as M iller puts it, is "free-floating, prescriptive, virtual, and nonreferential, untroubled
by the genealogy o f its sources and not accountable to the conditions of" real nomads (10).
Countering that some real nomads are not free-thinkers but "great appropriators, slaveowners, and
territorializers in their own ways," Miller accuses Deleuze and Guattari o f "reinventing" the kind of
"primitivism” that marked imperial structures o f awareness because they "need Africa to be

prim itive . . . and nomadic in order to have a place to talk about instead of just an idea' (25, 31).
James Clifford, whose work foregrounds travel as a cultural practice and is similarly
influential in theoretical discussions of mobility, argues for more comparative and historically
grounded conceptions of travel that pay attention to everyday practices and to the differences and
similarities, for example, between such kinds o f movement as migration, diaspora, and pilgrimage.
Clifford also distinguishes his approach from the kind o f "postmodern primitivism" that he
associates with generalized discussions of nomadism (113). In pan, that distinction means that he
calls for a reconception of home together with reconceptions of travel. Obseving that the "natives"
whom anthropologists have studied as "homebodies” also travel, he suggests that critics need to
reconceive the specific dynamics o f "dwelling and traveling: traveling-in-dwelling, dwelling-intraveling." His insistence on possible negotiations between travel and home even in "native" culture

1 The popularity o f such approaches was demonstrated, for example, when Yale French
Studies produced a special two-volume series on "Post/Colonial Conditions: Exiles, Migrations, and
Nomadisms,” edited by Lionnet and Scharfrnan, in which several o f the articles use "nomadism”
and related concepts as paradigms for revolutionary thought, identity, and behavior.
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keeps him from inverting cosmopolitan distinctions between natives and travelers in order to
revalorize travel over home from the opposite location: "I’m not saying there are no locales or
homes, that everyone is—o r should be—traveling, or cosmopolitan, or deterritorialized. This is not
nomadology” (108).
Even Caren Kaplan, who finds the concepts developed by Deleuze and Guattari valuable,
finds it necessary to criticize their ideas for glossing over real experience. She believes that their
utopian concept o f "deterritorialization" is valuable for oppositional consciousness because it
recognizes that "defamiliarization enables imagination, even as it produces alienation’
("Deterritorializadons” 188). But she finds more "cogent discussions of deterritorialization and
oppositional consciousness" in the work o f feminist writers who acknowledge, as Deleuze and
Guattari do not, that "oppositional consciousness (with its benefits and costs) stems from the daily,
lived experience of oppression” (191, 192). Michelle C liffs work in the series of essays collected
in Claiming an Identity They Taught M e to Despise is key to Kaplan’s conclusions that "there is no
pure space o f total deterritorialization” and that those who would avoid romanticization must "look
carefully at what [they] carry with" them (194). What she discovers in C liffs writing is a refined
notion o f "reterritorialization” in which "location is based on contingency, history, and change’ and
in which "settlement” takes place on a "terrain" that is neither fully public and collective nor private
and domestic, but Iiminal (196, 197). The movement toward home, or the concept o f travelling in
order to make connections, is key to Kaplan’s theorization of progressive identity politics and the
search for new ways of being at home.
Kaplan is also concerned that contemporary criticism’s fascination with the concepts of
displacement so often refer to individualized, or elite, circumstances rather than the widespread and
diverse experiences of poor people who move in large numbers around the globle. H er attention to
writers like Cliff responds to the fact that "immigrants, refugees, exiles, nomads, and the homeless
. . . move in out o f these discourses as metaphors, tropes, and symbols but rarely as historically
recognized producers of critical discourses themselves" (Questions 2).
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Carole Boyce Davies is one critic who locates herself, her mother, and numbers o f other
Black women, especially Caribbean ones, in a series of migrations. She asserts that the 're 
negotiation o f identities is fundamental to migration* and that such movement and renegotiation is
fundamental to their desire for and practice of freedom (3). She finds that Black women’s writing
crosses boundaries and she values their 'migratory subjectivites* as attempts to redefine identity
'away from exclusion and m arginality' (4). Bell hooks, by contrast, is another Black writer who
has entered this discussion to contest playful evocations that make it 'difficult to recognize an
experience of travel that is not about play but an encounter with terror”—in particular, with 'the
terrorizing force of white supremacy" {Black Looks 44).

And Jess Mowry enters the discussion

when he criticizes romantic evocations o f homelessness in his review of Rule o f the Bone by Russell
Banks. He contrasts that 'Runaway Tale" with The Catcher in the Rye and Huckleberry Finn and
asserts that the protagonists o f the classic adventure tales, unlike the 'hom eless' hero of Banks’s
novel, were 'warriors on walkabout* whose stories could inspire hope and attempted to teach youth
how to be decent, responsible human beings. But he also questions the idealization of "homeless”
youth as the path to maturity in all o f these coming-of-age novels. O f the classic tales, he
concludes: 'the sad truth is that neither Huck nor Holden would survive twenty-four hours homeless
in most American cities today” (826). And of Chappie, the hero of Banks’s novel, he observes: 'i f
this is supposed to represent accurately the life of a ‘homeless kid,’ I know a lot of real homeless
kids who would give all their spare change to be in his place. Chappie is never actually hungry,
cold, out on the street or in any particular prolonged discomfort or danger.” And he concludes by
implying that real homelessness is ju st as likely to foster undesirable as well as desirable values
when he comments on the last piece o f evidence that indicates that Chappie is not really homeless:
'H e never has to compromise his principles . . . even though we’re not quite sure what those a re '
(828).2

2 Just a few o f the many other critics who work with, challenge, or revise the concepts
developed by Deleuze and Guattari, Clifford, and other travel theorists include: Rafael
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By paying attention to Black writers like hooks, Mowry, and others who also travel, by
choice or necessity, o r search for new ways o f thinking about being home, I would also like to
recognize these authors as producers o f knowledge about home and travel. And I would suggest
that theories o f home and travel are so unsettled because, like the similarly unsettled value of
freedom, the histories o f home and travel have often been unsettling.
***

As even this sketchy presentation o f some theoretical approaches to the often bifurcated,
but interconnected discourses o f home and travel indicates, my analysis of the possible connections
between 'hom e,* ’travel,'' and the practice o f freedom with care could take a number of directions.
In Mowry’s fiction, for example, the Friends are nearly, but not quite "homeless." They are
necessarily concerned with what ’territory” belongs to them and with their responsibility for
protecting that space. Although they are also concerned with greater mobility, they reject
unthinking expansion o f their territory as a means to mobility. Deek tries to shame them into
struggling for more ground, by arguing that taking more ground would give them power and
respect-would make them into something more than "just another little Buckwheat gang.’” But
Gordon sees such expansion as enlarging the trap rather than enlarging the space o f their movement:
"‘tell me what that really get you, man? You gots more ground, mean you gotta cover it. An that
take more dudes . . . dudes what you dint grow up with an don’t know. Then, more dudes an
ground you got, more deals an shit you gotta do to keep em. Pretty soon you gots no fuckin time

Perez-Torres, who proposes a concept o f ’migratory sensibility” that does not allow the term to
remain metaphorical, but insists ’upon the fact o f deterritorialization as a historically grounded,
painful, and often coerced dislocation* (’ Nomads and Migrants" 173); Janet Wolff, who argues that
the ’metaphors" or ’vocabularies” o f travel in critical discourse are as gendered as the practices and
ideologies o f ’actual” travel and that simple metaphors of unrestrained mobility are not conducive to
engaged political activity {Resident A lien, ’On the Road Again: Metaphors of Travel in Cultural
Criticism*); Svetlana Boym, who combines concepts of home and migration in a notion of
’diasporic intimacy that is not opposed to uprootedness and defamiliarization but consituted by it”
(’Diasporic Intimacy" 499); and Rosi Braidotti, who argues that Deleuze and Guattari’s ’nomadic
epistemology" is more radical than romantic and traces her own ’intellectual itinerary” as "a
migrant who turned nomad” {Nomadic Subjects I, 5).
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for doin nuthin but gang stuff" (224). Instead, the Friends try to develop practices which include
trust and rules that allow them greater freedom of movement within and between their territories.
And because Mowry also criticizes "escape" as the practice o f "success," Ty replaces these desires
for physical mobility with a figurative conception of the connection between mobility, success, and
freedom. He applies the vocabulary o f "getting somewhere," for example, to such goals as getting
an education or reviving his father’s trash hauling business.
C liffs writing, as I already indicated in my discussion o f Kaplan’s theoretical work on
deterritorialization and reterritorialization, has also provided critics with much material for analyses
of home and travel and particularly o f the connections between the two. While Clare Savage does
return to her "homeland” after a series o f exiles, her notion of home is radically changed by the
time she returns. Home, as Schwartz argues, is not a place that Clare can "return to," but a place
that she must "create" with others in a "struggle to forge imagined communities o f political allies”
(294). And home is no longer something that "belongs” to her; the adult is embarassed by the
assumptions o f possession that characterized the young Clare’s notions of home, property, and
belonging. The alternative home that she creates as a space o f revolutionary activity is both more
public and more exposed.
In addition, Mowry, Cliff, and Lamming, as I already discussed in the previous chapters,
all use and then contest the practice of freedom as escape from (which usually involves physical
movement) rather than making connections with. In this last section, however, I will limit my
analysis by focusing on the notion of "‘world’-travelling" proposed by the feminist philosopher
Maria Lugones and by returning to the work o f I-amming and to the figure of the carefree tourist
with which I began this study.
***

Although the women in Natives choose to follow their husbands to the islands o f San
Cristobal, their attitude cautions against an uncritical embrace o f mobility as the hope o f the future.
Although a "traveller" may contribute more to freedom than a "potentate," as Said argues,
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Lamming’s novel suggests that the two roles are not so simply opposed. The women’s attitude
toward imperial enterprise, for example, demonstrates that the roles may be combined, for their
husbands play the part of ’travelling potentates.” The men’s movement is marked by conquest and
slaughter; it dispossesses ’natives’ in order to occupy and control ’virgin’ territory. The future the
women anticipate, by contrast, also offers an alternative to the mobility which Paul Gilroy analyzed
as the continuing history and the creative ground of The Black Atlantic. Gilroy uses the chronotope
of a ship in motion to contrast the enterprise o f the Black Atlantic, on the one hand, an enterprise
that sees ’identity as a process o f movement and mediation” and that seeks to ’escape the restrictive
bonds of ethnicity, [and] national identification,’ with a European notion, on the other hand, that
associates identity with roots and rootedness (4, 19). But I-amming ’^ novel shows that such
attitudes about movement may belong as much to Prospero as to Caliban.
The actions o f these men favor movement as escape, or going away from home, or even
movement for its own sake. In their eagerness to inhabit the mobile home o f the ship, the Lady
complains, they lose “ all sense of difference between the coming and the going. To come and to
go: these were only names for the same activity” (342). The actions o f the women, by contrast,
emphasize a movement that is directed, in the words of a recent essay by Lamming, toward
’Coming, Coming, Coming Home. ” This kind o f movement involves choice and commitment and
is closely connected with their willingness to view others as natives o f their person. For this
movement toward home emphasizes belonging and settling—in other words, becoming native.
The kind of movement that the women favor when they welcome others as natives of their
person is complemented by the notion of ’world’-travelling that Lugones advocates. Lugones
claims that the effort to recognize her mother, by "travelling" to her mother’s world, enables her to
recognize others in their worlds. She advocates a practice of ’world’-travelling as a partial basis
for cross-cultural and cross-racial loving and a partial solution to relationships structured by
domination. If such travel is to be effective in promoting relationships characterized by freedom
rather than domination, a person must travel not with ’arrogant perception,” as a conqueror,
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imperialist, or agonist does, but with 'loving perception” (391). This perception, as Lugones
describes it, involves caring about other persons enough to respond to them on their own terms.
Travelling to her mother’s "world," for example, means being willing to see with her mother’s
eyes, to identify with her mother, and even to experience herself as a different person within her
mother’s world (394, 396). Lugones also suggests that a person will be inclined to “travel" to
another’s world only if he or she is willing to sacrifice some of the "ease" involved in being in his
or her own world—in other words, som e of the ease involved in being fully at home (397). In order
for such practice to promote the intersubjectivity and reciprocal recognition that Benjamin and
Brenkman describe in their revisions to classical psychoanalytic theory, the travel must also be
mutual. When the possibility of loving perception is introduced into relationships among strangers,
someone might be willing, as a traveller, to take Caliban’s risk of welcome. It is this kind of
”travel* that the Lady of the House practices in Natives when she identifies with the native women
on the island o f San Cristobal and sees herself, the Commandant, and the entire Kingdom from their
eyes. Such loving perception can be seen as a practice of intersubjective experience through which,
Benjamin similarly argues, the "act o f knowing," and the act o f being known which so frightens G,
"can be felt as communion, not conquest” (192).
Lugones also argues that this kind of "world'-travelling should be undertaken with a spirit
of playfulness. This playfulness is distinct from contest or competition, which encourage selfimportance. Instead, this play emphasizes creativity, an openness to surprise, to change, to self
construction and reconstruction, and even to "being a fool." Rather than focusing on "competence,"
or mastery, it encourages "practice" (397, 400).3 Like Benjamin’s, Lugones’s proposal suggests a

3 Davies is troubled by the language o f "playfulness” in Lugones’s theory because it
conjures images of the "playful” tourists who want Caribbean folk, for example, to costume
themselves in exaggerated folk-dress and "to step back into their fantasies and be photographed
again” (24). I agree that the term may be implicated in this alternative, troubling history, but
believe that the activity Lugones proposes is more consistent with the kind o f "serious engagement
based on mutual respect" that Davies wishes for than with the "tourism" that Davies objects to (24).
I will develop this position more fully in Chapter 7.

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

208

way that travellers might approach the future promised in/as "natives of my person." By choosing
deliberately to "inhabit" different selves in different worlds, partly or hilly, briefly or at length, the
traveller may come to understand his o r her own and the other’s "world" better, as well as the
creative possibilities within both (396, 401).
If what G and the other boys in Lamming’s first novel object to so forcefully is a certain,
oppressive way of "being seen," what the notion of "world'-travelling seeks to encourage is a "way
of seeing” that is more caring than oppressive. To a large extent, what I will be examining in the
concluding chapters, which focus first on various "homes" in Lamming’s Castle and next on
Caribbean tourists, is how various ways o f being at home or of travelling contribute to "ways of
seeing,” o r epistemologies o f freedom with or without care.4

4 This way of talking about "world" travel connects this discussion with Silverman’s project
in The Threshold o f the Visible W orld. For Silverman is also concerned with offering "an ethics of
the field o f vision’ and learning "productive ways of seeing" (2, S). Even as she challenges the
notion o f an unrestrictedly mobile subject, she insists, as I noted earlier, that love is "as
indispensable in the political domain as in the psychic realm” and argues that "idealisation" can be a
crucial political tool for identification with bodies that have been and continue to be socially
despised (2).
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M o b il e H o m e s

and

" W o r l d "-T r a v e l l in g

In the Caribbean, as in Lamming’s novels, the structures of the landscape and the
architecture of houses are, as I observed in Part One, simultaneously material and metaphorical,
because the topographic and psychic landscapes are connected. In an early study o f Caribbean
peasantries, for example, Sidney Mintz argues that the concrete, material character of the house and
yard in rural areas are connected to the values, beliefs, and behavior that characterize peasant
culture (231). One significant finding reveals that the design and use o f the homestead express the
way people relate to each other. Another shows that the yard is as important a part of the ’home”
as the house, and the word "yard,” which can refer to both house and yard, is 'sometimes used to
define one’s total span of activities” (247). The symbolic meanings that may only be implicit in
these particular elements of 'material culture” are passed down from one generation to another and
also revised by continuities and changes in the structure of the houses and yards that they inhabit.
In Part One, I argued that G’s appropriation o f the master’s 'castle” may invert the
colonial structures of awareness that are embodied in a plantation landscape based on a polarized
structure o f relations between master and slave, but it does not change them. In particular, G ’s
home in the castle o f his skin is deeply connected with the notion of the home as an individual and
private space, with the concept of freedom as self-ownership, and with the ideals of full autonomy
and sovereignty that are attached to such ownership. That practice of freedom is marked by anxiety
about relations with other people, by a focus on self-protection from intrusion, control, or betrayal,
and by loneliness. I also suggested that the alternative bodily image that Lamming associates with
the women in the title and concluding section o f N atives o f My Person reflects an emergent structure
of feeling that is consistent with an alternative understanding of the ideals of autonomy and freedom
in contemporary critiques of traditional psychonalytic theory. The concept of a dynamic and
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intersubjective autonomy can lend itself to the practice o f freedom as a way of being together, o f
belonging with rather than belonging to. By replacing the focus on ownership with a focus on
reciprocal recognition, it also lends itself to the practice of freedom with care and response-ability.
In this chapter, I return to Lamming’s In the Castle o f My Skin and look closely at some of
the other landscapes and ’hom es' that are portrayed in that novel. In part, G retreats into a
’castle” as a means of protecting himself from the threat that he associates with being seen, or
known, and thus subject to invasion, control, or betrayal by others. By contrast, alternative
structures which are associated w ith the village and the natural world, especially the beach, are
more open and flexible; and they attempt to balance protection and the risk o f welcoming others by
encouraging a mutual practice o f seeing and being seen. They offer ways for imagining the kind of
liminal zone, or space between the worlds of the master and servant, that Jonas argues is necessary
for creating new structures and new ways of relating to each other. Like G’s appropriation of the
landlord’s castle and like the Commandant’s ship in Natives, these homes are sometimes mobile.
But unlike G ’s castle or the Commandant’s ship, they are not so exclusively focused on isolation
and self-protection and they suggest that a different kind of travel between worlds may be possible.
These alternative forms raise possibilities for imagining both ’home" and ’travel* in ways that
might be more consistent with the kind o f freedom advocated in theories that emphasize
intersubjective relations and response-ability and thus with the ’future" that Lamming anticipates
through his vision o f the women in Natives.
C r e a t in g B o u n d a r ie s

that

E n c o u r a g e T r a v e l B e t w e e n W orlds

In the Castle o f My Skin simultaneously narrates the coming of age of both G and the
village, as well as their uneven movement toward individual and collective freedom. While G’s
story moves toward symbolic appropriation o f the castle, the village story moves toward
dispossession and loss of their small, unfortified homes. Even as the island moves closer to
independence and sovereignty, the people of the village begin to lose what little they had under the
colonial system.
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The novel, however, does not simply reject the values with which the villagers structure
their ideas of shelter and o f the kind o f relationships that their homes encourage or make possible,
despite their inability to keep their homes. The villagers lose because others appropriate the
questionable values o f the Great House, not because their own values are undesirable.
If the worldview embodied in the Great House emphasizes suspicion and protection, the
worldview that guides the villagers is one based on trust. When the villagers are anxious about the
outcome o f a strike, for example, they rely on their knowledge o f the landlord and their faith in
Slime, a villager who rose to power, to keep them from harm. Even though they waver for a
moment, the narrative voice comments, they remain steadfast because, 'whatever they may have
been ignorant o f they understood the meaning of trust' (98). That trust is betrayed and the villagers
have few resources for responding to the inconceivable situation o f losing their right to the land on
which their houses stand. That misplaced trust, however, is like Caliban’s mistake of welcome, or
the women’s attempt to treat others as natives o f their person, and it may afford a similar kind of
creative blindness. Granted, trust that is misplaced in an opponent o r an oppressive master cannot
combat their abuse. And trust that is misplaced in weak, erring, or treacherous colleagues who also
desire freedom and may betray you can defeat your efforts to secure emancipation from common
oppressors. But suspicion and protection, by contrast, make free relations with others difficult or
impossible. Even if trust cannot secure freedom, trust is still necessary for attempting to live in
freedom. When relations with others are free relations, they will always be, to some extent,
precarious.
The men in Natives and G in Castle practice freedom by breaking away, by separating
themselves from those who oppress and betray them. The tribes in N atives practice freedom by
welcoming strangers who might oppress or betray them. The women in Natives, like some of the
villagers in Castle, practice freedom by continuing to choose relationships with others despite
betrayal and broken promises. In effect, their response to the possibility o f betrayal or oppression
is an attempt to move beyond a master-slave, or victor-victim, dynamic to a freedom that is
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masterless and slaveless. In the position o f the less powerful, they refuse the choice of slavery or
death, of submission o r separation, o f connection with others or freedom.
Those polarized choices which the women reject, as I described earlier, continue to
structure the landscape o f the plantation o r the Great House and G’s attempt to secure his freedom
by symbolically appropriating the master’s castle. If the polarized basis which structures relations
between people does not change, if the opposition between sovereignty and bondage, or master and
slave, continues, the plantation, as Lamming suggests in another context, survives emancipation
("Coming Home" 55). If G ’s choice becomes the model for independence, the plantation will also
survive the villagers’ dispossession.
Jonas uncovers a similar message in Castle by reading the village landscape as an
alternative ideology o f connection. She develops this reading by perceptively distinguishing G the
narrator, who has the perspective o f an adult, from G the character, who has the experiences and
the insights o f a boy. She concludes that the narrator counters the pessimism o f the linear plot by
presenting evidence o f and positive reflections on the alternative ideology that structures the village
landscape. Because he develops insight from his own experience of painful exile, the more mature
narrator "transforms the negativity o f dispossession . . . into a positive ground o f self-knowledge"
(64-67). Unfortunately, however, Jonas’s reading privileges dispossession and exile as the
experiences that allow people to recognize value in what they have lost or given up.
In a later fiction, Season o f Adventure, Lamming directly warns the reader against the
exile’s attachment to his own privilege and alienation when lemming inserts an "author’s note" into
the story (330-332). Paquet, reading Season against Castle, suggests that the author’s privilege and
alienation are "another version o f G’s predicament” (76). So the author’s note can be read as an
implicit, and cautionary, comment on the exile lived in castle architecture. Neither the pleasure nor
the pain of exile and separation necessarily leads to greater knowledge o f the self, the other, or the
relation between the two.
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What gets neglected in Jonas’s valuable analysis, I believe, is the alternative value that
lem ming’s work places on the willingness, and even the need, to live with risk and ambiguity. It
may seem counterintuitive to look for that value in the structures o f awareness that guide village
life, since the village apparently represents a feudal society, but the novel illustrates well the extent
to which the villagers accept risk even as they try to shelter themselves.1 The distinction between
village architecture and castle architecture might be understood as the difference in the degree of
protection and security that these kinds of home promise. While the villagers seek a degree of
imperfect, but good enough shelter from inclement forces, like the wind and rain, in their homes,
those who choose to fortify themselves in castles hope that walls will guarantee inviolable
possession and ownership and will protect them from other people.
Legacies of other structures of awareness inform a village architecture o f openness and
public or semi-public spaces rather than enclosure and fully private space. The end of freedom
represented in village architecture is not individual sovereignty and the protection from being seen
and invaded, but a relationship between people that depends on the knowledge that comes with
seeing and being seen. A key difference between village architecture and castle architecture, as I
will argue more fully, is the extent to which they allow or even encourage an ability to respond to
others.
Among the defining features that structure the architecture o f the Great House or of castles
are the walls which serve to exclude others and protect the self. It is true that the village, like the
Great House, is defined by many boundaries. Just as the paradigmatic wall separates the Great
House from the plantation, other walls enclose the schoolyard, and still others separate one set o f

1 Paquet, Kortenaar, and Ngugi, for example, read the novel as a collapse of feudal society
and see at least some promise in that collapse, which results from the incapacity for independent
action in feudal relations (Paquet IS, 2S; Kortenaar 46-48; Ngugi 114-115, 125-126). In contrast to
Kortenaar, for whom the villagers inhabit a stable, organic feudal society that functions even more
as a prison than a kind o f security, I read a degree of risk and openness in village relations. The
fact that I consider the villagers more in relation to each other than in relation to the landlord and
other authority may account for some of the shift in perspective.
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villagers from another; roads separate some groups o f villagers from others; and fences separate
one yard from another. But it is not necessarily true that these boundaries replicate the structure o f
awareness that governs Great House relations. For the boundaries are less firm, even unstable, and
subject to intrusion, dissolution, or blurring, by nature and by the people themselves.
To assume that the fences and walls in the village simply reproduce the function of the
castle wall would ignore both the possibility that villagers have other experience of boundaries and
also the process by which social groups, especially ’marginal* or oppressed ones, revise and resist
inherited forms, even as they recognize the power o f those forms.2 The difference with which the
villagers reproduce the boundaries of the castle becomes clear if we shift attention from the
exegetical (how actors, like G and the boys, interpret the meaning of symbols) to the operational
(what actors, like the villagers, do with symbols and how they relate to each other in the process).3
The way the villagers use partitions frequently defies the purposes of separation. They use the
walls that enclose the school and separate it from the village, for example, as a platform. They
crowd the walls in order to watch what happens inside and to consider among themselves what has

2 Victor Turner’s work in anthropology, for example, indicates that African societies, and
perhaps societies in general, "are processes responsive to change"; even when forms survive, and
undergo no radical change, they ’survive through flux,’ i.e., as variations of the old forms (184).
Much colonial and post-colonial criticism recognizes that marginal groups contest a dominant
paradigm by repeating its forms with a difference. See, for example, Henry Louis Gates, Jr.’s
notions o f signifying and chiasmus, as strategies o f repetition and reversal (The Signifying Monkey)-,
Homi Bhabha’s notions of mimicry, translation, negotiation, and (mis)appropriation in the
enunciation o f culture (The Location o f Culture); or Jenny Sharpe’s analysis of the ’Figures of
Colonial Resistance” as ambiguous figures that include recognition and refusal. Simon Gikandi,
reading the work of C.L.R. James, Lamming, and Cliff, and other writers in Caribbean modernism,
similarly argues that the colonized respond to the colonial order with anxiety; borrowing forms from
European modernism as a point of entry, they contest the social meaning of those forms with a
strategy that simultaneously reproduces and subverts them (W riting in Umbo).
Patrick Taylor partly recognizes this process in Castle when he notes that ’the novel ends
with a new spatial metaphor that is essentially a repetition with differences of the original colonial
model” (192, emphasis added). What I am arguing, however, is that this repetition with a
difference exists within the ’original* model to which he refers, within the village that repeats the
structure o f the Great House with a difference during the colonial period.
3 See Turner for a description o f the exegetical and the operational as alternatives sources
of information (190).
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and hasn't changed (37). Partitions originally intended to secure privacy by concealing what is
inside are used as places of social gathering. The people who crowd the walls, as well as the
fences which separate their yards, become observers, who take in what they see in order to reflect
collectively on the meaning of their lives. Walls once intended to impede vision and secure
individual privacy are now used to aid vision and serve the pursuit o f collective and reciprocal
knowledge.
In the village, the need for knowledge and the need for community are at least as strong as,
if not stronger than, the need for privacy. The villagers seek to know by looking, seeing, and
comparing—one person or place or event with another, or past with present—and by exchanging such
knowledge with each other. Villagers, especially the women and the children, repeatedly break the
plane o f the walls and fences that separate them in order to communicate with each other. Not only
do they climb fences in order to gossip with their neighbors, they as readily lean out of their own
windows, o r through each other’s windows, to exchange information (11-19). Even when they
remain physically in their homes, their voices can pass through and over the dividing barriers when
the windows are open. On the night o f the flood which opens the novel, for example, G’s mother
begins to sing, and her voice raises until it becomes "a scattering peal o f solicitude that soared
across the night and into the neighbor’s house. And the answer came back louder, better organized
and more communicative, so that another neighbor responded and yet another until the voices
seemed to be gathered up by a single effort and the whole village shook with song" (11). The scene
is notable for the extent to which these neighbors care for each other’s safety and encourage
response rather than secrecy and a private experience o f joy or suffering. Villagers live, by choice,
simultaneously within and without their homes, privately and publicly, alone and together. Only in
times o f highest anxiety—when floodwaters at their height threaten to inundate their homes; or when
they expect rioters to move from the town to the village—are their windows sealed.
The attitude o f the mothers when the fence between their yards sways with the weight of
spectators and crashes to the ground, making the two yards merge, contrasts sharply with G’s
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attitude. G is humiliated when his shower takes place in public rather than private and exposes him
to laughter, even though the showers of older boys also take place in public, communal baths.
Unable to accept the self-deflating humor with which villagers characteristically treat each other, G
feels that the ’barricade which had once protected our private secrecies had surrendered” (16-18).
The mothers take the collapse and the ’merger* o f their yards casually. They accept it as they have
other mergers, as when the ’roads disintegrated, the limestone slid back and the houses advanced
across their boundaries to meet those on the opposite side in an embrace o f board and shingle and
cactus fence” during a flood (10). They suspend judgment alike when a flood o r their own actions
level the distinctions between them. Bob’s mother apologizes about the fence, but G 's mother
responds: "‘Don’t worry, . . . it could have come down in the flood like so many others” (24).
Instead, the women use the collapse as an opportunity to gather under a cherry tree that
spreads out over the fences. As they relax together, exchanging confidences, the fallen fence
recedes from their minds. The narrator regards the women under the tree as three pieces in an
unchanging pattern, as women whose identities merge into each other, unaffected by either
difference or similarity. It might be more accurate, however, to consider the blurred boundaries
between them as the future o f the women in Natives o f My Person as well as an opportunity for the
intersubjectivity that Benjamin advocates.4 The collapse o f a wall or a fence invites welcome.
The juxtaposition o f the tree and the fences suggests that the yards, and the people who live
within them, do not lose all boundaries when the fence collapses. For the tree symbolizes an
alternative boundary that structures relationships, and thus the practice of freedom, differently than
a fence or a castle wall does.3 The cherry tree, as the narrative describes it, ’spread out over the

4 See Chapter 2 for a detailed reading o f the "future" that the women in Natives might
promise and its connections with psychoanalytic theories of intersubjectivity.
5 Jonas also suggests that this juxtaposition is significant. But she reads the scene in which
the fence collapses only from G’s perspective, as an invasion of privacy that leaves G without
protection and subjects him to a system of overseeing and violation in which the folk repeat the
behavior o f the landlord (60). The juxtaposition of the tree and the fence shows her only that
"harmony, meaning and fecundity” now replace ’deprivation and loss’ (66). She does not read the
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fences in all directions. The roots were in one yard, but its body bulged forth into another, and its
branches struck out over three or four more.'' In its shade, the women sit "in a circle composed
and relaxed.” They collaborate, "shuffling episodes and exchanging the confidences that informed
their life with meaning* (24-25). Thus the space under the tree allows the ”attunement” that,
according to Benjamin, is ’created by shared feeling and discovery* (130).
The tree describes a kind o f boundary that is difficult to articulate in terms o f the human
body, where skin is equivalent to a fence or a wall, and loss of boundary is seen as merger.
Rather, it corroborates the kind o f thinking with which Thomas Sebeok reflects on the semiotic self.
Conceding that it is difficult to describe ’where the ‘inner’ Self begins and the ‘outer’ Other
begins,’ he asserts that ’the boundary is, clearly, beyond the skin* (39). Though the tree is a
natural boundary between the yards, its roots and branches, which extend from one yard to another,
emphasize the joining as well as the separating aspects of a boundary. The tree is neither a symbol
of separation nor integration, but both simultaneously. Since many of its roots stretch underground
and can’t be seen, it is difficult to know, precisely, where the boundary ends or, with any precision,
just where the overlap between one identity and another exists. When a tree rather than a wall or a
fence defines the boundary between persons, then relationships do not require that we destroy
boundaries and freedom does not require that we erect stronger ones.
For personal space, the villagers rely not on barriers between their homes but on comers
within them. They retreat to comers for moments, but not lives, of privacy. By substituting
comers for the separation of walls, they afford themselves a kind of space that is more conducive to
mutual recognition and freedom within relationships because comers provide the kind of separation
that allows freedom with protection and openness to others. In Benjamin’s words, it provides ’a
feeling of safety without confinement,’ since it ’permits the important experience of being and

tree itself as a kind of boundary nor the juxtaposition as a comment on G ’s attitude toward fences in
the earlier scene.
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playing alone in the unobtrusive but reassuring presence o f the other" (126-127, emphasis added).
The relaxation, creativity, and personal growth allowed in the solitude o f the comer space
complements the relaxation, creativity, and collective growth encouraged by the collaboration under
the tree. Both become important spaces for ’practicing'* freedom creatively.
O n C ra b s

and a

H om e Y ou

can

C a r r y W it h Y o u

Though the houses the villagers inhabit are small, they are valued highly. They provide
both comers for privacy and windows through which villagers collaborate even when they remain
inside. Despite poverty, almost every villager owns "the little hovel he live in .’’ It is "the golden
rule” in their village because, M r. Foster claims, *‘A man ain’t a man till he can call the house he
live in my own” (240). But the old woman, Ma, values "good shelter" more than pride of
ownership. "‘I says let's have a good roof,” she tells her husband Pa, " ‘an’ make my heart
happy” (79). When she cautions Pa, religiously, against too strong an attachment to things o f this
earth, because "‘you can’t carry these things with you,” Pa worries, perceptively as it turns out. It
is precisely that that frightens him as he wonders why "you can’t carry it with you" (87-88).
For their houses are "precariously adequate." "Raised jauntily o n groundsels of
limestone," and heaped together, they can be lifted off their foundations by floodwaters. They do
not survive the move, but, as already noted, "meet. . . in an embrace o f board and shingle” (10).
If the villagers should try to move a house, as the shoemaker does when the land is literally bought
out from under him, everything would be lost in "a fall of wood and shingles" (299). There is
nothing to move or restore since the house is reduced to a stack of "broken boards" (301). This
precariousness is taken advantage o f by the middle-classes who are profiting from growing
independence and who dispossess the villagers in order to take their place on village land. The man
who buys the land on which M r. Foster’s house sits, for example, "generously" offers to buy
Foster’s much-loved house together with the land in order to "‘save you the trouble of having to
carry a house on your back” (239).
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Foster’s indignant response mnphasi7gs his attachment to and sense o f responsibility for the
house that gives him shelter over his head and a com er to rest his bones in. Recalling the time he
tried to save his house during a flood, he lectures the buyer:
’Once a house a mine move off this spot. ‘Twas a flood as we never ever before see, an’
like a good captain I won’t leave it till they force me to. I stay on the roof and sail down
the river with it, and some laugh and some cry. You can do what you please, but I tell
you that to let you know what a house mean to some people in this com er o f God’s earth. ’
(240)
Foster’s description allows his captaincy and the nature of his vessel to be read as an alternative to
the Commandant’s attitude aboard the castle o f his ship in Natives, hi addition, Foster’s memory
brings two losses together, so that the natural loss seems to foreshadow the loss caused by Foster’s
fellow men. Juxtaposition seems to establish a correspondence between the flood and the sale o f the
land, but, like the juxtaposition of the cherry tree and the fence, it also highlights a difference.
A fter the flood, Foster could and did rebuild. His foundation remained and land was
available. And it is possible that the floodwaters are, as the adults keep telling the inconsolable G,
a kind o f blessing. For the floods are a leveling force. When the roads which demarcate areas of
mutual antipathy dissolve, and the houses on opposite sides embrace, the loss o f their homes creates
the possibility for the villagers to renegotiate boundaries, connections, and values. Because their
houses are not permanent, the villagers have the opportunity to design their houses with different
worldviews when they rebuild. The sale o f the land, by contrast, reinforces the distance between
people and denies the villagers the chance to rebuild.
The Fosters now challenge the concept o f ownership with which the buyer removes Foster
from the land. To the buyer, ownership reserves all rights to the owner. "It makes no difference”
whether he owns a garage or a piece o f land; he can rent either to someone who wishes to park his
car or his house, and then legally demand the space back. Miss Foster argues that this land is not
the sort "‘that can be for buy or sell,” because it is "‘land for we people to live o n .”

M r. Foster

also disagrees with the buyer, arguing that a house cannot be moved anywhere the way a car can
(239).
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To understand the relationship o f the land sale to the flood, it is useful to remember the
two reactions of the people who watched Foster sail down the river on his roof. While some simply
laughed, others 'thought it was a revelation, a sort o f first step to the second coming, and they just
went on shouting, ‘Look, Noah on the Ark!"' (33). If the sale o f the land is the second coming
which the flood revealed, it seems to have as much in common with the monster who "slouches
toward Bethlehem" in W. B. Yeats’s poem, "The Second Com ing," as with Christ’s glorious return
as promised in the Book o f Revelation. With the sale o f the land, the laughter with which the
villagers renegotiate their relations and establish mutual recognition is replaced by a deadly serious
business, as Mr. Foster recognizes when the overseer confirms that the land is being sold: "If the
overseer said that the land was sold, the situation would have to be given a new meaning. It would
have lost its comic element. It would be true" (244). Freedom and respect would become as
serious for the villagers, and as unresponsive to playful practice, as they are for the colonial
landlord and the sovereign individual.
But this reading o f the revelation introduced by the sight of Foster sailing his house, like
Noah on the Ark, is complicated by a second image that is also described as a "revelation" and a
"lucky experience," the sight o f "two crabs in strange intercourse" (115). Significantly G comes
upon this "revelation” during the boys’ day at the beach, when the boys’ "confused" reflections on
"adult values," as T-amming says in an interview, "function as a critical comment on the adult
world" (Cited in Paquet 23). As the boys reflea on village experience, they develop innovative
alternatives for the way adults structure and understand their worlds. The transitional space of the
shore encourages creativity and playfulness in shaping endless worlds because, in Benjamin’s
words, the seashore "forms a boundary and yet opens up into unbounded possibility" (127). G
watches the crabs throughout the day, and they become significant not simply because they raise
questions about sexuality and about separateness and togetherness, but also because the body in
which they move is "like a house on stilts" (146). Crabs carry their shelter with them, on their
backs.
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Significantly, G first sees the crabs immediately after he watches some girls build sand
castles while another girl blocks the water by lying with her back to the sea (1 IS). This image
suggests that castles are not all invulnerable; and those that are made o f sand will be washed away
not only by an annual flood, but by the daily tide. The fact that G appropriates the castle image
after he watches the girls build sand castles, and after he and the boys demonstrate the imperfect
security o f the Great House by invading its walls, and after the landlord occupies his own castle like
"a relic o f another time, ’ casts doubt on the effectiveness with which G can protect himself in the
castle o f his skin. This juxtaposition o f the crabs and the sand castles allows the image of the crabs
to comment on the other architectural and semi-architectural structures in the novel, and vice versa.
Three parts of the crab’s body make it one of the most successful illustrations o f survival
on the island: its claws, its shell, and its eyes. Its claws give it the ability to attack and counter
attack, to run and burrow quickly, and also to embrace in what G, who is so concerned to keep his
world separate and hidden from others, can only understand as a terrible togetherness. Crabs are
equally well suited to the sea and the dry sand, and also to that shifting territory in between, the wet
sand into which the waves sink as they slide back to the sea. Only the crabs and a lone fisherman
withstand the force of waves that explode in a dangerous intercourse o f land and sea.
Because the movement of the crabs is interspersed with the boys’ stories of cultures in
conflict, their skills and adaptability become a resource for reflecting on the possibilities of
difference and belonging in multiple, and even treacherous, worlds. The significance of the crabs'
world for the stories the boys are trying to understand is highlighted, directly and indirectly, several
times in the course of the day: for example, when fishermen’s boats drift into the dangerous side of
the sea, they drown and wash up on the shore days later, "blue-black,’ like the large blue-back
crabs that are caught by the villagers when they wash into the village during heavy rains; when
three crabs move up the beach, clawing at each other, in a movement that is ambiguously wrestling
or intercourse, one disappears beneath the sand, much like Jon or Bambi, and leaves two to
embrace or fight, like Susie and Jen or Bots and Bambina, the principal actors in those stories o f
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beset manhood, or cultures in conflict, that the boys try to understand; and when Bots and her
undertaker try to steal Bambi’s coffin from Bambina, they "crawl like crabs quiet quiet” (117, 132133, 140, 149).
The crabs, partly like G in the castle o f his skin, are ’locked away’ and ’hidden
somewhere in their shells* (129, 146). But unlike G’s castle, their shells represent an architecture
that allows them to balance exposure and withdrawal, risk and protection. Unlike G, they can
embrace without coming out of their shell, which allows them protection and togetherness at once.
In these respects, the house of the crabs is more like the homes of the villagers than like G’s castle.
And what G does not witness on that day at the beach is the fact that each shell is a temporary
shelter, abandoned and changed fo r another as the crab changes.6 These comparisons suggest that G
develops some advantage over the villagers, chiefly in terms of mobility and the ability to move in
different worlds, when he chooses to inhabit the castle of his skin. But he also ignores or
misinterprets much of the value symbolized in the architecture of the village houses in which he was
raised. His chances for practicing a new kind of freedom, a freedom that allows and encourages
mutual recognition, commitment, and affectionate relationship, might be better served if he were to
choose a more homely structure than the castle in order to imagine the shelter that his skin can
afford.
The last significant feature o f the crabs are their eyes, particularly their color and their
movement. G thinks they are both "wonderful" and ’puzzling’ and describes them in detail:
We could find no colour for the eyes. They were so pretty. Not red or green, or bright
yellow, or deep orange, o r anything definite, but a wild, enchanting mixture o f all these

6 When Michael Cooke compares Brodber’s Jane and Louisa with Lamming’s Castle, he
argues that Brodber, unlike Lamming, is able ’to take hardened custom and display it as a
temporary shell" (35). Lamming, he argues, "gives us more custom," which is "what we
collectively do and continue to do in a fairly thoughtless, self-encased way’ (34, emphasis added).
While Cooke’s analysis perceptively highlights the symbolism o f the crab’s shell, he underestimates
its role in Lamming’s work. The reason, I believe, is because he reads the novel exclusively as a
record of ’the male Caribbean story," a story that affirms the perspective o f G, who considers the
fall of a fence apocalyptic and who conceals himself in the castle of his skin (30-33).
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colours. Crabs’ eyes were the most puzzling we could recall. They looked transparent in
the light. When the crabs lifted them to h a lf an inch above their backs, we tried to say
what they were lik e .. . . The colour o f the crabs’ eyes was like the colour o f the light
reflected from the moon through the [pint] glass [filled with water]. And the movement of
the crabs’ eyes was as wonderful. They were lifted so that they seemed to see all around
and in all directions at the same time. . . . and when they returned to the oblong cavity
where they rested, the movement was effortless. It seemed the crabs had nothing to do
with it. The eyes moved about at will and the crabs might have been hidden somewhere in
the shells waiting to get a wire from the eyes about the surrounding weather. Crabs’ eyes
seemed so much like a man’s hand . . . left to work following its own instructions . . .
something outside of you. . . . You stare, and the hand seems to stare back, an
independent object, making a message through its instruments, the fingers. The crabs’ eyes
had that quality. They had something in common with the crab locked away in the shell,
but they moved freely. (128-129, emphasis added)
Their eyes, which can "get a wire . . . [on] the surrounding weather," allow the crabs to move
freely in an environment they do not own and which they share with other creatures. For that
territory, unowned, shared, and comprised of constantly shifting ground, is, as G recognizes, their
"domain'* (ISO). Watchful for predictable and unpredictable threats in their environment, the crabs
can choose when to withdraw and when to emerge, when to retreat and when to move freely
forward, up and down the shore, above and below the sand, as needed.
Their life is not without risk, since they are pursued and often caught. They are caught
more readily, however, when heavy storms wash them into the village than they are when they
move in this unowned, changing terrain. Boy Blue, for example, considers him self a "master" crab
catcher, whose "an [has] become a practiced routine." But when he tries to capture the crabs on
this beach, simply for the thrill of capturing something, they elude his mastery. Their ability to
respond to the unpredictable with their own unpredictability outwits the assurance and command
with which Boy Blue pursues them. Because they exercise no great hurry in escaping, G imagines
that they feel they are "unseen because their eyes were dropped level in the slot that contained
them." G seems to project onto the crabs his own sense o f invisibility as he retreats within the
castle of his skin. The foolishness that G imputes to the crabs for this feeling offers G an
opportunity he doesn’t take to reflect on his own way o f hiding. But the crabs are not so foolish as
G imagines, for they appear and disappear at will, and just as Boy Blue attempts to grab them, they
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disappear. Boy Blue misses his grip, and the crabs are safe even as Boy Blue totters and sinks into
the wet sand that shifts sharply beneath him. When a wave wrenches him into the sea, it is Boy
Blue who must be "rescued, ’ or "caught," by the only fisherman the boys have ever seen who can
cast his net on this side o f the beach (150-151). Considering that the crabs are facile, adaptable,
and survive so well in this shifting world between the sea and the land, there is at least some irony
in the thought Pa once had that Mr. Slime might be a kind of Moses who had "saved” them from a
"plague" o f crabs after the flood (77-78). As the story develops, it becomes apparent that Slime is
a greater threat to the villagers than the crabs are. And the villagers might learn more that is useful
to them from the way the crabs inhabit their territory than they do from Slime, the village boy who
becomes teacher, then entrepreneur, then politician, and lures them into betrayal and dispossession
by promising to make them "owners o ’ this land" (79).
P r a c t ic in g B a l a n c e

in

S h if t in g W o r l d s

Lamming’s literary imagination structures a cross-commentary on the architectures and
domains o f freedom both within and between his novels. Juxtapositions, serial developments, and
allegorical accretions allow alternative structures, landscapes, and modes of habitation to respond to
each other.7 The "meaning" derives neither from an individual, central character like G, nor from
an imagined collective unity, like "the village," which presumes another kind o f centrality and
internal homogeneity, but from the heterogeneous activities and values o f various characters and
groups in relation to each other. The tensions that emerge in these relationships constitute the
situation o f freedom more as a "predicament," a complicated, perplexing condition within which we
continue to live our lives and practice our values creatively, than as a "problem" that can be solved

7 For other critics who emphasize this cross-commentary in lem m ing’s art, see Jonas,
Anancy in the Great H ouse, and McDonald, "‘Within the Orbit o f Power.’" Jonas, for example,
aligns the art o f the West Indian writer w ith that o f a painter in one o f Lamming’s last novels,
Season o f Adventure. This art constitutes a kind o f "bricolage" through which a "multiplicity of
signiflers . . . serve to correct and modify one another" (56-57). McDonald argues that the
allegorical method in Natives o f My Person works by a process o f "accretion" in which serial
elements o f the text comment on and contradict each other (73-74).
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finally and through some sort o f mastery. The shifting territory within which freedom and care
must be practiced requires a sense o f balance and suggests that the "domain" o f freedom might be
better approached as the domain o f the crab than the domain o f the icing.
Balance is crucial in the seaside domain of the crab and in all the liminal areas of the
island. In the area where the sea and the land regularly exchange places, the difference between the
successful fisherman and Boy Blue, the would-be crab catcher, is the fisherman’s ability to restore
his balance when a large wave shifts the sand sharply beneath him (146). Bob’s mother must try to
keep her balance when she climbs the fence to see what damage he has done to G’s mother’s
pumpkin vine, and must recover her balance after the fence collapses (17-18). And in a scene that
links the environment o f G’s early shower to that o f the sea, G must renegotiate his balance when
the pebbles, loosened from the earth by the water of his shower, slip beneath his feet. When the
pebbles shift, he totters, as Boy Blue does when the waves shift the sand beneath him. But G
recovers when the pebbles rearrange themselves, because his "balance [is] perfect” (16). In an area
where different worlds meet, maintaining and restoring balance becomes a lifelong activity,
practiced in continually new environments.
A similar balance must be continually renegotiated between the people’s twin legacies of
protection and risk, escape and welcome. The future of a freedom that is practiced with connection
to and care for others must hold solitude and relationship, mutuality and sovereignty, in a flexible
tension.
When the land and the sea, and even whole worlds, shift, the ability to start again becomes
an important component of dynamic balance. But that ability to respond to change and to
renegotiate is not synonymous with a practice o f escape that insists on starting from scratch, on
"virgin" territory, i.e. territory that, in the masculine frame o f reference, "belongs" to no man.
Since this territory, from the same perspective, is uninhabited, it is open to completely new
structures o f habitation and relationship.
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If the legacy o f freedom as escape searches for territory that is unpossessed, o r ’creates"
such territory through dispossession, however, that legacy has little tolerance for the risks associated
with living on "unclaimed” land and welcoming others to share that world. Rather, the legacy of
freedom as escape is subsequently practiced as a mode of settling down, o r settling in. The
emphasis on protection that informs both the escape and the subsequent structures o f habitation
seeks to establish freedom on a fixed terrain that is made "safe" through ownership and sovereignty.
Thus, when M r. Slime promises that his Friendly Society and Penny Bank will allow every villager
to own the land his house is built on. Pa tries to persuade a skeptical M a that parceling out the land
in owned plots is like salvation or the promised land, because history demonstrates that ownership
means safety:
"I ain’t know exact, Ma, . . . [but] ’Tis only right he say that every man should own his
own piece o ’ land at some time or other. ’Tis the ambition o ’ every man to do that same
said thing, an’ he say it ain't only poor simple people like you an’ me, but ’tis the way the
big folk think too. They think it safe to own too, an’ then he give a sort o ’ inside history
o ’ some o ’ the nations, how they all make it they business before anything else to own the
land they live on or the land nearest to them. ’Tis a lucky thing when you got a man at the
head who know what he talkin’ ’bout that’s why I sort o ’ put some trust in him. ’Cause
’tis education that’s his steering-wheel. . . . ” (87-88).
The novel demonstrates that "education” is indeed Slime’s steering-wheel. He has learned to value
the colonial structures of awareness and wants simply to take them over, not to change them. If
Slime knows what he’s talking about, it is less clear that Pa does. For the "safety” that comes with
ownership is only available to some and not to others. Within Lamming’s fiction, the freedom that
comes with ownership and self-protection conflicts with caritas. The new owners inherit that
colonial sense o f "responsibility" that fulfills obligation without attention o r care or a willingness to
allow others to respond. When the head teacher buys Pa’s land, for example, he arranges to send
him away to the Alms House. The Alm s House, the head teacher knows, is "a house o f charity"
that "had nothing to do with love or compassion." Rather, it "was a kind o f appointed State burden.
It was the unwelcome task of preventing old age, poverty and disease from spreading into the
nuisance that was inevitable if certain people were left unattended" (252, emphases added). Like
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the women in Natives who interfered with the men’s desire for freedom as escape, and the natives
who interfered with the m en’s desire for freedom as possession and control o f their own sovereign
territoiy, Pa and other villagers are simply gotten out o f the way. The history o f ownership and
sovereignty is one based on exclusion and has difficulty accommodating a sense o f welcome and
relationship. With the change in ownership at the end o f Castle, the terrors and betrayals o f the
colonial enterprise which sought to establish freedom on utopian ground are continued, in their own
way, by the twentieth-century heirs who seek to secure freedom on their ow n promised land,
lemming’s fiction insists that possession is based on a long history o f dispossession.
Although I -amming hopes to inspire a practice o f freedom and sovereignty in the West
Indies, his novels also question the value placed on sovereignty and sovereign forms o f freedom.
Questioning that value is both necessary and risky. When Wilson Harris reflects on C .L.R. James’s
analysis of the Haitian freedom struggles in the early nineteenth century, as Lamming also does,
Harris notes that "Toussaint may well have been an agnostic as far as contemporary political faiths
are concerned. He may well have had peculiar doubts about the assumption o f sovereign status and
power. And this was profound heresy even then, much more so now” (44). Toussaint arrived at
his doubts because he struggled to reconcile the abstract value of freedom, o r individual
sovereignty, with the practical need for self-sacrifice and community-building. For Harris, it is
precisely this willingness to allow other values to qualify the value o f freedom that holds promise
for a broader kind o f freedom in the Caribbean.
Harris criticizes Lamming for over-elaborating individual character in his fiction and,
implicitly, for overvaluing the freedom o f the sovereign individual and the sovereign nation whose
’rigid self-sufficiency [fails] to close the gap between [self] and others” (23-38). But a reading of

In the Castle o f My Skin together with Natives o f M y Person suggests that Lamming, as Harris
desires, is ’groping towards an alternative* conception o f freedom and its possibilities (45). Even
as G seems to embrace a form o f freedom as rigid self-sufficiency, the dialogue within and across
these novels dares to speak a heresy, to place sovereign freedom at risk and to grope towards a
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freedom that takes up the legacy o f welcome and response. In one of his most recent essays,
'Coming, Coming, Coming Home,'* Lamming notes that both Haiti and Cuba, ’pioneers in
initiating the debate on liberation and sovereignty in the Caribbean,’ were ’condemned to a state of
war [and] isolated.’ Escape from bondage did not yield ’recognition* between the former master
and the former slave (54-55). Although the blame lies with the Europeans and the Euro-Americans
who refuse that recognition, Lamming also suggests that ti e ’strategy of privatisation,” which refers
directly to economic development, but indicts indirectly other notions of privacy and independence
as development, is toxic (44-45). He concludes that a revolutionary freedom requires them to
aspire to *a new kind of sovereignty” (58). He proposes that they pursue this freedom by
entertaining, for example, *a concept o f Nation that is not defined by specific territorial
boundaries,” a concept o f community whose people are "scattered across a variety o f latitudes
within and beyond the archipelago* (45).
Lamming’s fiction suggests that the future he wishes the Caribbean to work towards must
consider what degrees and what kinds of ownership, protection, sovereignty, and welcome are
needed for 'shelter” rather than "self-defense, ” and for the ability to ’practice” freedom rather than
to 'm aster’ it. The alternative search seems to be for a space and a mode of habitation, yet to be
imagined, that encourages freedom and care, security and risk, a sense of home and a sense of
welcome, an ability to settle in a world and an ability to travel among worlds. Without the ability
to inhabit a new world, even if temporarily, "world’-travelling can promise a freedom that is
nothing more than the kind o f coming and going about which the Lady complains in N atives. The
territory in which this movement toward freedom must take place can neither be fixed nor
controlled, but like the tree near the fence or the sand near the shore, a space whose boundary is
uncertain, shifting, and open to travellers from other worlds.
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Having begun my project because of the unease caused by an advertisement that invited US
residents to escape the slavery o f their everyday lives by becoming carefree tourists in Jamaica, I
would like to conclude my discussion of freedom, care, and travel by returning to the topic of
tourists. For it is chiefly as tourists that world-travellers from imperial centers in North America as
well as Europe meet with ’natives’ o f the Caribbean islands and make the practice of freedom with
or without care about those natives real. As the work o f several Caribbean authors reveals, the
attractions of vacationing in the Caribbean revive all too closely the attractions of the past, when
plantation life separated masters from servants or slaves and made the freedom of the first
dependent on the unfreedom of the second.1 The plantation, to borrow Lamming’s phrasing, has
survived both emancipation and independence and continues in the domain of the tourist.
J a m a ic a K in c a id : O n C a r e f r e e T r a v e l

and

R u in e d H o l id a y s

Jamaica Kincaid has written a scathing indictment of carefree travellers in her passionate
jeremiad, A Small Place. She begins by addressing all readers as actual or potential tourists,
stating: ’If you go to Antigua as a tourist, this is what you will see” (3). What these reader-tourists

1 Davies suggests an alternative, but complementary link—between tourists and invaders.
She argues that the US invasion o f Grenada ’was also blatantly a tourist trip’ (26). She concludes
that ’ if we are clear,” among other things, ’that tourist installations often destroy the environment
and displace many people, that people are denied some of the most beautiful areas of their countries
because o f tourism, that the local people are constructed perpetually in positions of service, then the
link between tourism and invasion is not farfetched” (26).
Caribbean diatribes against tourism and tourists should not be conflated with the kind of
modernist critiques that heralded the expatriate, exile, or ’real” traveller, for example, as superior
to the tourist. For those travellers, as Caren Kaplan demonstrates in Questions o f Travel, have
much in common with tourists, despite their protestations to the contrary, and are also deeply
implicated in modernity’s colonizing projects (see Kaplan’s chapter on ’This Question of Moving:
Modernist Exile/Postmodem Tourism”). Caribbean diatribes would not see such ’real” travellers as
superior to the ’tourists” those travellers condemn.
229
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will "see" is a beautiful landscape with blue skies. What they will be unwilling to "see’ or think
about is the fact that the infrequent rain which makes the island so attractive to tourists who want to
vacation in the sun means that the natives suffer constantly from drought. Even the weather that
makes the vacation so carefree for the tourist m eans that the daily life of the residents must be
exceedingly careful; residents must "watch carefully every drop o f fresh water used” (4).
Kincaid has little sympathy for readers who might choose to travel when staying at ’home"
suddenly becomes less than comfortable. A tourist ’like you’ is "a person at home in your own
skin . . . in your own house . . . on your street. . . with your family, your relatives, your
friends’—who suddenly feels as if you need to ’get away* in order to feel ’alive and inspired” and
"free* (5, 15-16). You ignore the envy and frustration o f natives who are "too poor to escape the
reality o f their lives" and turn their "banality and boredom into a source of pleasure for yourself”
(19).
She is especially angry that one o f the few institutions which the government maintains in
good condition is the Hotel Training School which teaches these natives who can’t escape to be
good servants to tourists who refuse to have anything human or intimate to do with these servants
(27, 55). For Kincaid recognizes that the celebration o f this institution, and the fact that corrupt
officials have given their country away, are connected to the people’s continuing obsession with
slavery and emancipation, which seem as if they are contemporary events (55).
And she suggests that otherwise nice, ordinary people become complicit in this degradation
particularly when they go on vacation. For it is precisely their wish to escape their own cares, to
be carefree, that keeps them from sympathizing with or even thinking about the cares of Antigua.
Taking notice would probably "ruin your holiday’ (9).
The conditions outside the tourist resorts may be deplorable, but the average, rather than
the wealthy tourist probably couldn’t vacation without the contrast. For it is precisely when the
exchange rate makes local products and entertainments seem so cheap that ordinary tourists can feel
even more free. But tourists can’t entirely escape the conditions they would rather ignore. After
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all, they might need to use the hospital at which no government officials will be treated (8).
Despite their efforts to seal themselves off from the realities, the terrible inequities of island life,
the most carefree tourists sometimes "feel a little uneasy* (17).
And islanders who refuse to be good servants may sometimes make tourists very uneasy.
When the "natives* protest poverty and corruption too forcefully, or socialist governments like
Manley’s in the Jamaica o f the 1970s, come briefly into power, the tourists stop coming. For the
really ugly tourist, such people are all that keep these islands from being paradise. When Jamaicans
rebel against injustice, as Cliff observes in No Telephone, CBS News might report that Jamaica is
about to explode, not because CBS is concerned with the suffering that might lead to such
'incidents" but because "vacationers were endangered" and 'tourism was suffering.* Cliff presents
the self-absorbed and careless response o f a New York woman whose servant has family in Jamaica
as if it were typical: "‘Well, I guess that’s another place they’ve ruined for us’" (18).
The attitude is reflected in a recent article in Town and Country magazine. Michael
Thomas quotes what visitors heard from "an old Jamaican hand" (someone who vacations there
regularly) some thirty-odd years ago and which they still repeat: "‘there’s nothing wrong with this
island that couldn’t be fixed by holding it underwater for ten minutes’ ” (108). The implication is
that a flood would cleanse the island o f the irritating and sometimes dangerous natives.
Thomas repeats the story only because he wants to persuade his readers that Jamaicans
actually make vacationing in Jamaica more special than vacationing on other islands where travellers
mainly experience the "local population . . . in their touristic or serving mode.” Observing that "in
Jamaica you can’t escape Jamaicans," he concedes that some tourists find their personalities
"overpowering," "threatening," and even "dangerous." But he insists that Jamaicans are
"irresistible" because they "act like human beings": they are "diverse, lively, vexatious, noisy,
beguiling, irritating" (105, 108). Kincaid may object to the prevalence o f servant behavior in
Antigua, but Thomas’s dismissal o f servants is more reproachable. Kincaid recognizes that a
servile status is greatly, if not wholly, imposed on the "local population” by tourists who don’t want
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to recognize the full implications o f a history o f continuing oppression. The tourists she writes
about read books which explain that "the West got rich not from the free (free--in this case meaning
got-for-nothing) and then undervalued labour, for generations, of the people like [Kincaid] you see
walking around you in Antigua but from the ingenuity of shopkeepers in Sheffield . .

and

[explain] what a great part the invention o f the wristwatch played in it” (10). If such tourists get a
"slightly funny feeling . . . from time to time about exploitation, oppression, domination,” they
deny their own responsibility because that funny feeling might "develop into full-fledged unease,
discomfort" and spoil their holiday (10). Thomas, like these tourists, seems to accept no
responsibility for the distinction he implicitly draws between servants and real "human beings.”
And he also betrays his complicity in the objectionable attitudes that Caribbean authors condemn
tourists for in other ways.
The only ”Jamaicans” he actually refers to before he describes them as 'strongly
individuated people” are the "pillars of the local establishment” who own the 'marvelous houses”
between the tourist resorts (145, 147). Among the attractions he highlights in this area that
bespeaks "class" and "style" is the "Great House high on the hill" (145).
The weather is especially notable for him, as it is for tourists to Antigua, because it has
only "obliged" him "to eat indoors” a few times since 1960 when he began vacationing there
annually. But he doesn't only ignore the consequences of weather for the local population, as
Kincaid insists that most tourists do. He uses this comment on the weather as an analogy for the
slight inconvenience that local disturbances might cause tourists. In all the years he has been
visiting Jamaica, "the number of troublesome incidents [he’s] heard a b o u t . . . is less than the
number of times [he’s] been obliged by weather to eat indoors" (108). Like the readers Kincaid
deplores, he ignores his own role in creating the conditions that may lead to such disturbances. He
acknowledges that "talented" Jamaicans are too "proud, . . . intelligent and educated" to "deserve”
the economic inequities that characterize life in Jamaica. And he is "sophisticated" enough to
comment, ironically, that real institutions have something to do with such undeserved "fate":
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Jamaicans deserve "better than the fate the gods o f political economy-and the big American banks—
have decreed for the island." But he ignores the possibility that not only such systemic injustices,
but also the behavior of tourists themselves, tourists like him, might account for "the frustration that
one senses simmering in this talented people” (108).
Like the tourists Kincaid describes, he is oblivious to the fact that natives might dislike
tourists like him (18). For Thomas, the locals are simply not "threatening"; they might have been
"dangerous" in the 1970s when the population "succumbed to the inflammatory promises of socialist
Prime Minister Michael Manley, who didn’t love tourists or foreignors,” but they now "act like
human beings” (105, 108). Thomas is much like the American film director in C liffs No

Telephone, who, however, doesn’t even think the 1970s were very dangerous. Like Thomas, who
tries to assauge the fears o f potential vacationers, the American dismisses the fears of his British
colleague, arguing that the locals are "‘not any real threat’" (202). Where else, he explains,
"‘could you find people demonstrating, burning tires, blocking roads, and then accepting tips from
tourists to let them pass?’" (202-203). As far as the director is concerned, Jamaicans are simply too
willing to sell themselves and their country to carry out a real revolution.
Thomas similarly dismisses the fears o f potential tourists who ignorantly act, in Cliff’s
terms, as if Jamaica were a "war zone" rather than a "sandbox' or a "stage set" (No Telephone
151). If he mentions that he is off to Jamaica, such uninformed Americans ask "‘how is Jamaica
these days?’" in a "tone people usually reserve for discussions of Sarajevo" (108). Thomas rejects
the comparison. While he admits that "there have been uneasy times in the past," he contends that
not only "regulars," but even the "new faces," especially Europeans, who arrive every day are now
"quite or ease" (147; emphasis added).
Cliff might prefer that such tourists were less easy and more concerned. In one prose
poem, for example, a narrator from the island responds to a male tourist who seems to have
accepted an invitation to, in the words of the tide, "Make It Your Own" (Look Behind). The tourist
is pleasantly surprised because he "‘had been warned’” that "‘Jamaicans are arrogant,’" but "‘No
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one at [his] hotel seemed belligerent. Or angry” (81). He is pleased because the island is so
"beautiful”: "the sands—‘so white’—and the sea ‘at least five shades of blue.’ / ‘And [he]
understand[s] a reef keeps the sharks from the beaches. That’s lucky’" (80). The narrator, who
does not yet appear belligerent, or angry, "responds” silently: "Only for you, massa." For the
white sands belong to the tourist hotels; "native beaches are stony black—volcanic.” Native beaches
have "underwater sinkholes” and are unprotected by reefs. Sharks do attack; the narrator has "seen
the gray-skin sails circling, the sun lighting their passage through the waves" (80). It is only when
his persistent obliviousness leads her to respond out loud that he complains, because he can’t
comprehend why, "‘you seem to have gotten so hostile—all o f a sudden’" (84). He arrogantly tries
to explain that whites may simply be frightened by blacks, as in South Africa, for example, and that
blacks should be willing to practice "‘constructive engagement’" (83). The narrator is frustrated,
however, because he is not frightened, and she tells him: "‘I sometimes wish we had it in our
power to terrify you. And that your terror would come from a righteous place, and not the usual
source o f your fear—whatever image you have projected onto us. I wish you were swearing about
our power.’” But she is forced to acknowledge his power when she implies that her final wish is
impossible: "‘I wish we could destroy you without harming ourselves.’" What her sense of
belligerent defeat admits, in part, is that Jamaica needs the "money" that he reminds her the tourists
bring with them (84). The force o f the poem, howdfcr, makes an appeal for a different kind of
tourist, with a different kind of relationship to the country and the population.
As a final incentive to his readers, Thomas attempts to reinforce the harmless nature o f this
paradise for anyone who is "self-assured" and can "handle it" (145, 147). He observes that they
can "snorkel out to visit the colony o f harmless nurse sharks who live under our reef” (147;
emphasis added). And he also refers to a new kind o f tourist—he offers his readers the supposedly
comforting news that "Prosperous Americans o f color come here to commune with their African
roots” (147). These African-American tourists may come to Jamaica for a different reason than he
does, but the gist of his article implies that such "communion” is also an easy thing and that these
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new tourists enjoy the same kind o f easy relationship with the island that the white tourists like him
treasure. I would suggest that the tourists whom Thomas describes, including himself, are able to
travel so easily, not simply because they are self-confident, but because, as tourists, they refuse to
engage in the kind of "world'-travelling that Lugones advocates.2
Ju n e Jo r d a n : U n e a s y T r a v e l
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"W o r l d "

o f the

H o t e l D o m e s t ic

The Black American writer June Jordan, by contrast, suggests that real communion is
never easy, nor should it be. She reports that her 1982 vacation in the Bahamas was decidedly
uneasy. Although she is West Indian, she lives and teaches in Brooklyn, and she shares, to a
certain extent, the desires o f the kind of tourists whom Kincaid excoriates. For she also wants to
"rest" and she has chosen to stay at the British Colonial Hilton, in part, for reasons of safety: "I did
not want to be harassed by the middle-aged waiter," she writes, "or his nephew. I did not want to
be raped by anybody (white or Black) at all and I calculated that my safety as a Black woman alone
would best be assured by a multinational hotel corporation” (41). She is also on a limited budget.
The hotel is expensive and she needs to be careful about how much money she spends on local
souvenirs. But the kinds o f things which Kincaid suggests "must never cross [the] mind” of tourists
who intend to preserve their sense of holiday at all costs, repeatedly enter Jordan’s mind, and she
must deal with them, not by "handling" them in the self-confident manner that Thomas admires, but
by searching for a way to deal with their real, messy consequences.
Jordan’s sense o f dis-ease began with the ad for the hotel, which depicts a middle-aged
Black man in a tuxedo who, the photographed scene promises, "is so delighted to serve you he will
wade into the water to bring you Banana Daquiries while you float! More precisely, he will wade
into the water, fully clothed, oblivious to the ruin o f his shoes, his trousers, his health, and he will
do it with a smile" (39). This ad insidiously suggests that tourists are welcome to be carefree and

2 The two reasons may be closely connected, however. For the self-assurance that Thomas
describes may also be associated with the kind o f "arrogant perception" that Lugones criticizes as
the perspective of the conqueror who travels without engaging in "world”-travelling.
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oblivious to any injustice because the people who serve them also seem carefree, unaware o f any
harm.
When Jordan participates in the ’careless games’ o f tourists who ’harmlessly” kill time by
bargaining ’down the price o f handwoven goods* as much as they ’dare,’ she realizes that she is
one of a ’weird succession o f intruders’ who, to use C liffs terms, have made the island their own
(40). If she risks ’going broke on her first vacation afternoon” by paying too much, the women
who ’work their sense of beauty* into straw hats and bags ’risk not eating’ if she doesn’t buy their
goods. The institutions o f tourism, she believes, make them ’parties to a transaction designed to set
[them] against each each other” (41). Jordan recognizes that tourists, including her, continue the
"colonial consequences” that make up the ’history’ o f the Bahamas, as the brochure in her hotel
room describes the invasions begun by Columbus and continued by Loyalists fleeing ’the newly
independent states” after the American Revolution, as well as by Confederates fleeing the Union
after the War between the States (39-40). Concerns about race and class inequity intrude on her
consciousness as she reflects on the contradictions between the ’freedom* that this succession of
intruders wants and enjoys and the life o f humbling servitude that the Black population struggles to
endure.
Such consciousness, however, does not remove the difficulties of real communion.
Connections of or across race, or class, or gender are not "automatic” (46). Potential conflicts
become apparent when Jordan thinks about the values that ’O live,” the maid whose service Jordan
is encouraged to "rate,” and she might not share. If Jordan were to explain why she chose to stay
at this neo-colonial hotel, she imagines that Olive would respond with an indignant question full o f
heterosexist and antifeminist assumptions: "‘and why in the first place you come down you without
your husband?”

When Jordan tries to imagine how she might answer, she affirms the value she

places on her own freedom-she would probably try to talk about "my ‘rights’ and my ‘freedom’
and my ‘desire’ and a slew o f other New World values" (41).
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But Jordan is unwilling to simply accept the difficulties that their differences pose as
indications o f an irresolvable quandary. Rather, she attempts to 'travel,” as Lugones suggests, to
Olive’s 'w o rld .' W hen she does, she concludes that not only white histories, but Black histories,
and women’s studies histories must begin to care more about women like Olive and to respect and
value the practices of care. For the fault lies not only with the white 'h isto ries' like the one
summarized with the hotel’s tips for travellers, but also with Black history courses, as well as
Women’s Studies curricula that 'exclude from their central consideration those people who neither
killed nor conquered anyone as the means to new [and, I would emphasize, ‘free’] identity, those
people who took care of every one of the people who wanted to become ‘a person,’ those people
who still take care o f the life at issue: the ones who wash and who feed and who teach and who
diligently decorate straw hats and bags with all o f their historically unrequired gentle love' (44-45).
Jordan is compelled to ask herself several times, in several ways, why Olive should care about her
rights, her freedom, her desires, unless Jordan is willing to 'd o something, for real, about” Olive’s
(41).
On her way back to Brooklyn, Jordan remembers an incident involving two female students
who were active in separate liberation struggles. Cathy, an Irish student active in the campus IRA
affiliate, had volunteered to help a stranger, Sokutu, a refugee from South African apartheid.
Jordan thinks about the 'connection' the two women made because Cathy helped to take care of the
woman suffering from the battering rage of an alcoholic husband and became her friend. And
Jordan concludes that what will make freedom real is not simply organized political activity but
making connection real: ”1 felt how it was not who they were but what they both knew and what
they were both preparing to do about what they know that was going to make them both free at
last" (49).
P r a c t ic in g F r e e d o m

w it h
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As I indicated earlier, the tourists whom Thomas describes refuse, by contrast with Jordan,
to travel where they are ill at ease—in particular, they refuse to travel, in Lugones’s terms, to the
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’worlds* o f the caregivers who make their vacations so carefree. Alison Bailey, who also adopts
Lugones’s theory o f "world" travel in an article on "Locating Traitorous Identities,” works with
some complementary terms that might be adapted to understand both the desire for and also the
resistance to such carefree travelling. Bailey rearticulates some o f the insights developed by the
feminist epistemologist and philosopher o f science, Sandra Harding, in her 1991 Whose Science?

Whose Knowledge?: Thinking from Women’s Lives, in order to refocus from Harding’s discussion of
traitorous identities or locations to her own discussion o f traitorous performances. While Bailey
focuses her discussion on the performance o f o r resistance to "whitely" behavior, her analysis may
be applied to various kinds of privileged behavior, including privileged practices o f freedom.
Tourists like Thomas might be said to enact "privilege-evasive" scripts—scripts "which
might be said to have unreflective perspectives” on race, class, gender, or other sources o f privilege
(37). "The repeated animation" of such unreflective "whitely" scripts as "being nervous around
people of color [or] avoiding eye contact with them ,” in Bailey’s analysis, "reinscribes a racial
order in which white lives, culture, and experiences are valued at the expense o f the lives of
persons of color" (36). Thomas and tourists like him, who animate the scripts o f carefree
travelling, reinscribe in many ways the scripts that constituted the ideal of freedom in terms of
plantation living sans souci.
Traitors who would resist the assumptions o f privilege, by contrast, must attempt to
animate "privilege-cognizant" scripts.3 As Bailey describes it, the ability to become cognizant
depends on the willingness to listen to, and to learn a new way of seeing from the perspective of,
the kind of people whom Harding identifies as "outsiders within." The Black female domestic-in
the plantation household o r the upper-class white household, for example—provides Bailey with an

3 These terms could also be used to describe the kinds of efforts that Clare Savage makes
in C liffs novels. Clare’s return "home” to Jamaica as a young adult would then be understood as a
result o f "world”-travelling, of seeing herself, for example, through the eyes o f her childhood
friend, Zoe. I would suggest that Cliff’s novels try to encourage such "world"-travelling in her
readers also.
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illustration o f the kind o f person who is excluded from the privileges of these patriarchal settings,
but whose work o f caring for the privileged allows her an insider’s view of the lives o f the
privileged inhabitants and an ability to recognize contradictions in their lives (28-29). Persons of
privilege, however relative, can become cognizant by travelling to the ’worlds’ o f such domestic
caregivers. Traitors make a choice; they try to understand the price of privilege and search for
ways to disrupt the constant reinscription of whitely or other privileged scripts (37). Becoming a
traitor requires ongoing practice. Bailey asserts: ’An occasional traitorous act does not a traitor
make. Truly an im atin g a privilege-cognizant white script requires that traitors cultivate a character
from which traitorous practices flow* (38). In a sense, the traitorous person can never think o f
himself or herself as "free at last”; for freedom exists only in the practice.
It is precisely this kind of traitorous character that enables Jordan to attend to, and care
about, the domestics in the tourist resort, the setting that more than any other revives the plantation
-literally, in the restoration of Great Houses, for example, and symbolically, in the practice of
freedom that depends on the servitude of others but refuses to worry or to be ’overly” solicitous
about the caregiver’s freedom. That traitorous predisposition encourages Jordan to search for
another understanding o f the freedom that she values so highly. In the process, she avoids changing
place with the colonizer and concludes with a notion o f freedom that involves the ongoing practice
of care.
The focus on challenging and disrupting privileged scripts can give both ’traitors” and
’outsiders within” common cause or political interest, without suggesting that traitors should, or
even could, change places with the less privileged. For these two kinds of ’disloyal subjects” resist
privileged scripts from different locations (33). The would-be traitor cannot really "inhabit,” but
can only "travel" to the "world" o f the less privileged, or the person who may be less free. This
kind of practice does not necessarily foresee utopia, where everyone will become ’free at last,” for
the performance o f traitorous scripts, as Bailey predicts, are not likely to be perfect (39). As the
history o f freedom struggle depicted by lem m ing, Cliff, Mowry, and others also predicts,
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privilege-cognizant traitors, like all others engaged in freedom struggle, run the risk o f becoming
the more common kind o f traitor who betrays freedom struggle. But in the ongoing effort to
develop a character conducive to radical politics and greater freedom, the would-be traitor would be
willing, at least temporarily, to forego the ’luxury o f retreating to a safe [or, I would add, carefree]
space’ (40). And he or she would attempt instead to anim ate a script with an alternative value-a
practice o f freedom with care.
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